

administration's on how and where to allocate resources. Inter-service differences aside, the Chiefs assumed, in framing the recommendations contained in JSOP 79-86, that the Vladivostok accords would largely govern the sizing and rate of development of strategic offensive forces, and that the United States would continue to commit sizable numbers of general purpose forces and tactical nuclear weapons for possible contingencies in the Far East, to assure stability on the Korean peninsula and to defend against what the Chiefs described in the JSOP as "a significant military threat" posed by the People's Republic of China to nations on its periphery. In fact, the thinking of the Carter administration on these two points was quite different from that of the JCS. Not only did the new administration hope to achieve immediate "deep cuts" in the US and Soviet strategic arsenals, going well below the Vladivostok ceilings, but also it intended to pursue a rapprochement with China in an effort to relax tensions throughout the region, pave the way for the withdrawal of US combat troops from South Korea, and shift greater support to NATO. It was through policy changes such as these coupled with improved management that President Carter hoped to realize most of the permanent savings in defense spending that he had promised during the 1976 campaign.

(U) Shortly after taking office, President Carter directed Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to provide the NSC with a "detailed review" of the defense budget, a first step toward the broader review initiated in February 1977 under PRM-10.¹⁷ Anticipating the President's request, Brown had identified immediate savings totaling nearly \$3 billion attainable through slowdowns in the MX ICBM and other strategic programs, cutbacks in some procurement areas, and the outright elimination of certain programs (e.g., the Air Force's A-7E fighter and the Navy's nuclear powered strike cruiser) that he and his budget advisers deemed "marginally" important to national security. Favorably impressed, Carter in mid-February gave his unqualified approval to the adjustments Brown proposed.¹⁸ Looking ahead, Brown told the President that he was conducting more thorough studies to explore ever greater savings in four areas: (1) strategic programs, focusing on the B-1 bomber, the MX ICBM, and cruise missiles; (2) the F-15 fighter program; (3) NATO readiness and mobility forces; and (4) the Navy's ship construction program.¹⁹

(S) The Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum (PPGM) issued by the Secretary of Defense in March 1977 for FY 1979-1983

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WFS

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¹⁷ Memo, Brzezinski to Brown, 27 Jan 77, U, JCS 2458/983, 551 (27 Jan 77).

¹⁸ Memo, Brzezinski to Brown, 21 Feb 77, U, enclosing Carter's approval as indicated on memo, Brown to Carter, 18 Feb 77, U, National Security Adviser Collection, Subject File box 9, Budget: FY 78 Defense folder, Carter Library.

¹⁹ Memo, Brown to Carter, 26 Jan 77, U, CJCS Files (Jones), NSC Memo File 1977.

Department of Energy Document Review	
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confirmed that the administration's intention for the time being was to cap defense programs, pending the outcome of NSC and DOD reviews of basic policy, procurement practices, and overall strategy. Accompanying fiscal guidance indicated that any additional funding would be held to a minimum, confined mainly to offsetting the impact of inflation.²⁰ The thrust of the PPGM was to encourage, within existing fiscal limits, the development of a more flexible overall force posture, capable of responding to a wide range of nuclear and non-nuclear contingencies. For general purpose forces, this meant primary emphasis on early combat in the Central Region of Europe, the stockpiling of arms and equipment there, and the protection of sea lanes to guarantee the arrival of timely and effective reinforcements, with secondary emphasis on preparing for lesser contingencies in the Middle East or Korea. The basic force structure, however, would remain essentially the same as the year before: sixteen active and eight reserve divisions for the Army; twenty-six active and ten reserve wings for the Air Force; three active Marine Amphibious Forces and one reserve; and a Navy of twelve multipurpose carriers (plus one reserve for training purposes), eighty attack submarines, and 203 surface combatants (175 active and twenty-eight reserve).²¹

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(8) Strategic forces, already constrained to some extent by the SALT I agreements, would likewise remain at or near their current levels. Full-scale engineering development of the air-launched cruise missile initiated during the Ford administration, and further work to improve the effectiveness of the Trident II SLBM against hardened targets, would continue. But production and deployment of the MX would be held in abeyance, pending further study of basing options. Also undecided was the fate of the B-1 bomber which, though funded for prototype procurement, stood a good chance of being canceled before the end of the year owing to campaign promises President Carter had made to curtail the program. As a possible alternative to the B-1, the Secretary's guidance cited the possibility of "enhancing the penetration capability of [other] manned bombers," an apparent reference to Air Force efforts to upgrade the FB-111.

(8) In fact, the general purpose force levels in the Secretary's PPGM for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps were identical to those proposed by the Joint Chiefs for FY 1979 in JSOP 79-86. Where the Secretary's guidance diverged was in the programmed size of the Navy: one fewer carrier and slightly fewer surface combatants than the Chiefs had endorsed in the JSOP. The reasoning behind this decision was complex, but basically it

Memorandum
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²⁰ Memo, Brown to Secys Mil Depts and CJCS, 2 Mar 77, S/GDS, JCS 2458/988, 551 (11 Mar 77).

²¹ Memo, Brown to Secys Mil Depts, et. al., 11 Mar 77, S/GDS, JCS 2458/988, 551 (11 Mar 77). Navy and Marine Corps force-level figures from JFM FY 1979-1986, T8, JCS 2458/993, 557 (26 Apr 77).

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