

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS (2) WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

January 31, 1978

30

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SECDEF HAS SEEN 1/31
31 JAN 1978

Doc #176

HTB

2/2 5pm -

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting on Horn of Africa, 26 January 1978

A brief summary of the SCC discussion on the Horn of Africa which took place on 26 January 1978 is attached for your information and action, as appropriate.

Security of this discussion will be better assured if you do not circulate this memorandum, in its entirety, outside your own immediate office. Separate tasking requirements can be explained, of course, to subordinate elements who need to carry them out.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment
Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 24 2016

Office of the Secretary of Defense SU.SCS 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 24 FEB 2016 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(2)
MDR: 15 -M- 0378

Africa 092

31 Jan 78

Bde.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS (2)

DECLASSIFIED BY Zbigniew Brzezinski
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
EMERGENCY INFORMATION
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION

330-81-0202, box 52, Africa 092 (Am-9 Feb) (12)

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-0285

01/148

15-M-0378

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~XGDS(2)~~

27 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, SCC Meeting on Horn of Africa,
26 January 1978, 7:00-8:45 p.m., White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS:

State:
Cyrus VanceCIA:
Stansfield TurnerDefense:
Harold Brown
General George Brown (JCS)NSC:
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the meeting was to review the latest developments in the Horn, consultations with friendly governments and recent contacts with the Soviets and Cubans. Possibilities for U.S. initiative in the political, diplomatic, and military spheres were reviewed. The adequacy of intelligence available was discussed and opportunities for improvement in collection were considered. The problem of publicity was discussed. Congressional interest was also discussed. The Chairman noted that the President had recently sent messages to Brezhnev and Mengistu. It was the consensus of the group that the U.S. Government should be cautious about taking actions that would in themselves encourage a sense of crisis or confrontation with the Soviets or that would commit us prematurely to positions that could limit our flexibility. It was agreed that the following principles should guide actions during the next few weeks:

- We will continue efforts to impress upon the Soviets the seriousness with which we look upon their involvement in the Horn and the political problems which it causes for us.
- We will endeavor to broaden contact and dialogue with the Ethiopians in hope of encouraging them to reserve some freedom of action.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS(2)DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 24 2016

Zbigniew Brzezinski

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCY/DEPARTMENTAL HEAD EX-100~~
~~APPROPRIATE AGENCY/DEPARTMENTAL HEAD EX-100~~
 APPROPRIATE AGENCY/DEPARTMENTAL HEAD EX-100
 APPROPRIATE AGENCY/DEPARTMENTAL HEAD EX-100
 APPROPRIATE AGENCY/DEPARTMENTAL HEAD EX-100
 APPROPRIATE AGENCY/DEPARTMENTAL HEAD EX-100

...their aid in impressing upon the Soviets our serious concern, but we will be cautious about encouraging those who are inclined to help the Somalis to make commitments that they would expect us to back up.

- We will accelerate study of our own capabilities and those of other governments to intervene in the situation in ways that could complicate or make more costly the Soviet/Cuba intervention, but we will underwrite no action at this time.
- We will consider underscoring our concern by military movements designed to have psychological and political impact.

The following specific requirements were set for study/action with results to be reported back as soon as possible:

- Presidential letters to Giscard, Tito, Obasanjo, Perez and Desai will be sent. Messages to other Heads of State/Government will be considered later.
- Measures to improve intelligence collection through SR-71, U-2 and/or a SIGINT collection ship will be studied urgently and recommendations prepared.
- The JCS will prepare plans for deployment of a naval task force in the Red Sea as soon as possible.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)
OSD 3.3(b)(1)

- [REDACTED] the Iranian, Saudi, Egyptian and Sudanese governments will be sounded out on their capabilities and intentions for providing support to Somalia. We will not go beyond these discussions until we again talk to Sadat.
- [REDACTED] Ethiopian initiatives will be deferred for later consideration; the proposals for action outside Ethiopia were endorsed.
- An ambassador to Ethiopia will be dispatched in the near future.
- No action will be taken to inform the Ethiopians that pipeline military items will be held up.
- A determined effort will be made to avoid unnecessary publicity about the Administration's stance and actions in respect to the Horn.