

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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March 30, 1979
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions (U)

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions of the PRC Meeting on North Africa which was held March 27, 1979. (C)

Christine Dodson
Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

Attachment

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 02 2016

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33082-0205, box 16, Morocco 1979

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POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION MEETING

March 27, 1979

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

SECRET

Time and Place: 3:30 p.m. - 4:35 p.m.
White House Situation Room

Subject: North Africa (U)

Participants:

State

David Newson, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs
Lucy Benson, Under Secretary
for Security Assistance,
Science & Technology
Harold Saunders, Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs

ACDA

Barry Blechman, Assistant
Director, Weapons Evaluation
and Control Bureau

JCS

LTG William Y. Smith
Assistant to Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Treasury

John Lange, Director, Office
of Trade Finance

CIA

Robert Bowie, Director
National Foreign Assessment
Center
Robert Ames, NIO Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs

Defense

David McGiffert, Assistant
Secretary for International
Security Affairs
Owen Roberts, Director,
Africa Region

White House

David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National
Security Affairs

Commerce

Juanita Kreps
Abe Katz, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International
Economic Policies and
Resources

NSC

William Quandt, Staff Member
Jerry Funk, Staff Member

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. [REDACTED] assessment is that Morocco is facing serious problems, largely because of the stagnating economic situation, the continuing Sahara conflict, and the ineffective leadership. These trends may get worse, with serious consequences for U.S.-Moroccan relations. It was agreed that the U.S. has a serious interest in Morocco and in cooperation with King Hassan.

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Morocco's generally moderate stand on Middle East and African issues is a particularly valuable asset. While taking steps to strengthen U.S.-Moroccan relations, however, we should be mindful of our important economic interests in Algeria and of the fluid leadership situation there.

2. The Moroccans have requested \$6 million worth of spare parts for the F-5 aircraft. Until now, this package has been held up because of disagreement on the use of the F-5 in the Sahara. All agencies, with the exception of ACDA, now believe we should go forward with this request. ACDA's dissent is based on the belief that the spare parts will not significantly affect the military situation confronting Morocco and will constitute a technical violation of the U.S.-Moroccan military assistance agreement. Defense and State have determined that the spare parts would not constitute such a violation. Congressional consultations on this case have indicated general support, with the exception of Senator McGovern.

3. Defense and JCS will quietly examine other military items which might be of a particular help to the Moroccans in the present circumstances. Defense believes that inadequate communications equipment and surveillance may be the major problems currently confronting the Moroccan forces. Recommendations should be available within several weeks.

4. All participants felt that the Sahara conflict could not be resolved militarily. At some point, a political settlement will be essential. It is not clear that the time is right for a settlement, nor is there consensus on what possible role the U.S. might play. Consequently, a small study group will be formed to examine diplomatic strategies for beginning the process of accommodation between Morocco and Algeria concerning the Sahara. This group will also explore means for channeling more economic assistance to Morocco, and in particular a resumption of assistance from Saudi Arabia.

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