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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

August 11, 1978

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15 AUG 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 15 2016

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

HTS

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions -- SCC Meeting on
MBFR, Wednesday, August 9, 1978

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions of the August 9 SCC meeting
on MBFR.

US representatives should suggest to German and British representatives
in the forthcoming Trilateral consultations that Allied negotiators be
authorized to make selective use of Western estimates of: (a) [REDACTED]

(b) the total number of personnel in the major formations of each
Eastern direct participant; (c) the total number of personnel in all
the divisions of each Eastern direct participant; and (d) [REDACTED]

In the event of Allied agreement to this approach, US representatives
should press for early Allied agreement on intelligence estimates
that are more compatible with US estimates than are the current
estimates. When the above estimates are tabled, the US MBFR
Delegation should not be drawn into any discussion of the sources
and methods behind the Western estimates. The Delegation should
press the East to break its data down further.

USD 3.3(b)(1)
CIA 3.3(b)(1)
CIA
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) > 25Yrs

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski

~~SECRET~~
~~(By [REDACTED] Brzezinski)~~

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380 [REDACTED] 820.2 MBFR. (Gal-Dan)

SEC DEF [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

August 9, 1978

Time and Place: 11:30 am to 1:10 pm, White House Situation Room

Subject: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

Participants:

State

Mr. Leslie Gelb (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)
Mr. Steven Ledogar (Director, Office of NATO Affairs)
Mr. Jonathan Dean (MBFR Delegation)

Defense

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
Mr. Stanley Resor (Under Secretary for Policy)
Mr. David McGiffert (Assistant Secretary for International Security)

JCS

Lt General William Smith (Asst. to the Chairman, JCS)
Maj Gen Charles Sniffin (JCS, MBFR Representative)

CIA

Mr. Robert Bowie (Director, Natl. Foreign Assessment Center)
[REDACTED] (Director, Theater Forces)

ACDA

Mr. Paul Warnke
Mr. John Newhouse (Asst. Director, Intl. Security Programs Bureau)

White House

Mr. David Aaron

NSC

Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. James Thomson
Mr. Greg Treverton

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

THE SCC met on MBFR, looking to the next round of negotiations with the East in late September and upcoming Trilateral meetings with the British and the Germans in mid-September. With the Western initiative

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
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Reason: 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)
MDR: 15 -M- 0265

~~SECRET - XGDS (B)(3)~~

(By authority: Z. Brzezinski)

and the Eastern counterproposal now on the table, the SCC agreed that we should continue to work within the current framework and that no radical changes in the Western framework should be considered at this time. The SCC agreed that the major element in the Western approach for the next round should be to increase pressure on data and to provide incentives for the East to agree to additional data exchanges that could illuminate further the sources of the discrepancies between Eastern and Western figures. These discrepancies take on increased importance with Eastern acceptance of our common ceiling goal, since it is heavily dependent in its effects on the data used to calculate reductions. /

On the elements of the data approach, the following was decided:

- (1) There were two views on the question of whether the West should table on a selective basis Western estimates of the strength of the Eastern forces:

-- The West should proceed with selective use of Western estimates as suggested by the Delegation. We should expedite early Allied agreement to US estimates of the strength of Eastern forces and table these newly agreed NATO estimates instead of the existing 1976 NATO estimates which are not consistent with US estimates. OSD, State and ACDA support this approach because they believe it will increase the pressure on the East to disaggregate its data further and will respond to the East's demand that the West table some of its estimates. ✓

-- The West should not table its intelligence estimates but should continue to use approximate figures to challenge the East. The JCS feel that it is the East's responsibility to provide further data on its forces. CIA was concerned that tabling Western estimates would shift the focus of the discussion from the East's figures to the West's estimates, the bulk of which are based on evidence that cannot be discussed with the East. CIA was also concerned that the limited tabling of Western estimates proposed by the Delegation would only be the beginning and would create incentives for further tabling of Western intelligence estimates.

- (2) All agreed that we do not need to offer to update the data currently on the table, which reflect strengths as of January 1, 1976. Both East and West have already agreed that data should be updated at some point, but updating now would contribute nothing to advancing the data discussion and could create confusion.

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- (3) All agreed that we should proceed in some way to remove the road block posed by the East's demand to exchange data on average manning levels. The Working Group should develop a detailed approach and clear it with SCC principals. Any disagreements on this approach will be referred for higher-level decision.
- (4) We should proceed to reallocate certain air defense, helicopter and SSM personnel between ground and air, along the lines suggested by the East. The Working Group should ensure that this reallocation results in all like forces being allocated alike between ground and air forces. (The Germans should be consulted on Pershing.)
- (5) The Working Group should study and develop procedures for different definitions of the forces to be covered by MBFR.

The SCC also reviewed possible responses to the East in non-data areas:

- (1) We should discuss with the FRG and UK the possibility of Western European nations making an explicit commitment on the size of their ultimate Phase II manpower reductions before any Phase I reductions begin. This offer would be made to the East contingent upon:
 - (a) Eastern agreement to a common collective ceiling with sublimits on US and Soviet forces only;
 - (b) Eventual agreement on data;
 - (c) Eastern commitment not to use these reduction figures as a precedent for post-reduction national limitations.

This proposal would partially meet the Soviet desire to know the size of German manpower reductions before the Soviets make any reductions.

- (2) The other possible changes to the Western position that were discussed in the Working Group paper are premature at this stage.
- (3) We should not consider any changes in the Western nuclear offer until we have a better sense of our strategy on the long-range theater nuclear force hardware and arms control options now under study in PRM-38. We should make this view clear to the UK and FRG in advance of the upcoming Trilateral consultations.

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(4) We should continue to press for Allied agreement to our entire associated measures package, which is now under study in NATO. If German opposition to some measures persists at the Trilateral meeting, we will have to decide whether to make a political level effort to gain German agreement. These measures would have important security impact and are quite important politically with Congress.

All these ideas should be advanced to the UK and FRG -- with special concern for German sensitivities to national limitations -- prior to the September Trilateral consultations.

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