



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Date: JUN 01 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: CTB Meeting, Tuesday, 19 September, 1600 Hours

The apparent purpose of the meeting is to have an informal discussion among you, Cy, Zbig, and Paul on the outstanding CTB issues.

The major issue is how we should proceed in getting a Presidential decision on the issues of duration, the number of national seismic stations, and the level of permitted experiments. The alternatives include: (1) a NSC meeting to review the issues one final time; (2) a joint Brown Vance Brzezinski memo giving their recommendations; or (3) Brzezinski pushing for a decision on the basis of the Minutes of the previous SCC meetings.

With the negotiations set to resume in ten days, we urgently need a Presidential decision. As I do not know why we do not have a Presidential decision, I am not able to make a recommendation as how best to proceed.

In addition, the Working Group is analyzing the other outstanding issues. At TAB A is our summary paper on all the remaining issues plus the two draft interagency papers. At this time, we are not ready for any additional decisions on these issues.

Vance will also discuss how we should proceed to increase the chances of wide adherence by non-nuclear states to the CTB. At TAB B is a copy of the Vance/Warneke memo to the President which you saw last week.

As a final issue, I recommend you raise the possibility of supplementing the current US limited duration CTB proposal with a low-level threshold treaty. At TAB C is a brief statement of the advantages and disadvantages of such a low threshold treaty. (At a lunch with Cy and Zbig, you agreed to discuss such a proposal once again before initiating a formal inter-agency study.)

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A-4100.112 Test Ban

18 Sep 78

330-81-0202, box 53, A-460.112 Test Ban (6 Jun - Dec) 1978  
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
Both State and the NSC staff object to such a US Initiative at this time on the grounds that it would suggest the probability of follow-on testing. The NSC staff is also concerned with (1) the political impact of switching from a CTB to a TTB plus moratorium and (2) the risk of the Senate ratifying the TTB without the moratorium. (Note that the way the objectors phrase their arguments tends to prejudice the result. One need not talk 'moratorium' and '3 - 5 year ban followed by a low-level TTB' less of a step back from a comprehensive ban of unlimited duration than a ban followed by a high-level TTB would be. Further if the two elements were in one treaty, the Senate couldn't selectively ratify, I think.)

While we have not discussed this Initiative with either the JCS or DOE, we suspect that they would also have concerns about the ability to verify completely Soviet tests even at this threshold and to insure the reliability of the stockpile over an indefinite period of time. In other words, I think the idea has merit and deserves further analysis, but I find few supporters.

State has also produced a short paper on Stockpile Reliability and Testing. We are still staffing our response and so do not have any comments.

PD-38 is at TAB D.

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David E. McGiffert  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
International Security Affairs

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Outstanding CTB Issues

The Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) backstopping committee has prepared two papers outlining the key issues in the CTB negotiations. Some of these issues require a US decision. The page numbers refer to the analysis in the current draft CTB "issues paper" unless otherwise noted as referring to the separate "Permitted Experiments" paper.

I. Duration of the CTB.

- US has tabled five years (PD-38) but we have told Soviets we are reviewing this issue.
- SCC has considered the pros and cons of this issue extensively, i.e., the military risks versus non-proliferation benefits. No new material has been prepared.
- The UK favors five years but could be expected to accept a minimum of three years. The UK urges that US resolve this question as soon as possible.

II. Review Conference to consider follow-on test ban.

- The US has proposed that any follow-on test ban would require "a replacement treaty" (PD-38), while the Soviets refer to "extending" the test ban.
- The UK proposes a formulation between the Soviets' and US':

"The conference shall review the operation of the Treaty and decide whether any treaty arrangements should follow the period of \_\_\_ years."

III. On-site inspection (OSI) justification. The US has proposed that seismic or any other physical evidence could be used to trigger an OSI. The Soviets argue that seismic evidence would be required in addition to any other evidence. No change in U.S. position is being sought (pages 2-3).

IV. National Seismic Stations (NSS). While Soviets have agreed to some parts of our proposal (e.g., continuous operation, complete exchange of all data, installing agreed authentication equipment) and have shown flexibility in other areas (e.g., specifying equipment characteristics in the Agreement, data in digital form), three key issues remain: number of NSS, method of transmitting seismic data, and origin of equipment.

A. Number of NSS.

- We have proposed 15 stations but have considered reduction if duration is reduced. Soviets have not yet agreed to 15 and feel a smaller number would be appropriate if duration is reduced (pages 7 and 24).

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Determination: (Circle Number(s))

1. Classification Revisited
2. Upgraded/Downgraded To:
3. Contains No DOE Classified Info
4. Coordinate With:
5. Declassified
6. Classified Info Exempted
7. Other (Specify): PP 1-3 only

1st Review Date: 11/21/85

Authority DC: DOE

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2nd Review Date: see below

Authority: DD

- UK cautions on reducing our proposal because of the possibility of follow-on test ban arrangements. They argue that the verification agreement should "stand the test of time."
- The schedule for installation of NSS is speculative. The Interagency Working Group is seeking agreed estimate.

B. Method of Transmitting Seismic Data. US proposes that seismic data be transmitted by INTELSAT directly from NSS. Soviets disagree, proposing a monthly exchange of tapes (page 8). The US has the following options:

Option 1 -- Accept Soviet proposal for monthly exchange of tapes. (Pros and cons on page 20.)

Option 2 -- Propose a compromise of weekly exchange of tapes. (Pros and cons on page 21.)

Option 3 -- Propose two-part exchange with some key data on daily basis and complete authenticated tapes monthly. (Pros and cons on pages 21-22.)

Option 4 -- Continue to propose satellite communication. ✓

Option 4 is the most reliable, secure, and least intrusive method compared to the logistical complexities of Soviet proposal. (Other pros and cons on page 22.)

C. Origin of Equipment. US proposes that downhole equipment for NSS be designed and manufactured in the US while the Soviets want to use equipment of any design which meets the agreed technical characteristics (pages 8-10). The US has the following options:

Option 1 -- Revert to an earlier US position permitting parties to obtain NSS equipment which meets agreed characteristics from any source. (Pros and cons on page 16.)

Option 2 -- Propose a new position which would permit each party to design and manufacture stations to be placed on the other party's territory. (Elaboration with pros and cons on pages 16-18.)

Option 3 -- Adhere to present position that US design and manufacture all NSS downhole equipment. (Pros and cons on page 18.)

Option 4 -- (not yet in paper, suggested by DARPA staff) Each party manufacture an NSS of its own design and install both sets at each NSS location. *good idea*

V. On-site Inspection -- Rights and Functions. Soviets have agreed to some aspects of US proposals pertaining to access, basic equipment, transportation, communications, and other ground rules. While there are several unresolved issues such as processing inspection reports and selection of equipment, no new guidance is proposed for delegation at this time.

VI. Permitted Experiments. PD 38 stated that, in addition to experiments in laser fusion and other related areas for civil energy purposes, nuclear weapons experiments should also be permitted under a CTB. Weapons experiments would be limited to those which produce yield levels of a few pounds or somewhat higher. The SCC discussion recommended that 100 pounds should be the upper limit. There are two principal issues remaining: What restriction, if any, should be placed on facilities for these experiments and how should we deal with the Soviets?

A. Facilities. (Note: Compliance with restrictions would be largely unverifiable. The purpose of the restrictions would be for international and domestic acceptance.) The US has the following options:

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Option 1 -- Enclosed, reusable, above ground or partially buried facilities away from nuclear weapon test areas. (Pros and cons, pages 8-9 of Permitted Experiments paper.)

Option 2 -- Enclosed, reusable, above ground or partially buried facilities at any location. (Pros and cons on pages 9-10 of Permitted Experiments paper.)

Option 3 -- No restrictions. (Pros and cons on pages 10-11 of Permitted Experiments paper.)

B. Dealing with Soviets. At issue is how we handle the issue in the CTB. The US has the following options:

Option 1 -- Seek Soviet agreement on a permitted experiments position. (Pros and cons on pages 11-13 of Permitted Experiments paper.)

Option 2 -- Place a US statement of intention on the negotiating record. (Pros and cons on pages 13-14 of Permitted Experiments paper.)

The UK representatives have recommended that no agreement on Permitted Experiments be in the CTB Treaty in any form.