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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28 FEB 1979 12 02 *latest*

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SALT

JCSM-56-79  
27 February 1979

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*was - the points are*  
*appropriate, but*  
*what should be next*  
*U.S. steps on this matter?*  
*HWS*

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 20 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Telemetry and SALT Verification (U)

1. (S) Despite repeated attempts, including specific discussion at the Vance-Gromyko level, the United States has been unable to achieve an unambiguous understanding with the Soviet Union regarding telemetry encryption.
2. (S) The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to language in the Joint Draft Text which establishes that deliberate denial of telemetric information is prohibited whenever it impedes verification. Under instructions, both Secretary Vance and Ambassador Earle have made statements to their Soviet counterparts citing as examples the telemetry encryption practiced on 29 July 1978 and on 21 December 1978 in SS-18 tests, which, if extended to a new or modified ICBM, would constitute deliberate concealment that impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty. They further stated that, if the Soviets differ with this interpretation, they should so state because the United States will use this statement as part of the record. Although the Soviets have not disputed the interpretation, Ambassador Karpov, in his 14 February 1979 plenary statement, repeated, under instructions, earlier Soviet insistence that the common understanding "does not require additional interpretations." This statement serves to highlight the lack of a common understanding.

USSR 388.3

Classified by Director, J-5  
REVIEW ON 23 FEBRUARY 1999  
EXTENDED BY DIRECTOR, J-5  
REASON: 5200.1R, PARA 2-301c7

330-82-0205, box 25, USSR 388.3 (Jan-Feb) 1979

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157-1612

SEC DEF COMB No. X01298N


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3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe continued access to Soviet telemetry is too critical to verification to accept any ambiguity. Such ambiguity only serves to undermine the confidence of both sides with regard to the verifiability of the treaty. Further, the likely qualitative limitations and possible lower force levels of SALT III, and the attendant increase in the complexity of verification, will require greater cooperation on the part of the Soviets than they have shown to date. Not only must the Soviets agree not to impede verification, they must also show a willingness to agree to take cooperative measures regarding verification if the United States is to have sufficient confidence in Soviet actions and behavior to achieve the types of arms control measures envisioned for the 1980's. Impeding access to telemetry runs counter to that objective and degrades, rather than increases, confidence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that these factors must be pointedly stressed to the Soviets. As a minimum, a clear understanding that insures continued access to Soviet telemetry is needed before proceeding further with SALT II.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Date: 20 SEP 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
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