

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 05 2016

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1979

from [redacted] but not take over. He had now become a supplicant.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

SCC Meeting on Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces

JS
(41)
Doct#149

Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the March 23, 1979 SCC meeting on long-range theater nuclear forces. You will be receiving separately a decision package on the question of our SSBNs in the Mediterranean, which is mentioned in the Summary of Conclusions. *(S)*

The SCC particularly wanted me to bring to your attention the consensus that has been emerging in the NATO High Level Group (attached to the Summary of Conclusions). The consensus calls for an increase in capability to strike the USSR from the European Continent. It also suggests that a mixed force of ballistic and cruise missiles would be desirable. If we are able to follow-through with this consensus, it will be the first time since 1963 that missiles capable of striking Soviet soil have been deployed in Western Europe. *(S)*

JS
(2(a))

Although we are not legally bound to the High Level Group's (HLG) consensus, we are associated with it politically. Based on the instructions you gave David Aaron for his consultations in Europe, the US -- as HLG chairman -- permitted this consensus to emerge, though the Europeans came to it without prodding by us. Adoption of this consensus by the HLG will bind us even more firmly to the path that we are embarked on. *(S)*

It will not be easy to move down this path, nor is it at all certain that we will succeed. Although our parallel arms control effort will help politically, we can expect a good deal of controversy, especially abroad. Our European Allies will waver in the face of their own domestic

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~~(with Top Secret attachment)
Review March 23, 1985~~

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political problems; this has already begun, especially in West Germany, even though earlier the Allies appeared to be calling for new deployments. The Soviets are certain to build a political and propaganda effort on a scale beyond their neutron bomb campaign; this has already begun as well. Our consultations indicate that the Europeans still favor new deployments, but are cautious in view of the political difficulties they face. They need our help: to bring the Allies through this and lead them to an Alliance consensus, we will have to be steadfast. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions.

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove

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