

Doc #141

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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declassification, WHS
Date: FEB 24 2016

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1 st REVIEW DATE: <u>1/2/15</u>	DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: <u>48 CFR</u>	1 CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: <u>Helmut Schmidt</u>	2 CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: <u>FRD</u>
2 nd REVIEW DATE: <u>1/13/2015</u>	3 CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
AUTHORITY: <u>DD FORM 60</u>	4 COORDINATE WITH
NAME: <u>Carl Helmut</u>	5 CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
	6 CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
	7 OTHER (SPECIFY): <u>PP 239-240</u>
	<u>DUPLICATE P.240.</u>

Office of the Secretary of Defense SUS 4752
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 24 FEB 2016 Authority: EO 13526 +
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3. 3(b)(5)(6) + 6.2(a)
MDR: 15-M-0343

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA -
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
administrative and criminal sanctions.
Handle as Restricted Data on foreign
dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic
Energy Act 1954.~~

(S) Schmidt, meanwhile, was quite correct that the United States had yet to face up fully to the problems the SS-20 created for European security. But the reasons had nothing to do, as he seemed to imply, with any blatant disregard on the part of the United States for its allies' interests. Rather, they reflected a combination of factors, some having to do with the internal politics in Washington of the arms control process, others with logistical dif-

Schmidt
right
not
cause

⁵³ Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," 28 Oct 77, *Survival* 20 (Jan-Feb 1978): 3-4. A useful analysis of the background of Schmidt's speech is David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1983), 193-251.

⁵⁴ See George S. Brown, *United States Military Posture for FY 1979*, *JS*, 20 Jan 78: 26.

⁵⁵ Komer quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Missile Deployments Roil Europe," *Science* 223 (27 Jan 84): 372. Also see Stephen R. Hanmer, Jr., "NATO's Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces: Modernization in Parallel with Arms Control," *NATO* 28 (Feb 1980): 4.

239
-SECRET
~~Restricted Data~~ [Extrad not RD]

15-m-0343

JCS and National Policy

difficulties arising from the impending US withdrawal from its naval base



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Schmidt undoubtedly knew of this proposal and he probably knew also that General Haig and his NATO planning staff, alarmed that the United States would be diluting its commitment, had strongly advised against it. But as all involved by now realized, adjustments of one kind or another would become unavoidable once the Rota base was no longer available.⁵⁸

JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)
+ SECTION 6.2(a)

DOE
6.2(a)

OSD
Section 6.2 (a)

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⁵⁷ EUCOM Historical Report, 1976, 28, 237.

⁵⁸ J-5M-1957-77 to CJCS, 20 Sep 77, 8; and CM-1637-77 to SecDef, 27 Sep 77, S/OCS, both in CJCS Files (Brown), 806 NATO.

⁵⁹ See James A. Thomson, "The LRTNF decision: evolution of US theatre nuclear policy, 1975-9," *International Affairs* (London) 60 (Autumn 1984): 604 and passim.

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HISTORY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Volume XII

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
AND NATIONAL POLICY
1977-1980

By
Steven L. Ruppert

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