

CG-78

16 FEB 78 11 41 - 5CS
com

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JCSM-56-78

16 February 1978

DOC #162

8 0 FEB 1978

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WBS
Date: SEP 16 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Consolidated Guidance for Review (U)

2/20
JCS- I found the conceptual + procedural concerns useful + they must all be carefully considered in the CG re draft. The specifics also deserve attention, but suffer somewhat from a lack of explicit priority which will impinge to make choices efficient between before 24 30 and after.

1. (U) Reference your memorandum, 17 January 1978, subject as above, which forwarded the draft Consolidated Guidance (CG) for review and written comment.

2. (U) The draft CG has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands, whose comments have been considered. Major comments are provided below, and additional comments are contained in Appendix A. More-detailed comments and suggestions will be provided directly to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) by the Director, Joint Staff.

3. *set* The draft CG, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, does not yet provide adequate conceptual underpinnings to serve your goal of establishing more meaningful and timely dialogue with the President.

a. The first serious shortcoming is the absence of a reasoned and comprehensive description of defense policy and military strategy as a basis for planning or for evaluating and selecting program alternatives which will shape future defense posture. The result is that policy and strategy tend to become secondary to programming and fiscal considerations.

b. The draft CG also has implicitly altered or obscured existing strategy without providing an explicit statement identifying changes for high-level consideration.

the dialogue on the Draft CG is required to address such considerations

336-81-0202, box 12, 100.54 (15 Feb - 28 Feb) 1978

RG #2
of 40
of 100 series "A"

~~Classified by Director, J-5~~
~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION~~
~~SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652~~
~~AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO~~
~~YEAR INTERVALS~~
~~DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1986~~

15-11-78

~~SECRET~~

7 4 6 7

100.54

16 Feb 78

~~SECRET~~

c. The draft CG inappropriately includes detailed direction related to operational employment, identification of units for contingencies, and structuring of task forces. Such strategic direction with respect to planning and employment of forces is within the purview and the operational expertise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the Services. *Area should be included in CG as examples for force planning. Should there be another document on force deployment/employment for SecDef approval prepared by JCS with OSD P2?*

4. (8) There are other serious deficiencies in the draft CG. The most significant of these are as follows:

a. Force structure decisions, which have a long-term impact on US capability to meet national security objectives, should be based upon more than current capabilities, the immediate threat, and questionable assumptions about Soviet intentions. The United States must make decisions with full consideration of potential Soviet capabilities and possible responses (rather than intentions) and of the advantages that may accrue to the Soviets. *Yes*

b. The presentation of US/USSR strategic balance is based upon a relatively unsophisticated and questionable analysis which does not conform to current employment guidance. Many traditional requirements for US strategic forces, reaffirmed in Presidential Directive 18, such as support for NATO, secure reserve, and capability for flexible options, are omitted. The widely supported preference to maintain equal aggregates under SAL is abandoned without comment. The result is a relatively sanguine portrayal of the strategic balance, with insufficient emphasis on the modernization of US strategic forces in the programming guidance. One purpose of US strategic forces is to deter nuclear attack on US allies and US Forces deployed abroad, yet the targets selected as a measure of essential equivalence exclude certain nuclear threats to NATO. *The balance can be measured in many ways. We can't include extra US but needs in USSR main strategy.*

c. The section on General Purpose Forces is focused on NATO and, in that context, on central Europe only, omitting the important requirement to provide support to the other NATO regions. While it is true that the major effort must be made in the Central Region, it is critically important for deterrent as well as political reasons to maintain capabilities to assist in the defense of the NATO flanks. *Yes*

d. The draft CG contains guidance which is not consistent with Presidential Directive 18 because it fails to recognize ADDITIVE requirements for forces assigned to NATO and those required for simultaneous contingencies in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, (and Korea). It also ignores the Presidential guidance to protect the lines of communication and access to raw materials that are vital to the United States and its allies in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WBS
Date: SEP 16 2015

CG should not abandon right to equal aggregate. B. J. we have to build + what's added now.

*PD-18
under on
Iran, perhaps
CG has
some of it*

~~SECRET~~

one of

~~SECRET~~

e. It fails to recognize both the high probability that a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict will be worldwide in scope and the need to retain sufficient flexibility to undertake offensive as well as defensive operations in areas beyond Europe.

f. The draft CG should be revised to include appropriate analysis of Soviet strategic vulnerabilities which can be exploited and which could have an impact on US force programming. *OSD/NA could help here* The discussion in most areas implicitly leaves the initiative to the USSR. A related deficiency is the emphasis on defensive operations for General Purpose Forces. While US posture is strategically defensive, the capability to undertake offensive tactical operations is not only the most effective way to achieve certain military objectives but is also the type of capability which can be the most effective deterrent to potential adventurous Soviet actions.

g. War reserve procurement guidance provides for a level of equipment (60 days) which is not commensurate with the munitions level (90 days). At the same time, pre-positioning programs are expanded significantly without sufficient analysis or rationale concerning practicality, survivability, or operational flexibility.

5. *(e)* The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the comments in this memorandum and those in Appendix A, together with those provided separately by the Director, Joint Staff, be incorporated in a revised draft which should be circulated for final comment before submission to the President. Of particular importance is inclusion of a comprehensive statement on policy and strategy with identification of proposed changes. It is essential that a statement of approved strategy based on Presidential Decisions and the updated Defense Guidance be included in the CG. To assist in this effort, Appendix B represents what is understood to be your currently approved military strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that Volumes I and II of JSOP FY 80-87 be utilized in revising the CG. In particular, the assessment of risks expressed in Volume II, JSOP FY 80-87, should be noted and adjustments made where appropriate in the assessments contained in the CG.


Have services done this?

✓

✓

JCS assessments of risk can't be simply accepted without discussion

Office of the Secretary of Defense *505C 5552* For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: *10 SEP 80* Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 15 -M- 1735



GEORGE S. BROWN
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 16 2015