

~~TOP SECRET~~ - LHMDS

Doc# 398

30 AUG 1978 10 19



RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SECDEF HAS SEEN
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8/31

*Bill - The Space Shuttle problem is very disturbing.
29 AUG 1978
Why does it surface at so late a date?
MS*


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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 14 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: USDRE Activity Report - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. Tour of Strategic Facilities

~~(S-LHMDS)~~ I accompanied Charles Duncan, Dave Jones and Zbig Brzezinski on a whirlwind tour of key facilities of our strategic strike forces. We visited SAC Headquarters, Ellsworth AFB (B-52 base and MM base), NORAD Headquarters, and flew on the E-4A and EC-135. The trip, though highly compressed, was useful and stimulated some interesting dialogue on the survivability of our strategic forces. Much of the discussion centered on maintaining connectivity between the NCA and the deployed forces.



Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 14 Mar 2016 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
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Reason: 3.3(b)(8)
MDR: 15-M-0100

*JS 3.3(b)(8)
SUSC 3552*

Classified by USDRE
~~EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~
~~EXEMPTIVE ORDER 11650. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE.~~

330-81-0212, box 1, O20DDR&C, 1978

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(29 Aug 78)

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~~LIMDIS~~

2.

c. At the MM site, we discussed the two-sided implications of MAP. I pointed out the complexity of the MM silo with the launch equipment self-contained, in contrast with a MAP "vertical shelter". On the issue of the Soviet's "cheating" with a MAP, I noted that the SS-17 and SS-18 were already equipped with a cold-launch sabot. If the Soviets built more of these missiles without our knowledge, they could either reload their present silos or, for that matter, launch them without the benefit of a silo. Therefore, if they want to "cheat", they don't need a MAP to do so, and with or without a MAP, our best chance of detecting cheating would be through intelligence indications of a major increase in production and covert deployment.

~~(S LIMDIS)~~ We concluded the trip with a review of the Special Aircraft program. The test program has been successful and we have gathered a significant amount of in-flight data. Preliminary indications look good; I will give you a detailed report in a few weeks when the data are reduced. We reviewed the concept for a follow-on aircraft. Dr. Brzezinski seemed quite positive, especially on the strategic version. I expect to receive formal proposals from the Air Force in September. In the meantime, I have put an extra \$150M in the revised FY 79 budget request to support a 1983 IOC. I will inform the four committee chairmen of this action next week and seek their support.

2. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB)

~~(S)~~ This week I attended the final briefing of the AFSAB Summer Workshop on Strategic Issues and the Land-Based ICBM. The AFSAB did a thorough job of evaluating 6 programmatic alternatives in response to MM vulnerability in the early 1980s. Alternatives considered included various deployment combinations of 10 RV M-X, 6 RV M-X, MM, and a new, single RV missile.

~~(S)~~ Their analysis was based on an assumed requirement that 1000 US RV's survive. I pointed out that this approach left out the important consideration of Soviet ICBM force drawdown, and the group agreed to prepare drawdown curves for the more attractive alternatives.

~~(S)~~ Some of the more important observations of the AFSAB:

a. Vertical shelters are the preferred approach, with spacing of 7000' assuming careful attention to design for EMP effects in the near field.

b. Preferential defense (even within SALT constraints) may offer a less expensive alternative to unexpected future threat growth than aim-point proliferation alone. Vertical shelters and a large number of RV's per missile improve the prospects for preferential defense. But BMD of current MM III is not an attractive alternative to MAP.

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c. None of the alternatives considered will provide for 1000 surviving RV's prior to 1990 given the current NIE and the APDM funding levels.

d. If all funding constraints were removed, 1985 would be the earliest date to provide for 1000 surviving RV's.

e. A start in 1979 is essential, and rapid deployment may well cost less in the end.

f. At force levels of around 2100 RV's, there is no significant difference in missile cost with respect to size in the range of 5-10 RV's per missile, and a single RV missile is considerably more expensive.

g. A modified MM III in MAP provides the earliest increase in survivability, but in the long term is less resilient to an increased threat. A MM III MAP system should be designed to be compatible with a new 5-10 RV missile.

h. A fully common missile is not desirable because it is likely to: 1) result in delay; 2) reduce ICBM accuracy; and 3) restrict future negotiating options. They felt that predicted cost savings might not be achieved because of management complexity.

i. The best alternative is M-X in MAP using vertical shelters, probably deployed in the southwest.

j. SALT should limit RV's to a maximum of 10 per missile.

k. There should be an energetic program to reduce shelter cost with emphasis on mass production construction techniques and procurement strategy.

(s) At the bottom line of the discussions at the AFSAB were two fundamental issues: the common missile, and near versus far term solutions. The AFSAB concern about a common missile includes some technical elements (e.g., can the Air Force live with a stellar update on AIRS and can the Navy live with class II propellants?), but their principal concern was with the problem of managing a 2-Service program. They are concerned about divided responsibilities for management and the resulting delays and cost increases. In response, I pointed out that: 1) a common missile would be developed by a lead Service, with clear management responsibility as recommended by the Commonality Study Group; 2) if we do not select a common missile, we will be unable to afford to develop both the M-X and the D-5, and will have to select at most one of them; and 3) the ultimate selection must be made in consideration of strengthening the entire TRIAD, not just the land ICBM force.

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