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TALKER

Doc #153

JOINT TALKING PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, SCC MEETING, 5 JULY 1979

SUBJECT: Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces

PURPOSE OF MEETING:

To define US positions to be presented by the Presidential Emissary in the upcoming round of bilateral consultations on Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF).

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~~Unauthorized disclosure subject to~~
~~administrative and criminal sanctions~~
~~Handle as Restricted Data on foreign~~
~~dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic~~
~~Energy Act 1954.~~

Organization of the SCC Meeting

The NSC Agenda Paper at Tab III provides useful background information and sets out the issues to be discussed. It does not, however, reflect the order in which issues will be discussed at the SCC.

The meeting will begin by considering the size and character of the LRTNF Program the United States will initially present to the Allies. This discussion will center on examination of four land-based LRTNF options set out and analyzed at Tab III-B.* The Talker for this portion of the meeting is set out below. Tab IV summarizes Allies views which will be particularly relevant in discussing these LRTNF options.

Following the discussion of LRTNF Options, the SCC will go over in detail the Draft Instructions for the Presidential Emissary (Tab III-A, Agenda Paper). We have provided talking points on the facing pages of the Draft Instructions.

At the end of the SCC, other issues related to LRTNF may be discussed. Contingency talkers for this are also included below.

ISSUE: Options for LRTNF Modernization

DISCUSSION: The LRTNF options considered in the interagency analysis in preparation for the SCC are summarized on Table 1 of Tab III-B. We have provided a special tab called "LR TNF OPTIONS" to help you find it.

The SecDef memo to the President (Tab II) recommends a force structure somewhat different from those considered in the interagency analysis but comes closest to Option B. The following is a comparison of the number of warheads for Option B and the SecDef recommendation:

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*USAF Comment: The MRBM, a ballistic missile candidate, is not discussed in Tab III-B.

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JS 3.3(b)(5)(6)


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
OPTION B

SECDEF
RECOMMENDED
OPTION

DIFFERENCE



Reasons that Option B was modified to form the SecDef recommended LRTNF are:



Arguments in favor of the SecDef recommended LRTNF (which also generally apply to Option B) are:

- It consists of a mix of ballistic (Pershing II) and cruise (GLCM) missiles, affording a force with military advantages -- hedging against failure of one type of system, flexibility to select the best weapon for each mission -- and political advantages -- more opportunities for widespread participation.
- Its size is such that it:
 - provides a significant addition to military capabilities and deterrence;

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
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- gives flexibility to go up if the Soviets' deployments force us to or go down in conjunction with arms control but still modernize;
- Is large enough to show the Soviets that we mean business, and the Allies that we will preserve their security;
- Is not so large as to provoke an arms race or unduly frighten the Europeans.
- It provides for widespread LRTNF participation with all five candidate countries involved in basing.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the arguments associated with the SecDef Recommended Option and believe they apply equally to Option A. They believe, however, that Option A has the advantage of further strengthening our land-based military capabilities to cover identified shortfalls and its size is a more appropriate response to Soviet LRTNF modernization.

Interagency views on LRTNF Options are likely to be:

- NSC - Favor OPTION B
- State - Favor OPTION B but possibly delete GLCMs in FRG
- ACDA - OPTION D
- OMB - Pure cruise missile force.

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
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- If Schmidt succeeds in establishing his range criteria, others may also insist on special missile design features before accepting basing.
- If necessary, we can probably modify GLCM range.

ACDA favors Option D because, as a pure Pershing II force, it would avoid difficult arms control problems associated with theater limits on cruise missiles and as a relatively small force, would best avoid provoking an arms race with the Soviets. Our reasons for opposing Option D are:

- It does not provide the advantages of a mixed force.
- It is too small to have the requisite military or political effect, or to provide enough negotiating weight with the Soviets on theater systems.
- It does not have widespread participation.
- It would not be feasible to execute if MBFR Option III were to limit [redacted]

*Will PII
in [redacted]
reach USSR?
Yes, but not Moscow.*

OMB favors a pure cruise missile force on cost grounds. Arguments against their approach are:

- It does not provide the advantage of a mixed force.
- It risks overturning an emerging consensus in this government and the Alliance that the LRTNF should include Pershing II, thus interfering with Alliance movement toward a decision.
- The FRG appears to favor a Pershing force because of its evolutionary nature and its range does not threaten Moscow.
- If there were a pure cruise missile force but Pershing Ia were not retired, the overall cost would be greater than a cruise-ballistic mix where Pershing II replaces Pershing Ia.

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The US should begin these consultations with a preference for GLCMS as currently designed [redacted]

As a hedge that Schmidt may not change his position, Under Secretary Perry is conducting a study of ways to alter cruise missile range capability for deployment in Central Europe.

OSD
Section 6.2 (a)

RECOMMENDATIONS

OSD recommends that the LRTNF which SecDef recommended to the President also be the one used initially for discussions with the Allies.

JCS recommends Option A be used as a going-in position with the Allies for LRTNF modernization.

Both OSD and JCS recommend against LRTNF force structures which do not include GLCMS [redacted]

OTHER LRTNF ISSUES

Expanding NPG Ministerial Membership

The NSC may seek to firm up a USG position on whether NPG membership at Ministerials should be expanded so as to eliminate the current rotational system. The position we have taken in past Alliance discussions is that the US would look favorably on a proposal to expand Ministerial membership. The expanded membership issue is currently being considered under the silence procedure in NATO where, if no country enters an objection by 16 July 1979, expanded membership will become a fait accompli.

RECOMMENDATION

That the United States support expanded NPG Ministerial Membership.

Approved by Dennis G. Murphy
Asst. Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Director, Joint Staff

Coordination: _____
Asst. Secretary of Defense (PA&E)

Asst. to the Secretary of Defense (AE)

Adv. to the Secretary of Defense on NATO Affairs

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Memo For ~~Bob~~ Dave Magiffert

I'll try to attend this, but if I'm too busy you & ALT you should attend for me.

In general I agree with ~~the~~ ZSA positions, but want to note that after discussion with ~~me~~ EB, CV, & others

~~It~~ it seems to me that we don't want to introduce LRTNF into SAUT IET.

a) nightmare of allied negotiation will stall bilateral reductions in central systems (conclusively enough anyway).
cf MBR & our problems with FRG.

b) ^{keep LRTNF out to} sleep open prospect of many GLEMs in Europe (or on ships) to push on Soviet LRTNF. SS-20s ~~outreach~~

China / UK / French + US LRTNF in Europe. If the Soviets want to increase, so it worries allies we can (if allies willing) increase GLEMs. Let's, ~~therefore~~ therefore, negotiate LRTNF separately.
HWS

5 U.S.C. § 552

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