

LRTNF

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 05 2016

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces

In response to your request, this memorandum outlines my recommendation for the modernization of NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNFs). I believe the US should take a firm lead in bringing the Alliance to a decision on both TNF modernization and a parallel arms control approach by the end of this year.

The program I recommend, which is set forth at Tab A, is designed to serve as the basis for bilateral consultations with key Allies in July and thereafter as the program to be submitted for review to the NATO High-Level Group. At this stage we would not be asking our Allies for definitive political approval--that should come in December. Rather, we should be asking them only to approve placing the program before the High-Level Group, an expert body not invested with political authority, for analysis and recommendation. We should recognize that this consultative process may lead to program modification and be prepared, within reason, to accept that result.

Program for NATO LRTNF Modernization

(1) Systems Mix: The program I propose consists of a mix of PERSHING II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Such a force would have military advantages--hedging against the failure of one type of system, flexibility to select the best weapon for each mission--and the political advantage of affording opportunities for widespread participation among the Allies. This latter consideration in particular argues against a pure PERSHING force since its range vs. the Soviet Union would be too limited to allow deployment in the UK. Finally, the program provides a reasonable basis from which to pursue an arms control approach; in particular, by including cruise missiles with which the Soviets have been so concerned in SALT II, the program should provide a basis for leverage in any arms control negotiations.

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Introducing more systems into the mix to be initially proposed to the Allies, e.g., air-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles or a new medium-range ballistic missile, would not in my view be appropriate at this time. ALCMs have the same pre-launch vulnerability problems as aircraft; if their range were over 600 km (which for military reasons would be desirable given Warsaw Pact defenses), any US aircraft on which they were deployed (plus all US aircraft of the same type unless observably different) would count under SALT II. Only with a greatly accelerated program could the MRBM be available by 1985 and therefore it should be viewed as a follow-on to the PERSHING II. As to sea-launched cruise missiles, the point you made to Schmidt about playing down these systems to discourage Allies from avoiding participation still holds. However, we should keep sea-based systems in our back pocket in case the PERSHING II/GLCM approach fails to receive allied support. Our current R&D program for SLCM preserves this option, and sea-based forces may ultimately be required to achieve the required degree of survivability in the force.

(2) Force Size: The High-Level Group recommends a net increase of 200-600 in NATO LRTNF warheads. I support that conclusion both from the point of view of providing a credible military capability and of responding to Soviet TNF modernization. At this time I recommend we propose to the Allies a LRTNF program involving 476 additional warheads, anticipating that the Allies may somewhat cut it back. My reasons for recommending this level of increase are that:

- It would provide a significant addition to our military capabilities and hence to deterrence.
- It would give us flexibility to let the Allies argue us down modestly on numbers and yet still have a significant program.
- It would give us flexibility within the parameters of the HLG consensus to go up, if Soviet deployments continue to increase, or to go down in the context of an arms control agreement while still accomplishing the minimum necessary modernization.

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-- It is large enough to show the Soviets that we mean business and the Allies that we are serious about preserving their security. Yet it is not so large as to provoke the Soviets into an arms race or unduly frighten European publics over an increased emphasis on nuclear defense in Europe.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend going in with a larger force because of the uncertainties associated with future allied participation and arms control involving LRTNF. If the US could be assured of achieving a net increase of 400-500 land-based long-range warheads, the JCS might support a program similar to the one at Tab A, when augmented by SLCM to achieve the size force recommended in the Joint Strategic Planning Document. At Tab B is the program the JCS would prefer as a starting point. Either is reasonable. Militarily, and practically speaking, the JCS recommendation and my own differ little. The real issue is what mix and level is best as a going-in position for negotiation with our Allies.

(3) Basing and Participation: Permanent wide-spread basing of LRTNF would be the most significant form of LRTNF participation. Five countries are principal candidates for such basing: FRG, UK, [REDACTED]. Our preliminary consultations suggest that there is a reasonable possibility of basing in each of these countries but only if the deployment is carefully managed (individually and collectively) from a political point of view.

The program I propose includes basing in each of these countries. While basing in all these countries is not essential for a viable PII/GLCM program, we need at a minimum (1) basing in the FRG, (2) plus, in order to meet the German condition that at least one other continental country participate, basing either in [REDACTED] and (3) basing in either the UK or [REDACTED] in order to achieve adequate numbers.

The LRTNF presented to the Allies should be structured so that all participating countries receive their first LRTNF deployments as nearly simultaneously as possible. In this way, all will undertake the political burden at the same time and none will believe it can make an initial commitment that it can later avoid.

In [REDACTED] of the FRG, Chancellor [REDACTED] introduced what may be a new dimension during his recent conversation with me [REDACTED] his desire that no weapons [REDACTED] the FRG be at [REDACTED] Moscow. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Accordingly, some favor proposing only PERSHING IIs for the FRG. I believe, however that we should initially ask the FRG to accept GLCM in addition to PERSHING II, primarily to achieve wide-spread participation. [REDACTED] will probably prefer GLCMs, in part for cost reasons, but will almost certainly have difficulty accepting them unless GLCMs are also based in Germany. Moreover, it may well be that we can appropriately modify GLCM range; we are looking at this question now.

As for the other Allies, we can rule out the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as direct participants because of their peacetime no-nuclear basing policy. [REDACTED]

(4) Costs and Cost Sharing: I estimate that the program outlined above will cost (in 1979 \$) about \$370 million for R&E in addition to costs already sunk, \$1391 million for procurement, and \$240 million each year for operations and maintenance once the force is fully fielded.

Cost sharing will depend, in the first instance, on whether any of the systems are "dual-key", i.e., the launchers are owned and manned by Europeans with the US having custody of the warheads. Since the user country would presumably pick up the launcher procurement costs and subsequent O&M, such an arrangement would cut the costs to the US. On the other hand, dual-key arrangements might make subsequent arms control negotiations for medium-range systems of these sorts somewhat more difficult by raising questions of noncircumvention and nontransfer, as well as potentially involving dual-key systems in a bilateral "gray area" negotiation. The Germans have made clear they do not want a dual-key arrangement for political reasons; I am not certain what the position of the other countries will be. I believe maximum participation is more important than modest reduction in US costs or prejudgment of arms control arrangements. Therefore we should, in our consultations with our Allies, take no strong stand on LRTNF ownership arrangements.

The most feasible form of NATO-wide financial participation would be some form of NATO infrastructure funding for construction of basing facilities for LRTNF. In addition, I believe we should consider other forms of cost sharing, e.g., having an ally provide security forces to support a US LRTNF

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

OSD 3.3(b)(5)  
JS 3.3(b)(6)

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unit based on its soil. If it eventually turns out that our GLCM/PERSHING II approach fails and we rely on US sea-launched cruise missiles to augment NATO LRTNF, there are no obvious ways for cost sharing by the Allies.

*Harold Brown*

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GLCM/PERSHING II LRTNF FORCE MIX

**Cost-Share Issues:**

Construction could be picked up by NATO Infrastructure Funding into which the US pays 75% share. ✓

Operating & Support costs could be paid by those Allies which own and man LRTNF in their territory. US manning would probably require the US to pick up these costs.

Manpower could be provided by those Allies which own and man LRTNF stationed on their territory while US manned LRTNF would require that the U.S. provide this manpower.

Security could be largely provided by the Allied country concerned regardless of whether the U.S. or the Ally owned and operated the LRTNF systems.

Costs of FY 79 dollars. Unsunk R&D costs are \$300M for Pershing II and \$74M for GLCM)

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JS 3.3 (b)(6) + 6.2 (a)

OSD SECTION 6.7(a)

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GLCM/PERSHING II LRTNF FORCE MIX

(JCS Recommendation)

(Costs are in millions of FY 79 dollars. Unsunk R&D costs are \$300M for Pershing II and \$75M for GLCM)

Assumptions:

Construction could be picked up by NATO Infrastructure Funding into which the US pays share.

Operating & Support costs could be paid by those Allies which own and man LRTNF on their territory. US manning would probably require the US to pick up these costs.

Manpower could be provided by those Allies which own and man LRTNF stationed on their territory. US manned LRTNF would require that the U.S. provide this manpower.

Security could be largely provided by the Allied country concerned regardless of whether the US or the Ally owned and operated the LRTNF systems.

Should be developed as a follow-on to the Pershing II.

JS 3.3 (b)(6) + 6.2 (a)

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OSD SECTION 4.7 (c)

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GLCM/ALCM LRTNF FORCE MIX

of FY 79 dollars. Unsunk R&D costs are \$175 M for ALCM and \$74 M for GLCM)

aircraft. Number of aircraft correspond to the current number of UK Vulcans which will be replaced by aircraft in the early 1980s.

Facilities already available to support aircraft are sufficient to accommodate additional require-

ments. Initial launch aircraft and charges all O&S costs of the aircraft to the LRTNF mission.

(b)(6) + 6.2(a)

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