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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5183 OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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September 2, 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meeting  
on PRM-38

Attached is the summary of conclusions of the August 23  
SCC meeting on PRM-38. This summary of conclusions should  
be held closely and distributed only to those with a need  
to know. The summary has been approved by the President.  
Please note his one hand-written revision.

*Zbigniew Brzezinski*

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 23 2015

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## SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

August 23, 1978

Time and Place: 10:00 -11:30 a.m., White House  
Situation Room

SUBJECT: PRM 38: Long-Range Theater Nuclear  
Forces

## Participants:

State

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher  
David Gompert (Deputy Director,  
Politico-Military Affairs)

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny  
David Clinard (Asst. Dir.  
for Intl. Security Prog.)

Defense

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan  
David E. McGiffert (Assistant  
Secretary for Intl. Security  
Affairs)

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

JCS

General David Jones  
General William Y. Smith (Special  
Assistant to the Chairman)

NSC

Reginald Bartholomew  
Victor Utgoff  
Jim Thomson

CIA

Dr. Sayre Stevens (Deputy Director,  
National Foreign Assessment Ctr.)  
John Vogel (Natl. Intelligence  
Officer for Conventional Forces)

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Summary of Conclusions

The meeting began with a discussion of the general issue of how to respond to our NATO Allies' concerns that improvements in Soviet strategic and theater nuclear forces require an improved capability to strike the Soviet Union with nuclear forces based in Europe. All agreed that:

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(By authority: Z. Brzezinski)

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- The role of US strategic forces and our overall deterrent strategy should remain unchanged, i.e., there is neither a political nor a military need for a massive increase in nuclear forces capable of striking the Soviet Union from Europe.
- There is, however, a political and military need for serious consideration of some limited increases in long-range theater nuclear forces in Europe because of improvements in Soviet theater nuclear forces.
- Consideration of such increases should be combined with the development of an arms control initiative to deal with these systems on both sides.

The question of how to approach our Allies on these issues was then discussed. It was agreed that we cannot expect the Europeans to take the lead. It was also noted that the NATO High Level Group has come a long way in its appreciation of this issue; that the Europeans are not seeking a major new role or capability for NATO TNF.

It was agreed that in the next High Level Group meeting, we should support the HLG conclusion that "there is evident a need for an evolutionary adjustment in NATO theater nuclear forces that would provide somewhat more in-theater long-range capability than at present." To address this complex of issues and initiate substantive high-level Allied consultations, it was agreed that a Presidential emissary would be preferable to a Presidential letter. The emissary would discuss the issues with the appropriate Allied heads-of-government and other senior officials.

It was agreed that the best place to handle the long-range TNF/arms control issue would be in SALT. It was noted that we will have to complete our ongoing examination of what to do about the Option 3 proposal on the table in MBFR, which places a ceiling on NATO long-range TNF but none on the USSR. It was also noted that progress in development of our position with the Allies on the long-range TNF/arms control issue will be an aid to SALT ratification.

The SCC asked that the working group prepare the following for review and discussion in an SCC meeting the second or third week in September:

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- A paper should be developed for presentation to the NATO High Level Group. This paper should include a reduced number of notional hardware modernization options and should identify how the costs of such options might be shared with our Allies.
- These options should be generally consistent with the HLG conclusion concerning an evolutionary adjustment toward somewhat greater in-theater capability; except that one option (possibly with variants) involving major mission/forces should be included as a bounding, analytical case.
- A paper should be developed delineating our approach to the arms control bilaterals including scope and objectives and the political issues to be discussed. Consideration should also be given to presenting the Allies a paper based on Section III of the PRM response and an appropriate draft should be developed.
- An analysis should be carried out of alternative defense improvements that the US could make for amounts of resources comparable to those we might spend on TNF modernization.
- An analysis should be carried out of the idea of going ahead with a mobile GLCM system that would be deployed to Europe ~~only in event of a crisis.~~  
*when needed.*
- A chalk talk should be developed to bring out the important issues involved in developing and maintaining an appropriate set of hardware options (costs, IOCs, ranges, etc.).

Finally, the SCC agreed that the question of agenda and timing of consultations by a Presidential emissary with appropriate NATO heads-of-government and other senior officials will be discussed further in the next meeting.

*U.S. Army*

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