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account of mtg

Office of the Secretary of Defense ~~SECRET~~
Chief, RDD-E&D, WHS
Date: 21 OCT 80 Authority: EO 13526
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WS
3 Feb 1977

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Doc # (58)

These are notes of the SCC meeting of February 3. Present were President Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretaries Vance and Brown, Director Lance, Acting Directors Knoche, Shloss, Ambassador Johnson, Deputy Secretary Duncan, General Brown, and Dr. Brzezinski.

The President opened the meeting by saying that it was his most cherished hope that he would go out of office with substantial and dramatic reductions of the common threat between the USSR and the US, and that these measures would induce France, China and others to join in the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear weapons. This was a long-range goal and might not be achieved within our lifetime, but without leadership it would never be done. At the same time, he wanted to be sure that our relationship with our adversaries would be given assured equivalent capability, he would never make the United States unilaterally vulnerable. He recognized that there were many variations in opinion on this, and some leeway.

He felt that there was an opportunity for real progress. Breshnev had also expressed this view, and had taken the initiative to raise the issue by messages to him through various intermediaries.

It was also essential that the agreement be monitorable.

The Dobrynin meeting had outlined the points of dispute, including cruise missile range, mobiles, the comprehensive test ban, the time period of the agreement, Backfire (in covering assurances as to range, and tanker prohibitions). They had explored the idea of prior notification of missile tests. In short, we had already begun a dialogue and want to explore Soviet intentions quickly.

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Vance: In the next set of papers, we should address the implications of each resolution of the SALT II situation on SALT III negotiations.

Shloss: Also we should look at theater implications of SALT agreements, and particularly the possibility of later dealing with gray area systems.

Brown: There is a specific point on cruise missiles -- if you limit range, given their relatively lagged technology, the Soviets could now build a bigger cruise missile "legitimately" and then as they improve technology improve the range greatly by miniaturization.

Brzezinski: Is it an adequate summary that we all agree that the January 1976 proposal is not acceptable.

Vance and Brown: No, that's too strong, that's the way we are tending now, but we should look at it some more.

Brzezinski: Are we agreed also then that omitting Backfire and cruise missiles altogether is not a viable option. [General agreement.]

Aaron: To summarize, you want a discussion of the fairness, military effects, and verifiability of various elements in packages including reductions.

Brzezinski: That's right. There should be a Working Group Meeting to discuss the next papers, with a target of a meeting around February 22.

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long-range mobiles because it has sufficient numbers of fixed ICBM missiles. The President asked how we could confirm the difference between the two. Dobrynin said, "I will pass the question to my people."

The President suggested the Soviets might consider keeping their present SS-20s, but adding no additional ones or new types of mobile missiles. He added that he would like mobile missiles eliminated. He again asked if Dobrynin could tell us how to distinguish between the two missiles.

Advance Notice of Missile Test Firings

The President indicated that he would like to reach a formal agreement with the Soviet Union to have advance notice—at least 24 hours—of missile test firings. This, according to the President, would allow us to avoid any misunderstandings on intentions. This advance notice would include sea-launched missiles. Dobrynin responded: "that is a good idea."

[Omitted here is discussion related to other arms control issues.]

149. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 3, 1977, 9:06-10:48 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary Report for your Information and Reaction of the Special Coordination Committee Meeting, Feb. 3

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

The President (for the first half of the meeting)
The Vice President
A. Denis Clift

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 113, SALT: 1-2/1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the page is Carter's handwritten note that reads: "OK, J.C."

State
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Leslie Gelb
U. Alexis Johnson
DOD
Secretary Harold Brown
Charles W. Duncan
Walter Slocumbe
JCS
Gen. George S. Brown
Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny
CIA
Erno Knoche
Howard Stoertz

OMB
Bert Lance
ACDA
Leon Sloss
Paul Wolfowitz
NSC
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
William G. Hyland
Dr. Victor Utgoff
Dr. Roger Molander
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS²

1) The President asked for an analysis of the previous SALT negotiating history, and for some specific options directly related to the Vladivostok agreement, without profound deviation, including what our negotiating position should be on limits on cruise missiles and Backfire. He indicated that he wished to become thoroughly familiar with the details concerning these matters, including the consequences for the U.S. of various negotiating positions.

2) The President asked for an analysis of an ultimate relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which would include profound mutual reductions in overall strategic nuclear capability, carefully monitored, which would not be unfavorable to either side. He indicated his desire to go as low as possible while still retaining an adequate deterrent capability. He suggested the possibility of including at a later date France and the PRC in mutual program reductions.

3) The President confirmed his commitment to the military leaders that we would not put forward positions without adequate prior consultation and that he would not permit circumvention of normal discussions.

4) The President indicated that, while he would hate ever to have to make the decision, he had no intention of foregoing the use of nuclear weapons to defend the US or the freedom of our European allies.

5) The President asked Secretary Brown to prepare a brief summary of our ASW capability.

² No minutes of SCC meetings were found unless otherwise indicated. The minutes of this meeting are ibid., Institutional Files, Box 84, SCC 002, 2/3/77, SALT. Typically, Gary Sick prepared summaries of the meetings for Brzezinski's review, who then gave them to President Carter within hours of the meeting. Carter often made handwritten comments in the margins, and the annotated version was then used as the first item of business at the following SCC meeting. (Sick, *All Fall Down*, p. 247)

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 FROM: [redacted] Chief, ROD, WWS
 IMM ED [redacted], Section 3.5
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6) The Vice President stressed the importance of absolute security for these internal U.S. deliberations so as to permit a free exploration and exchange of ideas, some of which may never be considered seriously.

7) The President agreed that we need to let our European allies know what we are doing but that we must not allow their nervousness to drive our negotiations.

8) The President asked for further information on any agreements we have with the British and Germans on prior notification.

9) Dr. Brzezinski suggested proceeding as follows on four major issues:

—analyze a range of options for a SALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok formula;

—analyze the possibility of a SALT TWO agreement based on significant reductions;

—provide a recommendation to the President as to whether we should stick to Vladivostok for the present or go to a reductions proposal immediately;

—look at other aspects which might also be considered, such as the Test Ban, a Civil Defense Ban (as an extension of the ABM agreement), or exchange of sensitive information.

10) It was agreed to inform the President that the preliminary feeling of the SCC was that it was questionable whether it was negotiable or desirable to omit cruise missiles and Backfire from a SALT TWO agreement. However, some participants felt that for tactical negotiating reasons this option should not be publicly excluded.

11) It was agreed that the Working Group should prepare the following packages (either or both of which might be explored in Moscow by Secretary Vance in March) for another meeting of the SCC to take place after February 22:

—some packages based on the Vladivostok agreement, some of which would be related to the January 1976 proposal and some of which would depart from that proposal;

—a preliminary package involving significant reductions from the Vladivostok levels.

These packages should contain assessments of related political, military and verification issues.

150. Memorandum From Senator Henry M. Jackson to President Carter¹

Washington, undated.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON SALT

Summary Comment

In what follows I have tried to review those SALT issues that will determine the success of your administration in realizing its goal of reducing dependence on the resort to nuclear destruction while providing for the security of our country and its allies.

A sound SALT agreement could be an important element in your efforts to achieve this goal; an unsound agreement could impair those efforts and make that goal more remote.

It is essential to remember that not all negotiable agreements are in our interest; that some agreements may be worse than none; that the failure to obtain an agreement now does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of doing so in the future; and that an unsound agreement now could make it difficult or impossible to obtain a sound one later.

The previous administration often forgot these obvious truths. Too often it persuaded itself that its choice had narrowed to a risky agreement on Soviet terms or no agreement at all. Too often it lost sight of the goals that a sound SALT agreement could promote; often agreement itself became its goal.²

The previous administration helped to create a climate of urgency that made it difficult to think carefully about these complex issues. Cliches about the spiraling "arms race" have obscured the fact that we have been spending and doing less while the Soviets were spending and doing more. Despite a general impression to the contrary, the U.S. strategic budget actually peaked in the 1950's and declined from then

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SALT, 1-2/77. No classification marking. Jackson sent the memorandum to President Carter as an enclosure to a February 15 memorandum, in which he wrote: "In accordance with our discussion at the White House breakfast on Friday, February 4, I am enclosing a memorandum to you on SALT, together with a summary comment." Carter handwrote on the covering memorandum that copies were to be sent to Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski for their comment. On February 17, Carter sent Jackson a brief handwritten note that reads: "Your SALT memorandum is excellent, and of great help to me. I will stay in touch with you concerning future developments—Thank you!" (Ibid.) Carter and Jackson had breakfast together the morning of February 4. (Ibid., Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion was found.

² In the margin an unknown hand (presumably Brown) wrote, "The nukes are in the Balance not agreements."