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Army



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Draft Consolidated Guidance

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Pass to RMI for info.

(U) This responds to your request for comments on the draft Consolidated Guidance and presents the key issues which the Chief of Staff and I wish to discuss with you at our upcoming meeting. The memorandum is supplemented by more detailed discussions at the inclosures.

cbft-
You raise some important issues that merit further discussion.
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(U) For the Army the CG proposes significant and important initiatives which have merit. All initiatives, however, are not affordable within the basic fiscal guidance levels assigned.

(8) The principal thrust of the CG is the emphasis on the early days of warfighting in the NATO Central Region following a very short mobilization period. It is characterized by these specific initiatives for the Army: activation of 9 heavy battalions; mechanization of the 9th Infantry Division; POMCUS for 3 more divisions over and above the current 5 sets programed; procurement of 60 days equipment and 90 days consumables computed against the requirements for NATO, Korea (US+ROK) and Special Contingency Stocks; provision of active support units for the contingency corps for at least 90 days and simultaneously for 30 days support to NATO; and 100% manning for all forward deployed divisions and divisions deploying to POMCUS. The CG recognized and added resources for the first three initiatives only. While the underlying assumption of the CG is that the APDM/budget/program will be accomplished, the methodology of fiscal computation erased the previous FY 80-83 program values and began anew at the FY 79 budget level. Army analysis indicates that \$3-5 billion would be required above the base level to accomplish all the initiatives in FY 80 alone.

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(8) With that as framework, there are several issues that merit our discussion.

First, the CG directs faster deployment of Army forces by increasing POMCUS. This initiative is in addition to the Army program for POMCUS 80 (1 Division) and POMCUS 82 (2 Divisions) for which we owe you a detailed

If everyone at OSD agrees, POMCUS beyond 5 Divs is premature. I think we must study it further before directing implementation.

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assessment of impact. The Army supports enhanced strategic deployment; however, we believe the strategic deployment equation needs further comprehensive analysis by OSD, the JCS and the Services to provide insights as to the appropriate mix of forward deployment, POMCUS and air/sealift. This study should address global flexibility and appropriate force mix for long range defense strategy. In this connection, pending more finite resolution of several unanalyzed worldwide contingency scenarios and subsequent force requirements, the Army recommends deferral of the mechanization of the 9th Infantry Division.

- Second, D-Day combat forces cannot be added without an increase in support units. Units in combat must be properly supported if they are expected to perform to their full potential. To the degree that rapid deployment increases combat units a relative increase of support units must be accommodated.

- Third, the CG is unclear as to the Reserve Component role in Total Force Policy. In one section, the CG directs a major and costly shift to more reliance on Active component forces to displace Reserve round out units and support forces because of the current difficulty of having Reserve Component units ready for deployment within a 30 day period following mobilization. In another section, Reserve Component combat brigades and regiments which have a difficult problem in meeting early deployment objectives are made available for deployment by M+21 and contribute one-third of all of the combat force capability deployed through M+60.

- With respect to these last two issues, a more detailed analyses of the interrelationship of Active and Reserve forces, and the combat and combat service support balance is needed. This is highlighted by the computation that shows that the result of all additions to active force structure would increase active duty strength by more than 100,000 soldiers and \$1 billion in annual compensation expense. Thus, until the analyses are completed, a formal change in the Total Force Policy should not be made and the CG should permit the Army to bring forward feasible and cost beneficial alternatives. Additionally, the CG should address, consistent with other initiatives, the role and strength of the Selected Reserves and the Individual Ready Reserves.

(U) Three other suggestions.

- The CG could be strengthened by including a section concerning mobilization policy. This guidance should address an integrated Federal agency action plan for total national preparedness.

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- Associated with mobilization planning is our concern that implementation of the new guidance for production base sizing will significantly reduce our ammunition production capability. Changes to guidance should be deferred until completion of your sustainability study.

- The CG should avoid programing future cuts to the training base even at the decremented level. The recent massive cuts will not be executed fully until the end of FY 79. The results, in terms of soldier competence and unit readiness, will not be known until FY 80. We will readdress the training base in the FY 82-86 POM.

(U) Because of the limited time available the Army will continue POM development based on your draft program guidance in the spirit of its thrusts if not in its specificity. Our goal for the POM is to provide competing programmatic options for your review within practical limits of time, required submission detail and fiscal levels.

(U) Attached are issue papers that address specifics of some of the subjects I mentioned above. Also, I have asked Alan Gibbs to provide Russ Murray directly some other Army comments. As in the past, we will provide you a read-ahead book prior to our major issues meeting.

(U) We recognize the important changes outlined in the draft CG and welcome the opportunity to discuss their implications.



Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.

Inclosures

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