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SECDEF HAS SEEN

6 MAR 1978

CG-78

DOC

163

JCS comment

5 March 1978

Memorandum For: Sec Def  
Dep Sec Def  
ASD (PA&E)

That's how  
it works  
3/5  
ed - 2 See my  
RM II  
Comments  
at 2:00 PM 1475

1. My marginal comments on the latest CG are attached. Pages with comments are paperclipped. I discussed them and got help from Pat Hanrigan and J-5; Pat made a few notes. I also have discussed this memorandum -- but not my detailed comments -- with General Brown. I believe my comments in the text reflect fairly well his views as well as my own. Quite frankly, he probably would feel more strongly on a few points; probably not less on any.

100-54

2. This version of CG is an improvement over the previous one. Particularly gratifying is inclusion of the section on strategy.

5 March 78

3. There remain, in my view, serious deficiencies in the

15-m-1736

line below how JCS comments in the CM and JCSM

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(2)

were treated. They identify the deficiencies based on earlier-expressed JCS views.

a. Need for Policy, Military Strategy, Planning Guidance We

appreciate inclusion of strategy section. Next time I believe consideration should be given to delineating at end of each section of CG the policy statements & planning guidance. Some is done now.

b. Definition of Essential Equivalence. Discussion of strategic nuclear

forces & accompanying charts essentially reflect the revised Annual Report ... & suffer same major deficiencies. You know General

Brown's views on them. The chart footnote identifies some of the problems, but not all. I think a top priority this coming year should be DoD-wide work on how better to define essential

equivalence & what we need to measure it, especially in view of lack of NIF.

I think the section is acceptable as is, but the definition of essential equivalence should be worked on from year to year

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c. Downplaying Soviet Capabilities. There is still some of this;

the corollary is upgrading US capabilities. One example is found in chart (p C-15) on NATO/WP tactical air force that excludes

Backfire as a WP bomber but includes B-52Ds for NATO. It

seems to load the issue unnecessarily.

I picked up the same point

d. Overly Specific Guidance on Force Structuring. This

deficiency is still with the document; classic example the

ME forces. I am struck by differences of specificity even there.

(Do \$ follow?) Army/Marines are told what units, AF/Navy

guidance more general. I prefer the latter.

Isigoupa - change; we should try to ease off on AFMC even on this year's.

e. Short Conflict in Europe -- in Central Europe. CG is

better than before, but Central Europe emphasis remains.

Central Europe emphasis should remain

f. Inclusion of Soviet Vulnerabilities and Opportunity for

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(4)

US Initiatives. CG could do better in discussing these possibilities. And in my mind there is a difference between exploring Soviet vulnerabilities and overstating Soviet weaknesses, understating their capabilities.

Two Excellent Points

g. Logistics Guidance. Guidance on War Reserves

procurement and repositioning did not accommodate JCS views.

I'm not sure a compromise is feasible + I'm sure we can't take JCS views as they are.

4. One final point that comes from my discussion with General Brown is part. Throughout the document there is too

much reliance on ASD(PA&E) judgments as opposed to those of other elements of DOD whose operational responsibilities are heavily involved. A prime example is the assessment of the North Korean threat (p D-6).

This is an apt observation. I have tried to correct it in places. It is also common sense that should be more carefully reviewed. But I can't always accept JCS pronouncements.

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(5)

General Brown as you know feels very strongly on  
this issue.

S. Thank you for the opportunity to comment. We are  
making good progress on a very important document.

Res  
W. Y. SMITH