



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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SALT
BY
12/27
ws - see my notes
HB

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs 27 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: SALT: Trip Report: Vance-Gromyko Geneva Meetings,
December 21-23, 1978

(b) Attached at Tab A are copies of the reporting cables as well as my own notes from Vance's debrief where they differ from the reporting cables in any substantial respects.

(c) Overall, I believe the trip produced a reluctant success, in that on all of the major issues, we were able to go a long way toward achieving the results we had decided we needed: (The chart at Tab B summarizes where we are.)

Telemetry Encryption.

(d) The Soviets have apparently agreed to the approach we sought. The hard issue has always been the scope of the prohibition, not the words. The result on what is prohibited, i.e., on what encryption could impede, while not ideal, is incompatible with a later Soviet contention that the negotiating history reflects agreement that telemetry is irrelevant or even Soviet persistence in asserting that proposition. We do, however, need to continue to stress the utility of a formal recording of the statement which Secretary Vance made. The issue is not the solemnity of the statement, which is, of course, better served by a Vance-Gromyko or Carter-Brezhnev exchange than by an Earl-Karpov exchange. The issue is that of creating an appropriately formal record, not just for Congress but for the Soviets. The need for such a record with the Russians is indicated by our confusion over what H.A.K. may or may not have said with respect to Minutemen shelters.

(e) Apart from making the record more formal -- and apart from Gromyko's reservation of Moscow's acceptance -- the position is fairly good on telemetry encryption:

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15-m-1657

330-81-012, box 4, USSR 386.3 (Dec - Nov) 1978

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- (S) The language agreed is a blend of the Soviet permissive and American prohibitory:

"THE SIDES AGREE THAT THE NEGOTIATING RECORD REFLECTS THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH PARTY IS FREE TO USE VARIOUS METHODS OF TRANSMITTING TELEMETRIC INFORMATION DURING TESTING, INCLUDING ITS ENCRYPTION, EXCEPT THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XV, NEITHER PARTY SHALL ENGAGE IN DELIBERATE DENIAL OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION, SUCH AS THROUGH THE USE OF TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION, WHENEVER SUCH DENIAL IMPEDES VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY."

(S) The explicit admission of the possibility of legal encryption, which results from adoption of some Soviet language, has been inherent in our position from the beginning and the Soviets are agreeing to a direct prohibition on encryption that impedes.

- (S) Gromyko did not contradict this view in the face of Vance's warning that they should object now if they had objections. Of course, that silence does not amount to an affirmative agreement, and there should be no exaggeration on that score, but it is better than the Soviets persisting in saying telemetry is irrelevant to verification or illegitimate as a subject of NTM.

One question which arises is whether we should make any follow-up with respect to the recent tests.

[REDACTED]

We might also think of suggesting to the Soviets that they should refrain from encryption adventures during the ratification process. Finally, this question of when the ban on encryption takes effect is one which we should bear in mind in thinking about whether we want an agreement that the sides will abide by the terms of the treaty between signature and ratification.

We must also recognize that the Soviets have not yet definitively accepted the compromise language. The Soviets have reserved their position. What Gromyko said was that he had no difficulty with it and would recommend approval of the language. That allows the Soviet Government to repudiate his position or to hold off agreeing. To forestall such a tactic, I believe we should promptly table the new language, and should make the Vance "silence" statement at the same time. An important reason for pressing for prompt agreement on the

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

*CV (+ Enck)
are very sensitive
(1 negot...)*

on this. The decision may have to be made at the top.

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language (plus whatever silence in the face of US statements we decide to insist on further) to backup Vance's warning of Thursday afternoon that without agreement on telemetry, we cannot proceed on the other matters.

Cruise Missile Definition.

The Soviets agreed to split the "armed" definition into two parts, one for ALCMs in the Treaty, one for GL/SLCMs in Protocol. This step may be more impressive to those of us who study the agreement with a microscope than to others with more perspective, but it was an issue to which the Soviets attached a fair amount of importance -- and it re-inforces the proposition that this definition is not necessarily permanent. (Incidentally, the Soviet agreement to have separate CM definitions, as well as their dropping the 2500 kilometer ALCM range in the Protocol, suggests to me that they have heavily discounted any chance of a simple extension of the protocol. Also interesting in this context, is Karpov's statement that any limits on the systems covered in the protocol would require a new negotiation. This recognition that the protocol sets a precedent only in a rhetorical sense is a point we may want to consider including in our briefing in the allies.)

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However, there remains an important piece of unfinished business with respect to the Cruise Missile definition: The need promptly to make the statement, which Secretary Vance agreed is appropriate, that this definition of GLCMs and SLCMs in the protocol does not set a precedent for the definition which might apply to any future limitations on such systems. (In a potentially troublesome bit of confusion, the FRG and UK have been told that the "no precedent" statement was made in Geneva.) Attached at Tab C is a statement drafted for Vance to use.

I agree

I had noticed that (with dismay)

Here again, we should promptly table language to implement the apparent high level agreement.

Agree

The Protocol.

There was no concrete progress on this issue but Gromyko's business about two years and nine months duration if ratification takes place by the end of March is the first definite break in their rigid insistence on three years from entry in force. It seems pretty clearly to suggest we should stick on December 31, 1981.

CV says this may be a real sticking point with Sovs.

Backfire.

In an important development, Gromyko confirmed the thirty per annum production rate, and held out hope that Brezhnev would do the same. The reporting cable is, of course, our only record of that confirmation

by Gromyko. We should continue to press for Brezhnev to confirm the same number. Indeed, it will be a source of additional complication if we have to say that Gromyko confirmed the number in a private conversation with Vance but Brezhnev then did not confirm at the Summit.

AG told CI it would. done on. - one LZB to

ALCM Average.

The 27-28 split is a little silly, but rather than settle for 27 1/2, there is something to be said for trying to hold out for 28. It is a whole number, not a fraction, and it is (barely) closer to our opening position of 35 than their effective opening position of 20.

of course

The bigger problem is the so-called "defacto limit" of 20 ALCM's per carrier (not just per B-52) during the period of the treaty. An important piece of data in this matter is what the President actually said to Gromyko in September of 1978 with respect to this point. The MEMCON of Secretary Vance's October 1st meeting with Gromyko says that the "no-plans" alternative to an average was stated conditionally as follows:

I don't see how we can have this and the 28 (or 27) language in the Treaty, as a practical political matter.

"We would be prepared to give the Soviets a US statement indicating that we will continue to develop and test cruise missile concepts and various cruise missile carriers, but do not plan to deploy cruise missile carriers with more than 20 ALCMs or to deploy multiple warhead ALCMs during the period of the agreement, dependent on deployment of Soviet air defenses and other forces, including the total number of Soviet warheads."

We should go no further than this conditional formula. Any sort of waiver of a US right would be an endless headache -- and bar an important and viable option.

even if it is not a legally binding waiver (the distinction which CV noted that AG made).

ICBM Fractionation.

The formal state of play remains the same: if the ALCM issue can be settled, there will be a freeze on the number of RVs on existing ICBMs and a maximum of 10 on the exemption. However, the ALCM issue now seems considerably closer to solution. Given the interest in air mobiles, the agreement to a maximum of 10 RBs on ASBMs is not trivial. Gromyko also re-affirmed the 14 RV limit on SLBMs.

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remote piloted vehicles

RPVs and Multiple Warheads Cruise Missiles.

These emerged as the new, tough issues of the meetings. Obviously any issue can become important at the end, but it seems surprising that the Soviets would have chosen these two if they were really trying to position themselves for a breakdown as opposed simply to delay. (In this context, I find it mildly curious that they dropped, even conditionally, the Minuteman II/Minuteman III issue -- on which their case is in many respects not a bad one.)

On the RPV and MW/CM issues it seems to me that the US should not fall into what could be a facinatingly complicated negotiation but simply to stick hard to our positions: that a type rule is sufficient for unarmed cruise missiles (RPVs), and that the limitations on multiple warhead cruise missiles should conform to basic structure of the agreement, and apply only to ALCMs after the protocol expires, and should cover deployment only, not testing. (In this context, too, we need to know what was said to the Soviets in Washington in late September. Again, the Vance-Gromyko Memcon of Oct 1 is clear on the limited scope of the representation about multiple warhead cruise missiles: "In this option, (that is, the average) we would in addition provide a statement that the US has no plans for multiple warhead ALCM deployment prior to 1985."

I agree

Other Issues.

Although the list is shrinking, a number of further points remain to be worked out that got little or no attention in the Vance Gromyko talks. They include:

- New types definition: We should look closely at the 20% downside variation which Gromyko proposed. That would create a very large envelope and we should, at a minimum, use it to get the other things we need in respect to definition. Further in this area, we should decide very promptly whether we want the Soviets to declare their RV numbers on existing types. (Incidentally, Nitze's paper, which is certainly available to the Soviets, discusses the Pave Pepper seven-RV Minuteman III test, so that is a matter of public record.

If an inclusion project this as allowing another new missile

- Bomber/CMC Rule: This on the whole seems rather well in hand.

- B1/Tu-95 Tam 18 Silos/Bear AS-3 Carriers: This collection of accounting problems should be addressed promptly. I know how annoyed you are at the idea of counting the US B1s but not the Backfire, but I'm not sure that we would necessarily be the ones to gain from a rule that exempts bomber airframes on the grounds of their not being operational. However, we should at a minimum get the TT 18 treated

in the same way as the BIs, or else get some agreement on what is to happen to those silos. Similarly, we should press for an answer on the Bear AS 3 carriers.

- Minuteman Shelters. I think Minuteman shelters situation is a bit of a problem. I will be sending a separate memo. The essential questions are whether the removal of shelters is to be reciprocal or unilateral, when it is to take place on our part, what kind of environmental covers are permissible consistent with the representation to the Soviets, and how, if at all, this rule is to be formalized.

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Next Steps.

I Agree this Needs to be cleaned up

I agree, because I have no basis to disagree, with the general assessment that the Soviets are stalling for time. When there will be a break in their position and whether they will want to link agreement to a summit date with substantive agreement are basically guesses about Soviet tactics and views of the Chinese visit. I believe it is only a question of a political decision from Moscow before all issues can be resolved. A question we should face in thinking about our own timing and tactics is whether we should insist on settling in terms of all the outstanding issues before setting a date for a Summit.

Meanwhile, we should use the time to work on the JDT issues. Moreover, we should use the delegation to the maximum degree possible for working on the remaining issues and firming up the decisions apparently reached in the recent talks. Working through the delegations allows the US, as well as the Soviet Union, to deal at a lower level which is especially important on the trivia that the Soviets have chosen to stall on. We should not waste time and prestige by having the Secretary of State negotiating with Ambassador Dobrynin about unarmed cruise missiles.

Yes

More generally, it is very much in our interest to try to translate the apparent agreements on the important issues into JDT language quickly and to cast conceptual agreements on other issues in terms that fit in to the JDT. Finally, and by no means it is unimportant, the delegation process is inherently more open.

✓

Administrative Points.

Secretary Vance was not as open in his internal management of the delegation as he has been on some occasions, but ultimately we got good debriefs and a chance to comment on the reporting cables. He had a long talk with Rowny just before he left Geneva, the content of which I do not know.

Geneva is an excellent locale for serious work, because we (and Russians) have excellent communications and the support of expert delegations.

I believe you should try to see all Memcons, particularly of these final meetings. You may find yourself in a position where you will be asked what the Soviets have said and what has been said to them at high levels.

Finally, it seems to me to be appropriate to keep the allies and Congress filled in during this period while the Soviets are stalling. Therefore:

- a. The NAC now scheduled for January 8 should go forward as a low key summary by Earle. *Earle*
- b. Key senators and staff should be briefed. (See Tab D). ✓

Walter Slocombe

Walter Slocombe
Director, DoD SALT Task Force

Attachments *DNC*

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