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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

July 6, 1979

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JC
(44)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, SCC Meeting on Theater Nuclear Forces, July 5, 1979 ~~(S)~~

25.

Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the July 5th SCC meeting on Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF). The meeting settled on the US positions that David Aaron will put forward during his upcoming mission to Europe. ~~(S)~~

After reviewing a wide range of options that were analyzed in a DOD paper, the SCC settled on an option that would provide for 572 long-range TNF warheads. The SCC felt that it was desirable to start with a reasonably large program on the assumptions that Allied consultations will result in a shrinkage in the program. ~~(S)~~

The instructions for Aaron's mission emphasize that these are exploratory discussions designed to obtain Allied reactions to our thinking but not final commitments. The salient points are:

- We continue to aim at a December Alliance decision. To facilitate that timetable, we plan to introduce our TNF modernization program into the NATO High Level Group in September and thus need Allied reactions by mid-August so we can take their views into account.
- Our modernization program would provide for either single-key deployments with US forces, or dual-key deployments with Allied forces; we will be guided by Allied preferences. It is unlikely that any Ally will want dual-key deployments because the FRG does not

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~~Classified & extended by Z. Brzezinski~~
~~Review 7-6-99~~
~~Reason for extension: NSC 1.13(S)~~

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 22 2016

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want them, but we should give the Allies the choice because dual-key deployments would relieve some financial burden from us.

- The British want to replace its 50 VULCAN bombers and we are willing to discuss possible cooperation on the VULCAN replacement in the context of our broader US/UK exchanges on nuclear cooperation and as part of Alliance TNF modernization plan.
- There should be sharing in the financial burden of the TNF modernization program. Construction of new facilities would be funded through the NATO Infrastructure Program and the US would want host nations to provide security personnel for single-key US deployments. OMB agreed with this approach. ✓
- The deployments will be undertaken without increasing the nuclear stockpile in Europe; for each long-range TNF deployed, one would be withdrawn. ✓
- In connection with a decision to proceed with TNF modernization, we are prepared to include TNF arms control in the SALT III framework. We will aim for an Alliance arms control position on TNF by December. ✓
- We will want to have special Alliance consultation arrangements to deal with TNF arms control issues during SALT III -- in a format, such as the NATO Special Group, which provides for US chairmanship. ✓
(TS)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions. (X)

5 U.S.C. 552

Office of the Secretary of Defense
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
 Date: 22 Mar 2016 Authority: EO 13526
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