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ERW

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Do not ~~last~~ issue
any statement re ERW
J.C. ✓

NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Harold Brown ^{HB}
Cyrus Vance ^{CV}

SUBJECT: ERW and Alliance Consultations

We have been working with the NSC to prepare a plan for Alliance consultations on your three-part policy on enhanced radiation weapons: a US production decision, an offer to forego ER deployment if the Soviets will forego deployment of the SS-20, and Alliance willingness to accept deployment of ER in two years if arms control is unsuccessful. We are seeking to implement the policy in meetings of the North Atlantic Council on March 20 and 22.

We have agreed to a British draft summing up statement to be made by Secretary General Luns at the conclusion of the March 22 meeting which would express an Alliance consensus in support of the policy. (Tab 1). The FRG has not agreed to this draft statement even though the Germans want an expeditious resolution of the issue. While the FRG supports production and deployment, it prefers a linkage to Soviet tanks outside MBFR and wishes to present their arguments during the consultations. However, the FRG has said that if an Alliance consensus develops around the SS-20 linkage, they will join it. It is not clear whether the Germans will hold to their tank argument until the second NAC meeting, which could jeopardize a consensus, or whether they will fall off during the March 20 preliminary meeting.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +5 USC § 552
Date: 20 May 2016 Authority: EO 13526
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Date: MAY 20 2016

JC, NSA, Brz Mat, Subj File, Enhanced Radiation Weapons and Radiological Warfare, 2-4/78
box 17, # 2

15-M-0338

I am going to communicate with Foreign Minister Genscher today and try to persuade him to follow the FRG to join us in supporting the SS-20 linkage on March 20, after they have made their case for tanks.

We are still having varying degrees of difficulty with the Dutch, Danes, Belgians and Norwegians over deployment element. However, we believe clear FRG support for production and deployment will help bring these Allies around or at least induce them to remain silent so that a consensus can be expressed.

Our plan for next week is for the preliminary March 20 meeting to demonstrate an Alliance consensus supporting our approach and to set the stage for a conclusive meeting on March 22. Assuming we are successful, I propose that a White House announcement of the three-part ER policy be made the morning of March 23 along the lines of the draft at Tab 2. Also on March 23, Secretary General Luns would make a supportive statement in Brussels.

While ACDA does not object to the development and deployment of ER weapons per se as part of a NATO modernization program, ACDA believes that coupling this action with SS-20 is not a credible arms control trade off, and that serious consideration therefore should be given to the German proposal to link ER to Soviet tank reduction outside MBFR. ACDA believes such a proposal, which involves closely related limitations, would be more credible to public opinion and have some chance of leading to useful negotiations.

This is probably true.

USUN opposes production of ER weapons on the grounds that it would seriously jeopardize our credibility and our whole effort at the upcoming UN Special Session Disarmament.

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We continue to support your decisions made beginning last November in your letter to Chancellor Schmidt and which we have pursued since then.

The issue has festered too long already at considerable cost to Alliance unity. The decision will be made more difficult the longer we wait to follow through in giving the clear lead the Alliance expects of us. The SS-20 offer is an appropriate arms control move for the reasons it was originally advanced in November. The German proposal is potentially highly complex - outside MBFR but what new form? How big a reduction? Covering what area?

To defer pressing for final Alliance action now on our proposal would mean a long delay, until at least after the SSOD and the NATO summit, and such delay would make the problem worse not better.

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