



RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: USDRE Activity Report - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. Nevada Trip

Office of the Secretary of Defense U.S. 4352
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 06 MAR 2016 Authority: EO 13526
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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: 06 MAR 2016

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1 st REVIEW DATE: <u>02/29/95</u>	DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER)
AUTHORITY: <u>EO 13526</u>	1. CLASSIFICATION REMAINED
NAME: <u>J. [unclear]</u>	2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: <u>PRD</u>
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AUTHORITY: <u>EO 13526</u>	1. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
NAME: <u>[unclear]</u>	2. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
	3. OTHER GROUPS: <u>Redacted</u>
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DOE INFO IS SFRD

(TS//LIMDIS) The special aircraft program is back on track, with the successful test flight of S/N2. I do not plan to authorize the fabrication of S/N3, but rather to direct all of our resources to proceeding to an improved (larger) aircraft as soon as we are ready. We will continue with a comprehensive, deliberate program to make dynamic radar cross section (RCS) measurements, correlate the results with predictions and static measurements, and apply the results to the new design. My visit to the special test site also provided some important results derived from flight test exploitation of a MIG-23. Of particular significance was the ineffectiveness of U.S. airborne ECM (including the B-52, EA-6) against the MIG-23 airborne radar. I plan to conduct an in-depth review of the test results and implications and expect to provide a follow-on report in October, which will examine implications for on-going ECM programs.

This info
to me in
series
matter

380-81-0212, box 1, 020 DDR&E, 1978

Classified by USDRB
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1
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2.

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(C) At Nellis AFB I reviewed the RED FLAG and AIMVAL/ACEVAL programs. Both programs were highly impressive; they clearly have a significant impact on the readiness and effectiveness of our tactical air forces, and provide invaluable feedback for our R&D programs. I believe that the RED FLAG program can be significantly improved by adding a real time capability to model the performance of ordnance, and by reducing the time required to develop pilot debriefing packages. Lt General Stafford and I are working on an improvement program.

2. Potential Overload in the Aerospace Industry

(C) The surge in commercial orders in the aerospace industry is beginning to have an impact on lead times for delivery of components and materials -- particularly for those materials required for avionics and engines. For example, General Electric has indicated that the lead time for forging deliveries is now 40 weeks rather than the 24 weeks which has been experienced in the recent past. Prices of raw materials appear to be increasing at a faster rate than labor. For example, nickel, chrome, tungsten and cobalt prices have been reported to rise 8-10% or more over the past 8 months. Vendor delivery delays have been blamed for slips of 2-4 months in both the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor (SURTASS) program and the STINGER POST program (an improvement to the present STINGER seeker incorporating spectral, spatial, pulse-width and amplitude discriminants). I will keep you advised should the impact of vendor delays begin to affect delivery schedules on major Defense programs.

3. 120mm Gun for XM-1

(C) We are continuing to have problems getting the 120mm gun program through Congress. The latest crisis is that the HAC has turned down the FY 78 reprogramming request (which in turn will cast a pall over the conference deliberation on the FY 79 request). This action caught us by surprise, since the HAC has been supportive of our standardizing on the 120mm gun. I reviewed the transcript of the hearings which indicated that the Committee was concerned that the Army planned to "Americanize" the gun at great expense (the Army has requested \$171 million for R&D on the gun) and their action was intended to force the Army to change their program to more fully use the German design. The transcript also revealed that the Army did a very poor job of presenting and defending their program. The actual situation is that their R&D program is well conceived but overly conservative in two respects: (1) the number of test firings (18,000 rounds!) partly because of their worry about the combustible case; and (2) virtually no shared development assumed in ammunition design. If those two factors were modified, the program cost could be reduced by \$30M to \$50M. I have discussed this at length with the Army R&D staff who are

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reluctant to make changes for fear of losing user (TRADOC) support for the program. I plan to discuss this problem today with Ralph Preston (HAC Defense Subcommittee Staff) and expect that discussion will result in the Chairman agreeing to schedule a rehearing for a revised program with some of the conservatism taken out. Then I will explain the situation to Cliff Alexander and ask his support in restructuring the program. (I will let you know if I need help in this.) I plan to represent the Defense position at this hearing with support from the Army. We have had too many problems because of the weak witnesses that the Army has sent to these hearings.

CD-7:
and I should talk to Cliff & Al about the general problem

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Section 6.2 (a)

4. Interim M-X

(75) The M-X program, as proposed by the Air Force in their POM, envisioned an IOC of 1986 and a full operational capability several years later. The FOC date is almost 5 years later than the date by which the Soviet Union may have the capability to destroy our MM silos; therefore, we have been studying different ways of getting an interim capability to address the near term threat. The AF proposal for modifying MM III for MAP deployment does not look attractive with respect to schedule and cost. Therefore, I have been investigating the possibility of deploying the TRIDENT I missile (C-4) in MAP until the M-X missile is ready.

It is already designed and tested for a canister-based cold launch and for mobile deployment, and present production capability is compatible with meeting this need and the submarine need (mainly because of slips in TRIDENT boat delivery). The major unresolved problem is how to adapt the TRIDENT launch control system to MAP. Also, there is a possible problem in AF reaction to being handed a Navy missile (again!).

Also SALT implications if this is considered a "new" ICBM.

(6) In order to accomplish the factual analyses necessary to make an informed decision on this question with a minimum of Service-slanted analyses and counter analyses, I have asked the Common Missile Task Force to conduct a study with a September 15 reporting date. They will investigate the technical, schedule and cost implications of an interim missile in MAP, considering MM in a canister, MM not in a canister (moved in pieces) and C-4 as candidate missiles. This group, consisting of key personnel in the AF-Navy missile programs under Dr. Zeiberg's leadership, has done a competent and objective job on the common M-X study and will, I believe, do equally well on this study.

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5. Testimony on 1978 Communications Act

(U) Gerry and I have discussed the hearings on the 1978 Communications Act held by the Van Deerlin Committee. Gerry has had informal discussions with one of the staff members but has no formal request to testify. This is at variance with Mr. DeButts' belief that Gerry was scheduled to testify. The

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question now arises as to whether to (informally) volunteer to testify (the Committee would be glad to hear from us) or simply wait until we get a formal request (which conceivably might not happen). Gerry is preparing testimony should it be needed.

I think it should be informally volunteered

(U) Gerry continued his support for an FY 1978 supplemental to purchase FleetSat vehicles #4 and #5 at a hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The Committee has just approved the full request for FY 78.

William J. Gerry

Attachment

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