

-2 FEB 1979 18 55 Doc# 278
NSC752XX

OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Nicaragua (109)
- PRC mtg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

February 2, 1979

1/2 K10

CIA

EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526
3.5(c)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ADMINISTRATOR, AID
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Action Memorandum and Summary of Conclusions
PRC Meeting on Nicaragua TOL

9 FEB 1979
SECDEF HAS SEEN

Nicaragua

Attached is an Action Memorandum from Dr. Brzezinski and the Summary of Conclusions from the January 26, 1979 PRC meeting on Nicaragua. TOL

These documents are to be held very closely. (U)

Christine Dodson
Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

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~~Declassify on February 2, 1980~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUL 13 2016

5 USC 552
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 13 Jul 2016 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)+50 USC 552(b)(2); 100 CFR 401g
MDR: 15 -M- 0430

2 Feb 79

15-0480

330-82-0205, box 19, Nicaragua 1979 SEC DEF CONTR No. 00999
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NSC752XX

February 1, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ADMINISTRATOR, AID
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Nicaragua (S)

The President has approved the Summary of Conclusions for the PRC meeting on Nicaragua of January 26, 1979. (S)

Specifically, the U.S. Government will take the following steps to signal our displeasure with Somoza's intransigence with the mediation effort, and to get some distance between the U.S. Government and Somoza's Government:

- terminate all military assistance and withdraw the Milgroup;
- withdraw the Peace Corps for security reasons;
- reduce all non-essential official personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Managua;
- in a reconvened 17th meeting of O.A.S. Foreign Ministers, consider their report on Nicaragua of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the report of the Mediation Group and obtain as strong a censure of the Somoza regime as possible;
- continue to strongly urge governments likely to sell arms to Somoza or to provide weapons to the Sandinistas not to do so in order to limit escalation of the violence in Nicaragua;
- keep in suspense the two AID loans signed (but never implemented) last August;
- disburse the remainder of the AID loans which have been partially implemented. (S)

The State Department should prepare a public statement and clear it with the appropriate Agencies, including the National Security Council. (S)

~~SECRET~~
review on January 31, 1985

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In addition, State should coordinate briefings for Congressional leaders and appropriate Heads of State. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

Summary of Conclusion of 1/26/79 PRC meeting

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Date: JUL 13 2016

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POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING

January 26, 1979

NSC752XX
HB

Time and Place: 3:40 - 4:30 p.m., White House
Situation Room

Subject: U.S. Policy to Nicaragua

Participants:

State
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
Ambassador William Bowdler, U.S.
Mediator to Nicaragua
Mr. John Bushnell, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs

AID
Administrator John J. Gilligan
Mr. Edward W. Coy, Acting
Assistant Administrator for
Latin America and the
Caribbean

Defense
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Mr. David McGiffert, Assistant
Secretary for International
Security Affairs

NSC
Ambassador Henry Owen
Mr. Robert Pastor

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

JCS
General David Jones, Chairman, JCS
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith, Assistant
to the Chairman

NSC FOIA 5 USC. § 552(b)(3);
50 USC. § 403(g)

CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI
Office of Regional
and Political Analysis Analyst

CIA 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)

OSD 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c) +
FOIA 5 USC. § 552(b)(3);
50 USC. § 403(g)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Purpose of Mediation Effort. There was agreement that we had reached a critical decision point. The moderate opposition (FAO) as grudgingly accepted the mediators' revised proposal, but Somoza as not. Bowdler believes that we cannot break the impasse without making concessions which the FAO and the other two mediators could not accept. The mediators intend to submit a report to the O.A.S. which indicates they have not through mediation been successful in finding a solution to the crisis in Nicaragua. (S)

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Review on January 26, 1985

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2. In Nicaragua. In the short term, Somoza has consolidated his position by significantly strengthening the National Guard. The Sandinistas appear intimidated and have changed their tactics, focusing on a longer term operation. With the Group of Twelve, they have set up a National Patriotic Front and have begun to attract elements of the FAO. The PRC agreed that polarization will increase over time, and that eventually Somoza will be vulnerable to a radical solution. (S)

3. Political Considerations. Rep. Charlie Wilson (D-Texas), who strongly supports Somoza, has threatened "to cut the heart out of the AID program" if we terminate reconstruction assistance for Nicaragua. He said he cares less about the question of withdrawing the Milgroup. (S)

4. U.S. Policy. The PRC unanimously agreed that we need to take the following politically symbolic steps now to show Somoza and the FAO that we were serious when we said that ~~failure to agree to the mediators' proposal would negatively~~ affect our relations: terminate all military assistance and withdraw the Milgroup; withdraw all Peace Corps for security reasons; reduce non-essential official personnel; in a reconvened 17th meeting of O.A.S. Foreign Ministers, consider the report on Nicaragua of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the report of the Mediation Group and obtain as strong a censure of the Somoza regime as possible; continue to strongly urge governments likely to sell arms to Somoza or to provide weapons to the Sandinistas not to do so in order to limit escalation of the violence in Nicaragua; keep in suspense the two AID loans signed (but never implemented) last August; disburse the remainder of the AID loans which have been partially implemented; and don't go ahead with any new aid at this time. These steps should be taken to signal our displeasure with Somoza's intransigence and to get some distance between us without losing the possibility of influencing him in the future. While the decision to go ahead with the AID money in the pipeline will probably provoke criticism from the opposition, the PRC felt this would be balanced by the other steps and by a statement, which we should issue, pointing out the humanitarian aspects of the earthquake reconstruction aid (which Wilson is so concerned about). In the statement which is issued to explain these decisions, there will be a condemnation of violence and any attempt to begin such violence. We would also remain ready to talk with Somoza if he is prepared to reconsider the mediators' proposal. (S)

5. Next Steps. The PRC agreed to consider in a few weeks the suspension of on-going loans plus additional steps in a possible second phase effort to resolve the crisis. (S)

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