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3015 - *with Harold (he  
E JCO) & comment  
to me by Sat.* (38)

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

SALT  
- See HR's comment

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OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

September 21, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Paul C. Warnke *PCW*  
SUBJECT: SALT: Strategy for Gromyko Talks

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In the climate created by your Middle East success, Cy Vance and I believe that this is an opportune time to take the initiative in SALT aimed at signing an agreement by the end of the year. If we are to do this, and avoid a lengthy and risky delay, the basis for settlement of the outstanding issues must be laid down while Gromyko is in the United States. Cy will be meeting with Gromyko in New York on Wednesday, September 27, and possibly Thursday morning, September 28. Gromyko will be coming to Washington on Saturday, September 30.

USSR 388.3

To establish this basis for wrapping up the agreement this year, Cy and I have drawn up the following suggestions, which represent no drastic change in our position and will in no way adversely affect the strategic posture of the United States. In the final analysis, these are issues for political judgment, and it is our view that SALT remains good politics both internally and internationally. A successful conclusion hinges on a decisive and unified administration position on the remaining issues as was the case at Camp David.

BACKFIRE

Before I went to Moscow, you decided that we should indicate flexibility on Backfire only after a positive and substantive response to the package I presented there. The fact that I both emphasized the importance we attached to the Backfire issues and stressed our general desire to conclude SALT TWO led to some confusion on the Russian side. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko asked me in a private conversation whether my presentation represented a hardening of our position. Cy and I believe that Gromyko probably won't be too positive on the general package unless there

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is some hint of US flexibility on Backfire. We believe that you should authorize Cy to tell Gromyko early in his sessions that we are taking into account the Soviet arguments on this issue and that, provided the Soviets move toward us on other issues, we are prepared to discuss ways we might resolve the Backfire issue. This will give Gromyko incentive to indicate flexibility at an early stage of the round, so we will be in a position to make progress before Gromyko returns, perhaps when he meets with you.

#### CRUISE MISSILES ON HEAVY BOMBERS

In accordance with the instructions, I informed Gromyko in Moscow that, as a practical matter, we could not deploy more than 20 cruise missiles on a heavy bomber and could not deploy cruise missiles with independently targettable warheads for the protocol period. There is, I believe, little chance that the Soviets will accept this as an adequate quid pro quo for their agreement to accept fractionation limits on ICBMs through 1985.

We should wait for Gromyko's reaction to my Moscow statement. But Cy and I suggest we be prepared to add to this statement by telling Gromyko, as we have told Congress, that we have no programs planned for deploying more than 20 cruise missiles per bomber or any cruise missiles with multiple independently targettable warheads prior to 1984. I think we ought to give this informal approach a very hard push with the Soviets. But I also think we have to be prepared for the possibility that this will be a real sticking point with them. In this case, we might consider agreeing to some formal limit simply for the period of protocol.

*miss  
to be  
etc.*

#### PERIOD OF THE PROTOCOL AND DESTRUCTION/DISMANTLING

In Moscow I presented our new proposal which extends the date for termination of the protocol and completion of dismantling and destruction from December 31, 1980 through June 1981. Gromyko's response on duration was that he could not agree to a certain date when we didn't know when the agreement would be completed or signed. On completion of dismantling and destruction, he repeated their Geneva position that physical limitations prevent completion of dismantling and destruction before the end of 1981.

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The date for termination of the protocol is much more important to us than a six-month difference in reaching the new lower ceilings. Here again we should wait for Gromyko's comments on these related issues. But Cy and I believe we should be prepared to tell Gromyko, either in New York or when he meets with you in Washington, that if they will agree to the June 1981 protocol date, we will agree to December 31, 1981 as the date for completion of destruction or dismantling, provided that this begins no later than the end of 1980 and continues at a steady rate throughout the year. The six-month differential beyond the protocol period, with a steady rate of dismantling and destruction throughout 1981, will not interfere significantly with greater SALT THREE reductions or give the Soviets any bargaining leverage on protocol issues. As long as the protocol date holds, our allies will have no problems with this proposal. If Gromyko sees the end in sight and signature of SALT TWO this year, the June 1981 protocol date may be acceptable.

*Disagree. The most important thing is that both dates be the same. I'd prefer for Sept 30 1981, but would perhaps settle for Dec 31 1981.*

CRUISE MISSILE RANGE ALLOWANCES

We believe that our current position is neither necessary for us nor consistent with good faith bargaining with the Soviets:

-- When we agreed on 2500 km. and 600 km. limits we gave no indication that we would seek significant additional range - capability. In effect, we are now arguing for 3500 km. ALCMs with no limits on fuel reserves and nearly 1500 km. range for GLCMs and SLCMs which would be completely unconstrained by SALT.

-- We can, in any case, test all cruise missiles up to 2500 km. even without allowances.

-- When the protocol expires, there will be no range limits on cruise missiles, except for those on airplanes other than heavy bombers.

-- We have told our allies our policy is that we will not accept any further constraints on GLCMs and SLCMs after the protocol expires without appropriate limits on Soviet theater forces.

*meaningless unless we say what's appropriate*

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We can live with a flat 40% allowance including fuel reserves on all systems for the protocol period.

Not for use

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It is our judgment that if these items can be made a part of our negotiating approach to Gromyko, we will be able to make sufficient progress in SALT to set the stage for a successful Summit meeting between you and President Brezhnev.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 20 SEP 2016 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. § 552

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