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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

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March 5, 1978

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Comments on Consolidated Guidance - ACTION MEMORANDUM

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comments.
This is a useful
critique. We should
incorporate as
much of it as we can.

(U) We have gone over the latest draft of the Consolidated Guidance (CG) in some detail and were pleased to note many improvements in consistency, clarity, and substance. In particular, the accommodation of our concerns regarding the 17 January version's fiscal guidance, fragmentation of strategy guidance, and failure to draw on NATO guidance documents will make the CG a much more useful foundation for Service planning and programming.

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They have copies of 100-54

(U) However, several rather fundamental problems have not yet been entirely resolved. Since we recognize that time is short for further revisions to this draft, we will confine our remarks to the most critical issues and reserve comment on other concerns until a later date.

Strategic Nuclear Forces:

(S) First, we remain concerned with the CG's assessment of trends in the strategic balance and in its assumption on force application. A thread of "best case" analysis permeates Section B, conveying an optimism about the future maintenance of essential equivalence (as defined in your FY 79 Defense Report). We believe that, as a minimum, the need for a comprehensive strategic net assessment should be cited in the CG, with explicit recognition that future strategic program guidance may be adjusted based on analyses of risks and relative capabilities. A basic national goal should be to maintain the number of SNDVs at SALT limits. We note an unexplained decrease in SNDVs on page B-3. We also plan to provide strategic options in our FY 80-84 POM should U. S. SALT goals not be achieved.

To a degree we should be able to accommodate this concern. Hardly a basic strategic goal, but a useful contribution.

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Date: AUG 31 2015

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~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL~~
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~~OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652~~
~~AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED~~
~~AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS.~~
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(S) We welcome the opportunity to address alternative B-52 standoff/penetration mixes in our POM, but note that the guidance on this issue still defines cruise missile IOC as one B-52 with 20 cruise missiles. Based on the discussion at our CG issues meeting, we should be able to settle on a more realistic definition of the term "operational capability," such as a fully operational, ALCM capable, B-52G squadron which we estimate can be provided by late CY 1982.

I had changed this please copy - could not find version

Fighter Interceptor Force:

(S) The revised CG does not specifically address the broader question of fighter/interceptor force structure or its composition, e.g., the 26/2 force. We believe it would be consistent with your views on strategic air defense to issue guidance along the following lines:

- Continue to dedicate 6 active squadrons for strategic air defense and worldwide contingencies.
- Air Force may provide limited modernization in basic program using planned procurement aircraft
- Additional modernization may be included in enhanced budget
- The Air Force should be permitted to identify the specific composition, or mix, of this force and change it to reflect the availability of total force fighter aircraft over time
- Continue with TAC augmentation of air defense
- Plan to have equivalent of one wing of F-15s available for CONUS air defense in a crisis
- Continue the 10 Air Reserve Force air defense squadrons.

Whatever language is used should leave open the question of whether there will be a dedicated first wing for air def. AF to put in their priority order. Keep present F-15 force while that is decided.

Contingency Forces:

(S) We question the logic in directing preparation for two simultaneous contingencies--a NATO and a non-NATO conflict--yet structuring forces such that only a "holding action" elsewhere might be supportable should we be engaged in Europe. The argument--that the character of designated contingency forces (e.g., their "flexible, expeditionary nature") represents an additive capability with political

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utility--would evaporate if we find ourselves actually committed to two simultaneous conflicts. Moreover, the rationale that the size of a non-NATO contingency force is smaller than the range of uncertainty in force needs for Central Europe strikes us as a frayed fig leaf for "double-counting" forces which cannot be "doubly employed."

(S) We recognize that probable budget levels will not, in the near term, support the forces required for high confidence execution of two simultaneous missions. We should recognize short range deficiencies and come to grips with long range requirements to avoid self-delusion. We would much prefer a recognition that, for the immediate future, we must do first things first, relying on fiscally constrained "swing" forces, but fully intending to analyze and, over time, procure the forces appropriate to our national strategy.

NATO/GP Forces:

I think there is something to their argument, the question is how to express it in the guidance.

(S) Despite many improvements in the "Forces for NATO" section, we are still concerned that our approach is too narrowly focused. The words on maldeployment of forces and the CENTAG/NORTHAG capability imbalances have been beefed up, but the underlying analysis still treats NATO-WP force ratios in linear fashion.

(S) The CG directs the Services jointly to assume that until additional land-based air forces are available and adequate to make a significant contribution to the air defense of the sea lanes, 2 two-carrier task forces will be needed in this role whenever a military convoy is in an area where it could be attacked by Soviet aircraft. (L-19). We believe it is important to recognize that U. S. and allied land-based air resources, presently programmed and planned for Iceland, Norway, and the U. K., can make significant contributions to air defense in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea.

I agree

(S) We also believe the CG overestimates allied logistics capabilities, especially munitions stocks. The CG states that, in at least a few cases, our allies probably have more than 30 days of munitions using U. S. wartime consumption rates. We doubt that any of the allies could come close to 30 days sustainability under this assumption. We should encourage our allies to increase stockage, but recognize that--pending

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improvements--the weight of their contribution is less than advertised.

(S) An additional distortion is continued by assuming employment of forces in a way totally at variance with NATO planning or military effectiveness. An example is the chart (p. C-15) showing range/payload comparisons premised on employing B-52s on conventional strikes up to 600 NM into Pact territory. Given the realities of survivability, forward basing, munitions, etc., it is difficult to conceive a realistic scenario which would warrant using 70 B-52's in this manner.

(U) On balance, we found the 7 March 1978 draft a major improvement over earlier versions. Moreover, the interchange on the successive drafts and "face-to-face" meetings have been very valuable in crystallizing the key issues for guiding our planning and programming. We hope this iterative process will continue in the days ahead.

Hans Mark

HANS MARK
Acting Secretary of the Air Force

David C. Jones

DAVID C. JONES
General USAF
Chief of Staff

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense
ASD (PA&E)

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