


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Iran Dec 90



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Date: 05 MAR 2016

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with the Shah of Iran (U) -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

TIME AND PLACE: Tuesday, 15 November 1977, Working Luncheon, James Madison Room, (8th Floor, State Building) 1300-1430 (discussion could last to 1500) and 1530-1630 (+ 30 minutes buffer) at Blair House.

(FYI. Issues are likely to be raised by the Shah at either or both of the following meetings with you. End FYI)

WORKING LUNCHEON PARTICIPANTS: See Tab B.

BLAIR HOUSE PARTICIPANTS:

US

IRAN

Secretary of Defense + *Mr. Hanson*
ASD/ISA McGiffert
Ambassador Sullivan
LTG Fish
DASS/NESA Sober
DASD Janka -- notetaker
RADM Hanson

Shahanshah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
PHONETIC: Pah-la-VEE
ADDRESSED: Your Imperial Majesty
Ambassador Zahedi

IRAN 09/11/77

5 U.S.C. § 552

CHECKLIST:

- Nuclear Energy (raised by State)
- Human Rights (raised by State)
- Indian Ocean (raised by State)
- Purchase of 140 additional F-16s (raised by President in AM)
- Replacement aircraft for F-4s and F-5s (raised by President in AM)
- Release of electronic warfare items (DoD if raised by Shah)
- Coproduction of surface-to-surface missiles (DoD if raised by Shah)
- Command, control and communications (recommend DoD raise)

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, FSI, WHS
Date: 05 MAR 2016 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)
MDR: 15-M-0292

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EXEMPT FROM EO 13526, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OSD S.S. 313 Date: 4 March 2002
Review/Declassify On: 31 Dec 2007
Other Agency Equivalency: TBD

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330-80-0017, box 69, Iran 091.112, 1977

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~~(S)~~ SETTING

The Shah's last visit to Washington was in May 1975 at which time he requested the AWACS and participated in a flight of the E-3A. This trip follows the more than two year review process which culminated in the October 1977 signing of the AWACS LOA by the Government of Iran. Fresh on the Shah's mind, therefore, will be the Administration's struggle with the Congress over the Iranian AWACS and what impact that struggle will have on future arms transfer policy regarding Iran.

This visit comes at a time when the mood in Congress clearly calls for restraints in arms sales by the USG in general and to Iran in particular. It can be expected that behind the Shah's requests for particular defense related items will be his search for a signal of reaffirmation of the continuity of USG resolve to continue to serve Iran's military needs -- as perceived by the Shah. Our challenge is to assuage both the Shah and the Congress.

It is expected that the President will personally discuss with the Shah the arms transfer policy in general as it relates to Iran, his decision on the 140 additional F-16s and the replacement aircraft issue. All other defense related issues probably will be deferred to you for discussion at the working luncheon, immediately thereafter with Secretary Vance and Mr. Brzezinski or by you at the Blair House meeting.

BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

~~(S)~~ Personal Notes and Observations: A stock biography of the Shah is at Tab A. Not included in the biography is that the Shah is a very persuasive individual. This is a key point in that past Administrations have found it extremely difficult to say "no" to the Shah unless it could be clearly shown that the turndown (1) was in the best interests of Iran; (2) was not released to any foreign government; and (3) would be reviewed again in the future. He is also an impatient man who desires to see the results of his White Revolution (discussed later) in his lifetime. He is on a force building timetable that cannot necessarily be reconciled by traditional USG threat analysis. It has been said that the Shah is driven by a great need to prove his worthiness as heir to a long-family tradition of fighting men. The Shah is a self-proclaimed divinely ordained man with a mission, who easily perceives denial as a serious challenge to his self-esteem.

Therefore, in negotiating with the Shah, it may be assumed that any statement or action which might be construed as a personal affront will be so construed by him. Denials must be couched very carefully so as to avoid the implication that the USG does not fully agree with his perceptions of Iran's destiny.

~~(C)~~ The Role of the Iranian Military: The Shah's stated goal is to create by the mid-1980s an Iran comparable to any one of the major nations of Western Europe of the mid-1970s. His White Revolution (as

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opposed to a Red Revolution which suggests blood letting) encompasses land reform, economic development, literacy and public health. The role of his military is multifaceted and related to the White Revolution. He sees modernization of his military first and foremost for defense against any potential enemy. The rapid military modernization is also looked upon as complementing economic development, improving the nation's literacy and improving public health. A large modern military (Tab D) -- encouraged in part by the USG's Guam Doctrine -- is also to provide a symbol of Iran's sovereignty and independence. The Shah's emphasis on his military tends to put a strain on Iran's limited supply of technically trained military manpower. The heavy demand of private industry for trained personnel at higher wages makes it difficult for the armed forces to keep those who are skilled in modern technologies. The Shah is aware of our concerns in these matters and yet has stepped up his military recruiting programs. He sees his military training programs as a major tool in nation building because in many cases the once illiterate and unskilled conscripts are returned to the civilian sector after two years of military duty as more useful citizens.

The backbone of the military is the career noncommissioned and regular officers -- augmented by the "homafar" (a long-term, contracted technical warrant officer type). The officers typically come from the provinces and have a civilian high school education, followed by training at a military academy, one or more service schools and in many cases training in this country (Tab F).

The officer corps as a whole is conservative and by the time one reaches flag rank he has been exposed to the Western culture -- specifically, American. The military is apolitical and strongly loyal to the Shah. The chain of command, to hinder a military coup by an emerging strong military leader, is intentionally diffuse. The Shah personally is "Chief of Staff" of each of the Services with a joint-like Supreme Commanders Staff maintaining only coordination authority with the Services.

As far as military equipment is concerned, the Shah buys only the most modern equipment available (Tab G). He also purchases military equipment from several countries to further his own foreign policy. He purchases vehicles and automatic weapons from the Soviet Union, missiles and tanks from the UK, helicopters from Italy, small arms from Israel and the Swiss, and ships from France. The preponderance of equipment, however, especially aircraft comes from the U.S. Although he prefers American equipment, he has gone and will go elsewhere if necessary.

Despite much discussion on the subject, it is believed the USG has little leverage over Iran when it comes to the Shah's plans for modernizing its military.

~~(S)~~ Iran's Foreign Relations:

The Shah, although pro-Western, maintains a balanced approach in international affairs -- as indicated in part by his third country arms

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purchases discussed above. Additionally, he has sought and consummated economic agreements with Iran's historical "enemies." Nonetheless, he worries about the Soviet Union and its influence in Iraq's radical regime and Soviet influence in Afghanistan. He is particularly concerned with the current problem of leadership in Pakistan, fearing that a collapse there will invite Soviet intervention.

While we in the USG strain to articulate specific Iranian threats in order to determine the validity of Iranian military hardware requests, the Shah is looking as far as 30 years into the future to develop capabilities of meeting any threat -- which we cannot begin to define now. Therefore, given the Shah's other reasons for acquiring a modern military and the impossibility of conjuring future threats to Iran, attempting to justify his purchases on threat analysis alone could be a futile exercise. Nonetheless, discussion of the U.S. perception of Iran's current threat is at Tab E.

One of the other reasons, alluded to above, for acquiring a modern military is related to the Shah's objective of becoming the dominant power and arbiter in the Persian Gulf. He sees this as an economic necessity in that he believes that only Iran can defend the vital oil routes through the Strait of Hormuz -- through which pass most of the oil for the Western world and Japan. Moreover, recent Soviet and Cuban incursions into Africa have alarmed the Shah, causing him to expand his scope of interest along those oil routes well into the Indian Ocean. We are unaware of any U.S. official discouragement of the Shah's recent utterances on this subject. Our silence in this matter, especially in view of our discussions with the Soviets regarding superpower demilitarization of the Indian Ocean (Tab I), could form the basis for undeclared U.S. support for the Shah's "new" Indian Ocean philosophy.

Close relations with the U.S. remain the cornerstone to the Shah's foreign policy. His perceptions formed on this visit could very well influence our relationships with Iran over the near term. If he is led to believe that the President's arms transfer policy and the mood in Congress have caused a swing in our historic and traditional relationship, we may find him very difficult to deal with in regards to present and future desired U.S. rights, authorizations and facilities arrangements in Iran. We have been unsuccessful generally in convincing the Congress that U.S./Iranian relationships have increased in importance following the Turkey/Greece conflict, vis-a-vis, potential USG objectives in Iran. We must begin to articulate exactly what our national security objectives are relative to Iran. A suggested starting point is to reconcile differing U.S./Iranian understandings of the 1959 Bilateral Agreement (Tab J) between the USG and GOI. The Shah views this agreement as a USG commitment to meet Iran's defense needs, while the USG believes that it merely provided the USG a vehicle to become involved with the Central Treaty Organization of the UK, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan (CENTO). Identical agreements were signed with Turkey and Pakistan. Additional politico-military prognosis information is at Tab K.

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(U) COURTESY POINT

If you have not had the opportunity to listen to the Shah's viewpoints on the politico-military situation in his region, you may want to begin with a request for his evaluation of the situation in his area of interest. (The Shah received his annual DIA regional balance briefing from LTG Tighe mid-Oct 77)

~~(S)~~ ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

1. Purchase of 140 Additional F-16s

Three years ago the Shah first expressed interest in acquiring 300 F-16 aircraft to augment his Air Force. In early 1976 he divided this request into two segments as a result of financial pressures owing to a temporary oil lifting shortfall. The initial purchase was to be limited to 160 aircraft of which we notified the Congress that year. Shortly after we made the notification, he added the remaining 140 planes to his request. We advised Congress of the request for 300 F-16s, but did not increase the sale proposal to include the additional aircraft. The Shah plans that 160 F-16s will provide a two-for-one ratio with his 80 expensive F-14s (in accord with the U.S. concept of high-low mix). The 140 F-16s at a cost of about \$2 billion would be deployed mainly at the new bases Iran is constructing in the south and the east.

USG Position

(FYI. No Presidential decision was made at the time of this writing. Also the President's "going in" position could be modified during his personal meeting with the Shah. End FYI)

It is anticipated that we will agree in principal to supply 140 additional F-16s at the rate of four per month as a continuation of the delivery of Iran's first order for 160 aircraft. Therefore the second increment would start about mid-1983. We would however choose the timing of sending the formal notification to Congress between now and 1980.

Your Talking Points

-Your Imperial Majesty, I believe the President informed you of our willingness to agree in principle in providing the additional 140 F-16s.

--but would retain flexibility in our formal notification of Congress between now and 1980

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- This would allow us to measure the pulse of Congress and better manage a perceived balanced world-wide arms sale reduction.
- Even if we had to wait until 1980 for the notification this would not impact on a smooth F-16 delivery schedule for Iran.
- Because of production limitations and other commitments we could not support more than four F-16s per month for foreign military sales.
- This would allow the second F-16 increment to follow in tandem with the first 160 F-16 increment -- which ends about mid 1983.

Alternative USG Position

No commitment for 140 additional F-16s now. We will study the request later.

Your Talking Points

- Your Imperial Majesty, I believe the President informed you of his decision to restudy your request for 140 additional F-16s.
- I assure you that this decision, which I support, does not signal a USG change in our policy toward Iran.
- The President indicated continuity of US/Iranian relationships when despite his vowed pledge to reduce arms worldwide, he vigorously supported Iran's request for seven AWACS.
- But it is exactly that reason, why we must show restraint now.
- To submit another major arms request to Congress at this time would be counterproductive.
- Congress may disapprove the request.
- It would dilute the President's credibility in his attempt to reduce arms worldwide, thereby reducing the importance of any future requests pertaining to Iran.
- I note that the approved 160 F-16s will continue to arrive in Iran until mid-1983.
- Therefore, we have until mid-1980 to decide.

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2. Replacement Aircraft for F-4s and F-5s

Although Iran is still taking delivery of 209 F-4s and 169 F-5s, the Shah desires to replace both aircraft in the mid-1980s. Candidates are F-16s for the F-5s and the F-18A, F-16, F-15, Europe's multirole combat aircraft (MRCA or TORNADO) and the MIRAGE 2000 for the F-4s. The USG previously had denied 250 F-18Ls as a replacement for the F-4 on PD-13 grounds. The Shah appears to favor the F-18A.

USG Position

(FYI. No Presidential decision was made at the time of this writing. Also the President's "going in" position could be modified during his personal meeting with the Shah. End FYI)

With the exception of 28 F-4Ds, both the F-4s and F-5s have useful lives until the early 1990s. We would prefer that the Shah keep these capable aircraft at least until the late 1980s for absorptive capacity reasons. Nonetheless, it would still be premature to make specific commitments on types of replacement aircraft for the mid-1980's. Moreover, it would be a PD-13 exception to commit the F-18A until it became operational in our own forces -- about 1982.

Your Talking Points (agreement in principle)

- Let me assure His Imperial Majesty, that the Department of Defense agrees with long range planning for modernization of military forces.
- And we agree in principle to replace Iran's American aircraft with follow-on American aircraft.
- I would like to point out that our long range plans call for employing the F-4s, a very capable aircraft, into the 1990s and we will be logistically supporting other nations' F-4s into the 1990s.
- We would hope that Iran would therefore keep this capable aircraft with growth potential until the early 1990s.
- The F-18A may not be operational until about 1982, therefore, I cannot make any commitment for that aircraft until we are certain where we are going with it.
- We are prepared, however, to indicate our willingness to discuss specific types, amounts and delivery schedules when we get within three to four years of initial delivery.

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~~SECRET~~Alternative Talking Points (no agreement in principle)

-Let me assure His Imperial Majesty, that the Department of Defense agrees with long range planning for modernization of military forces.

-I would like to point out that our long range plans call for employing the F-4s, a very capable aircraft, into the 1990s and we will be logistically supporting other nations' F-4s into the 1990s.

-We would hope that Iran would therefore keep this capable aircraft with growth potential until the early 1990s.

-The F-18A may not be operational until about 1982, therefore, I cannot make any commitment for that aircraft until we are certain where we are going with it.

-I share the President's view that the USG should be sympathetic to Iran's need to replace its aging force with American aircraft when necessary -- but that it is just too soon to address the specifics.

3. Electronic Warfare (ALQ 131 and PAVESPIKE) and COMSEC Releasability:

The Government of Iran has repeatedly sought a more liberal, blanket policy concerning the release of advanced electronic warfare equipment and training. DoD periodically has re-evaluated our position and reaffirmed a policy of case-by-case review. Nonetheless, the Shah is expected to press for a liberal overall policy and the latest in technology and training in order to establish credible capabilities in ECCM and Signal intelligence (SIGINT). He may also press for the latest communications security (COMSEC) equipment.

USG Position (NOFORN)

The areas of electronic warfare (EW) and COMSEC encompass the most sensitive equipment and procedures in the USG arsenal. Despite this, we have been very liberal on a case-by-case basis, on what we have released already to GOI. The joint EW program recommended by the MAAG and cleared by our own Joint Electronic Warfare Coordinating Group and the recent decision on COMSEC by the interagency US/COMSEC Board (U.S. commercial only) represent programs suitable to Iran's needs. We must preserve a policy of case-by-case review to protect USG interests.

Your Talking Points

-With regard to COMSEC, we have just formed a joint US Army, Navy and Air Force team that will work with US industry to

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develop commercial equipment that is compatible with SPRUANCE, AWACS, TSQ-73 Missile Minder (command and control for I HAWK), and other weapons systems, and suitable to prevent compromise of your tactics and our systems' capabilities.

--My appropriate agencies will certify that the selected equipment does provide sufficient protection from compromise and will allow interoperability of weapons systems before we recommend specific purchases to Iran.

-Also, I believe, the joint EW program developed by the MAAG in cooperation with the Iranian Services is a good program.

-We will continue to evaluate each Iranian request and will look favorably on approving those items which are releasable to our friends.

(FYI: Should the Shah press for reconsideration of PAVE SPIKE (TAB N) and the ECM Pod, ALQ 131 previously denied, use the following Talking Points. The Shah believes -- erroneously -- that Israel has approval for the ALQ 131. End FYI)

-We have re-evaluated the previous denials on PAVE SPRIKE and LATAR and we may be prepared to release price and availability on them (TAB N).

--approval of the sale, however, may require Congressional notification.

-The ALQ 131 pod has yet to be fully integrated into our own forces. Therefore, we have not released it to any foreign government.

4. Coproduction (TAB P)

The GOI currently has USG approval to coproduce Bell 214 helicopters, TOW missiles and launchers, MAVERICK (AGM 65A) missiles and to repair F-4 components. Under review are coproduction arrangements for 2.75 in. rockets and an M-47 Tank modernization program. We have, despite repeated requests, denied coproduction arrangements and sale of the AGM 65B. HARPOON, REDEYE and STINGER missile coproduction arrangements also have been denied. (Moreover, REDEYE and STINGER and encapsulated HARPOON have not been released to Iran.) The Shah desires to enhance his defense industry by seeking other coproduction arrangements. He is currently negotiating with Israel (TAB P) and is expected to seek an arrangement with the U.S. on a surface-to-surface missile.

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USG Position

PD-13 prohibits coproduction arrangements with non-exempt countries on all but high usage spare parts and minor assembly of subcomponents. Because of absorptive capacity considerations and possible economic disadvantages for the U.S., no new coproduction arrangement commitments with Iran should be made now.

Your Talking Points:

-The President's arms transfer policy which he has committed his Administration to implement, allows coproduction arrangements only for high usage spare parts and assembly of subcomponents where "significant weapons, equipment, or major components" are concerned.

-My research and engineering organization is presently examining possible coproduction arrangements within the scope of the President's arms transfer policy.

(FYI. If raised by the Shah, acknowledge that this examination includes a review of Iranian request for coproduction of 2.75 inch rockets and on M-47 tank modernization programs. End FYI).

-I note that in the past we have approved coproduction arrangements on Bell 214 helicopters, MAVERICK AGM 65A missiles and TOW missiles and launchers -- as well as approving Iranian repair of F-4 components.

-But until our review is complete, and the limits of the new policy more clearly defined, I do not believe we can make any specific additional comments.

5. WILD WEASEL/SHRIKE

WILD WEASEL (TAB T) is a specially modified ECCM aircraft for seeking and destroying surface-to-air missile (SAM)/radar complexes. We expect the Shah may request this system now because impending F-4 production line closing requires a foreign government's decision to buy F-4s by December 1977. We do not know what specific number of aircraft he has in mind, but estimate that the number would be enough to equip at least one American size squadron (18 aircraft). This would be enough to form two Iranian squadrons of F-4 WILD WEASEL aircraft.

USG Position:

WILD WEASEL can be considered an offensive weapon system which would be difficult under normal circumstances to sell under the security assistance program. Moreover much of its EW equipment and associated tactics are unreleasable.

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Your Talking Points:

- The WILD WEASEL is a specially modified aircraft with systems considered by many as offensive in that the aircraft is designed to cross borders to seek out and destroy fixed missile complexes.
- Specially designed aircraft for offensive missions are not available for sale.
- There is a valid need, however, for a nation to be able to counter mobile SAM emplacements that penetrate borders.
- Therefore, there are some models of an anti-radiation missile (ARM) that we may be prepared to consider (SHRIKE).
 - These missiles can be loaded on your present aircraft and would provide you a capability against mobile SAM sites.
 - This, of course, may also be subject to a review by our Congress.

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6. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C³)

(FYI. If the situation presents itself this subject should be raised by you. End FYI).

General Azhari, Commander of the Iranian SCS -- Supreme Commanders Staff (a JCS-like coordinating staff but without command authority), in 1975 requested a command and control (C²) team to assist Iran to develop a national C² capability. On the eve of departure of the OSD level team, Ambassador Helms cancelled the team, reportedly at the request of General Toufanian, Iranian Vice Minister of War. The request has periodically been raised since then -- most recently this past summer. This time, however, Ambassador Sullivan and General Toufanian are in agreement that help is required to establish a C² program which will net or electronically link [redacted] the commercial Bell International satellite communications system, AWACS, ground radars, I HAWK missiles, UK RAPIER Missiles, data link and non-data link fighters and Naval systems such as SPRUANCE. This request is fraught with danger of enmeshing us in Iranian parochialisms. Do we net these systems under the Imperial Iranian Air Force which its commander desires, or under the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) for maritime operations which the IIN commander may desire, or under the SCS Commander who has no command authority, or under a non-existent joint command? Seasoned Iranian watchers believe that the Shah intentionally wants the Services to be separately commanded by him -- to diminish the likelihood of a coup. If this is indeed fact, then a logical joint integration of systems into a well planned C² or C³ (plus communications) architecture is indeed a very difficult if not an unresolvable problem.

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USG Position

Before C³ interfaces are addressed, doctrinal issues must be resolved. Logical joint integration of systems would suggest establishment of joint battle commands under a well defined National Command Authority (NCA). Only the Shah can decide these doctrinal issues which are basic and preliminary to designing C³ architecture.

Your Talking Points:

(FYI. This is a delicate subject. We believe an organizational structure must be designed first which will have command and control over combined land, sea, and air forces before the weapon systems purchased by Iran can be effectively netted. However, it is not for the USG to recommend foreign military organizational structures. End FYI.)

-Your Imperial Majesty, we have an Iranian request for assistance in integrating all your data link and voice systems into a command and control system with appropriate communications security.

--Our DoD jargon refers to this as C³ for command, control and communications.

-C³ is a function of a command structure beginning with what we call the National Command Authority.

-In our case, the National Command Authority is exercised by the President or me directly to the joint or unified commands and finally down to the combat unit commander.

--JCS are the agents.

--Our combat unit commander is under command and control of his unified or joint commander, not his military service.

-As I understand the Iranian command structure in Iran, the National Command Authority begins with the Shahanshah and goes directly to each of the Services -- and there are no joint commands. However,

--to effectively use weapons systems requires integration which would suggest joint battle staffs. At any rate, the answer to this organizational question determines the systems architecture.

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- This poses a problem which we believe only the Shahanshah can solve.
- Although we have asked our JCS to recommend options for C³ there still remains the doctrinal issue of command structure which must first be addressed at the highest level.
- It is not for the U.S. Government to recommend the establishment of joint commands.
- It would also be difficult for us to recommend integration of systems -- for example, netting AWACS/SPRUANCE/FIGHTERS for maritime operations without first knowing what organization will have command authority over maritime operations involving aircraft -- or for that matter ground operations involving aircraft.
- We seek your advise in this matter.

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D.E.M.

David E. McGiffert
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

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