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MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Summary of 16-17 October HLG Meeting

The attached paper summarizes the discussion of our recent HLG meeting in Brussels. Rather than attempt to touch upon all the views expressed at the meeting and reported in the MEMCON we have attempted in this summary to capture the "sense" of the meeting.

I plan to include this summary to the Allies in advance of the next HLG meeting, as part of a paper on Assumptions and Questions required for Cost Effectiveness Analysis.

Enclosure (2)

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SUMMARY OF THE 16-17 OCTOBER HIGH LEVEL GROUP MEETING

This meeting focused on the major military issues associated with the potential deployment of additional long-range TNF capability into Europe. The meeting represented an exchange of views of "responsible officials" not national positions and subject, of course, to the understanding that not all the issues under discussion had been fully studied and understood by the participants. From this meeting, it would thus be unwarranted to suggest that any new consensus emerged. However, the views expressed seemed to narrow the range of possible approaches to satisfy the earlier HLG consensus in favor of an evolutionary upward adjustment in the TNF long range. This first of possibly several successive approximations seemed to indicate general tendencies along the following lines:

- A need to structure a military justification for longer range capability which is suitable for presentation to publics and Parliaments. (Such a rationale would be hinged on the provision of selective use options and combine the requirements for modernization, survivability, flexibility, and improved military capabilities.)
- A sense that diversity of long-range systems is important and that some mix of systems (ballistic and cruise missiles on-shore and off-shore) would be desirable. (There was a stronger attraction to ballistic than to cruise missiles, perhaps because they could be absorbed into existing force structure more invisibly.)
- An appreciation that while targeting should not be a dominant factor in the design of long-range systems, it would be valuable to have a better understanding of the targeting considerations involved in utilizing long-range systems in Selective Employment Plans.
- A recognition that widespread basing was desirable, although politically difficult, from the standpoint of flexibility and survivability.
- A desire to insure survivability in any modernized long-range TNF but not necessarily establishing the criterion of "bolt from the blue" conditions.
- A reaffirmation that the new long-range systems should be capable of striking into the Soviet Union from their bases. This consensus was further refined with the appreciation that the capability is not required to be able to reach Moscow (though a system need not be rejected if it had such a capability).

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- A rejection of any attempt to mirror-image or number for number match the newer relevant Soviet systems. The NATO program should be derived from NATO's perception of its strategic requirements.

- A recognition of the importance in sizing a longer-range force that the deployment be seen as an evolutionary response to growth and changes in the Soviet threat and that the force convey no impression of change in the role of TNF in either the Triad or NATO strategy.

In summary, the discussion tended toward a NATO TNF posture with [REDACTED] consistent with the present understanding of the political and military "requirements" as well as the evolutionary nature of the adjustment. Such numbers should be obtained within the levels presently associated with NATO's TNF [REDACTED]

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The HLG representatives generally appreciated that the burden of procuring and deploying such systems could not rest solely on the US and expressed general sympathy with dual-key and cost-sharing arrangements. However, they also understood that the actual arrangements for basing and programs of cooperation would require agonizing appraisal of national positions before any political decisions could be made.

Finally, in the discussion of alternative force postures, there was no sense that these IOCs must be strictly held to and considerable concern was expressed about the handling and scheduling of discussions with both Parliaments and publics.

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