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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

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A very good memo.  
KB

June 6, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: Jim McIntyre *Jim*  
SUBJECT: Strategic Program Issues

7 JUN 1979  
SECDEF HAS SEEN

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Tentative Decisions and reasons:

1. Selection of missile size and configuration.

During the strategic program review last year OMB raised the issue of whether a common missile (Air Force and Navy) should be developed in order to save money.

After a thorough review in cooperation with Department of Defense and other agencies we have concluded that selection of a common missile design would not be wise. While there is clearly the possibility of substantial savings, over \$2 billion, other factors outweigh this consideration.

These include:

- a. savings are possible but far from assured given institutional (inter-service) and technical considerations
- b. technical-operational risks increase because of commonality thus reducing some of the inherent stability of the triad
- c. schedule delay of at least one year in the initial development of the land based option
- d. need to surrender the opportunity to deploy full MX (190,000 lbs.)
- e. political considerations

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 3 0 2016

CLASSIFIED BY *Jim McIntyre*  
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2. It continues to be necessary to have a survivable, verifiable land based missile force in order to preserve the triad. It continues to present the Soviets with three long term problems in terms of negating US forces. In addition, it displays US determination to maintain a strong deterrence while improving both the Soviet's incentive for large reductions in SALT III and the ability to make reductions that are balanced and thus inherently stable.

3. The remaining critical issue is the land basing mode for such a system. The selection of the mode is the most difficult aspect of the decision. It is critical that the system be designed to be survivable (secure) and verifiable. In addition, the deployment mode must meet environmental considerations, be cost-effective, be capable of expansion and contraction, meet perceptual needs (Congress, public, Allies) and meet SALT constraints (both offense and defense limits). ✓

Because of the complexity of the issue, the inherent trade-offs that must be made in its selection and the large number of mobile launcher variants that must be considered it is premature to make the choice now. Besides the need for assessing the alternatives against the mutually conflicting criteria presented above there are still a number of questions that must be answered about key options; including technical problems, impact on schedule, land use and cost. We are confident that these questions can be answered in the next few weeks.

4. A note on cost of the system cannot be determined until the basing mode is selected. However, if the 10 year investment cost is between \$30-35 billion (1980\$), the program will clearly be manageable within the currently projected DOD budget, even at the acquisition "peaks." Even with the deployment of an MX, cruise missiles, and TRIDENT, these annual totals will remain in the \$11-14B range (constant FY 80 dollars), or less than 10% of projected totals. ✓

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