

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Doc # 138

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: ER Weapons

You still need to make decisions to implement your April 7 statement that you intend "to proceed with the modernization of the Lance missile nuclear warhead and the 8-in. artillery weapon system, leaving open the option of installing ER elements." The modernization programs are currently halted awaiting your decision. If continued, this halt could become a public issue. You need to decide how to proceed with warhead modernization in general and how far to go in producing ER elements.

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Date: MAR 30 2016

Warhead Modernization

At this stage, you realistically have three options for warhead production:

- (a) Do not proceed with modernization at this time.
- (b) Modernize with the existing ER designs. Leave out the ER elements for now. ✓
- (c) Modernize with the existing ER designs, with ER elements installed (in other words, produce ER weapons).

Department of Energy Document Review	Determination: (Circle Number(s)) 1. Classification Retained 2. Upgraded To: <u>RD</u> 3. Contains No DDI: Classified Info 4. Coordinate With: <u>ASCC</u> 5. Declassified 6. Classified Info Bracketed 7. Other (Specify):
	Review Date: <u>1/14/15</u> Authority DC: <u>HS-60 Reviewer</u> Derived From: <u>DD-1</u> Declassify On: Review Date: <u>1/13/2015</u> Authority: <u>DD</u>

Option (a) is inconsistent with your April 7 statement and therefore, in my view, unacceptable. If it became public knowledge, a decision to delay modernization would require you to demonstrate that Soviet restraint has occurred, though there is no sign of any.

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~~(By authority: Z. Brzezinski)~~

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JC, USA, Brz Mat, Subj File, Enhanced Radiation Weapons, and Radiological Warfare
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Option (c) would require reopening of consultations with the Allies, and a definitive statement on lack of Soviet restraint. It is my, Harold Brown's and, I believe, Cy Vance's, view that no useful purpose would be served by reopening consultations at this point. The issue remains politically sensitive in Europe; and anti-ER forces in Europe would interpret an early move toward ER production as unwarranted in view of the short time that has elapsed since April 7 and the lack of a specific US arms control proposal. The issues of ER production and Soviet restraint can be taken up later with the major Allies in the context of discussion on gray areas.

I want Harold assess an affidavit (they may be formed)

RECOMMENDATION -- Warhead production


Initiate production of the existing designs, which can accept ER elements, but leaving out ER elements for now Option (b).

Approve Option (b) Alternatively Option (a)
Alternatively Option (c)

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Production of ER Elements

With Option (b) above, you also need to decide how far to go in technical preparations to be ready to convert the warheads to ER later. Since this decision does not involve actual ER warhead production and deployment, we would not be asking for Allied decisions and thus do not need prior Allied consultations. The Allies will be interested, however, and should be informed of the decision. The options are:



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DOE (G.212)
NSC SECTION 6.7(a)
OSD
Section 6.2 (a)

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
OSD
Section 6.2 (a)



The number of steps you take toward production will be viewed as an indicator of your inclinations on ER in general. A middle course is advisable at this stage. Hence, Option 2 appears the best approach. It signals a firm decision to maintain the ER option without beginning to assemble the ER components.

DOE
6.2(a)

NSX SECTION 6.2(a)



Approve: Option 2 Alternatively: Option 1
Option 3
Option 4

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Congressional Attitudes

Congressional sentiment in favor of ER has been increasing. The DOE FY 79 authorization bill has so far proceeded through Congress without restrictions on ER production. The restrictions in the FY 78 bill (the Byrd-Baker amendment) have now lapsed. In a report, the Senate Arms Services Committee recommended the production and stockpiling of ER elements. However, the bill recently passed by the Senate simply authorizes Lance and 8-in. modernization and contains no language either restricting ER production or forcing production of ER components.

↑
We can expedite if necessary after Summit or lack of same.

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