



POLICY

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~ D-24#103 IRAN

~~WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT~~  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

21 DEC 1978

SECDEF HAS SEEN

21 DEC 1978

DIA

Minimal DIA-equity information not to be  
disclosed to the public. This information is  
the result of a security review. JCS 18 20118

12/21/78  
SRP - We  
ought explore  
further the  
options I have  
checked, when  
then show or indicate  
action.  
cc: CD MB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Sensitive U.S. Military Equipment in Iran

Attached is a paper from the Joint Chiefs of Staff together with a cover memo from Dan Murphy on the sensitive U.S. military equipment in Iran.

You will note from the JCS paper that BUCOM is identifying the precise location of all sensitive items and that ISA and R&B may add to the list of sensitive equipment.

Wednesday night, December 20th, Ike Pappas of CBS news reported that "sources say the United States is prepared to take what they called appropriate action, possibly removing the F-14's and Phoenix missiles, or destroying them on the ground if it appeared they might fall into hostile hands in Iran." Tom Ross has no idea where this story came from.

IRAN 092

Stanley R. Resor

CFA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO: DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT. DATE: 02-18-2015

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Exempt from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification  
Date: 11/17/07  
By: 11/17/07

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016

21 DEC 78

330-81-0212, box 8, Iran 092, 1978

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Downgraded by: [unclear]  
Date: 11/17/07  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

COPY NO. 1B

~~WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT~~

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-00424

15-m-0505  
11/138

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POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

21 DEC 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)

SUBJECT: Sensitive U.S. Military Equipment in Iran

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016

Attached is an expanded Joint Staff paper on sensitive equipment. We have been working closely with them in its development. I believe the paper addresses the questions raised as a result of your previous review, but I want also to provide you with the following amplifying remarks as background:

- "High sensitivity" items in the paper were so identified to safeguard our advanced technology. In non-technical terms, loss of those sensitive items associated with the F-14 aircraft and Phoenix missile would assist the Soviets in developing equipment or methods to counter the tactical advantage the systems give us. Compromise of the AN/AMG-9 fire control system on the F-14, for example, would reveal the technology that permits us simultaneously to track and shoot down multiple targets with a single interceptor. This is an area in which we now have an estimated 6-10 year lead over the USSR. Compromise of the electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment on the F-14 would reveal to the Soviets the degree to which we have exploited their radar systems and the degree to which we are able to react to their defensive threats. Such a loss would increase the vulnerability of all our aircraft (not merely the F-14) in combat to a degree that cannot be quantified, but would most likely be grievous.

- Items identified as having "medium sensitivity" are those which an enemy can exploit through examination to develop similar types for his own use (a process known as "reverse engineering"). The HARPOON and HAWK missiles fall into this category.



Review on 20 Dec 1998  
Reason 2-301 (C) (6&7)

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

15330X5), (G)

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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More guidance is required on which of these options, if any, need to be developed further. It is also important to remember that time for detailed planning will be required before any operation could be initiated.

*Dan*

Daniel J. Murphy  
Admiral, USN (Ret.)  
Deputy

Attachment 1  
a/s

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

13M 2599 19/0  
13 DEC 1978

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY

Subject: Sensitive Equipment, Iran (S) IS 3.3(b)(5), (6)

1. ~~(S)~~ Pursuant to your request, the following information on possible disposition of sensitive US manufactured military equipment presently in the Iranian inventory is provided.



3. ~~(S)~~ The attached preliminary point paper, which addresses the recovery of certain sensitive US military equipment under Iranian control, is provided for information.

4. ~~(S)~~ The attached military options do not appear attractive. It is evident if this matter is to be pursued further detailed study would be required.

*Philip D. Shutler*  
PHILIP D. SHUTLER  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Director for Operations

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016

Attachments  
a/s

~~CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3~~  
~~DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION~~  
~~OR (X) REVIEW~~  
~~IS: 1 Dec 1998~~  
~~EXTENDED BY:~~  
~~REASON:~~

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

POINT PAPER

I. SUBJECT: Sensitive US Military Equipment in Iran ~~(TS)~~

II. PURPOSE: To address recovery of certain sensitive US manufactured military equipment currently under Iranian control.

III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. Classification of Sensitivity

- Based on three discreet effects if item is compromised:

-- High Sensitivity: Ability of USSR to identify and exploit capabilities of new systems (before US could modify or replace).

-- Medium Sensitivity: "Reverse engineer" equipment to compromise a US technological advance.

-- Low Sensitivity: Employment of equipment in a means antithetical to US interests.

- Assume the items identified as High and Medium sensitivity will remain so but other equipment not yet identified will be placed on list.

- EUCOM is presently identifying the precise location of all known High, Medium, and Low sensitivity items.

- ISA and DDR&E are expanding the list of sensitive equipment. It is not complete at this time.

B. Security

- US - Iran General Security and Information Agreement, June 1974, prohibits disclosure of information to a third country without prior consent of the government which furnished the information.

-- Agrees to material security inspection of furnished equipment and information.

-- Latest Iranian inspection, August 1978, covered AWACS support. Security was considered adequate.

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- Next DSAA inspection of TAFT - Iran is scheduled for mid-January 1979.
- US technicians assist in maintaining the F-14A and Phoenix missile and have access to most components and associated publications.

C. Sensitive Equipment (see Attachment)

- The F-14A Interceptor and associated Phoenix (AIM-54) missile are considered highly sensitive in Iranian hands. Sensitive component sub-systems include:
  - AN/AWG-9 FCS.
  - AN/AWM-23 test set.
  - AN/ALR-45 (V) ECM set.
  - AN/ALR-50 (V) ECM set.
  - AN/ALQ-100 ECM set.
  - DSM-130 test set (Phoenix Missile).
- The HARPOON surface/air to surface missile (RGM-84A) and the improved HAWK missile with the AN/TSG-73 missile minder are of a medium degree of sensitivity.

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D. Political Considerations

- [REDACTED]
- Equipment is under the sovereignty of Iran even though of US origin.
  - The only legal action is re-purchasing the equipment from the existing Iranian Government.

E. Conditions under which action may be taken

- Iranian military remains loyal to the Shah (no action required).
- Neutralist government with potential compromise of US equipment.
  - Negotiation for return of equipment by re-purchasing.

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
(S) (S) (S) (S)

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- Request sanitizing equipment.
- Marxist government with likely compromise of US equipment to USSR.
- Some Iranian military remains friendly to US.



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
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JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)



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


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JS 33(b)(5), (6)



APPROVED BY Philip D. Shutler Director, J-3

Prepared by: MAJ [REDACTED]  
Special Operations Division  
Ext [REDACTED]

JS 5 U.S.C § 552 (b)(6)

OSD 5 U.S.C § 552 (b)(6)

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~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

SENSITIVE US MILITARY EQUIPMENT OWNED BY IRAN

High Sensitivity

<u>System</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Location</u>
F-14A	77	Isfahan**/Shiraz
AN/AWG-9 FCS	107	"
AN/AWM-23 Test Set	6	"
AN/ALR-45 (V) ECM set	86	"
AN/ALR-50 (V) ECM set	85	"
AN/ALG-100 ECM set	93	"
AIM-54A Phoenix Missile	274*	Isfahan/Shiraz
DSM-130 Test set	2	"

Medium Sensitivity

<u>System</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Location</u>
I-HAWK Btry	36	Bushahr/Vadati
I-HAWK Missiles	1448	Semnan/Kharg Island
AN-TSQ-73 Missile minder	4	"
HARPOON Missile (RGM-84A)	13	Bandar Abbas
SM-1 Missile	130	Bandar Abbas

\* 340 additional PHOENIX are to be delivered over next three years.  
 \*\* Some operations and technical manuals are located at IIAF headquarters, Tehran.

5 U.S.C. 552

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 12 Apr 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
 Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in Part: X  
 Reason: 33(b)(5)(G) + FOIA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)  
 MDR: 15 -M- 0305

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