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SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

FY-80

- Army Port
center

23 MAY 1978

DOC #173

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: FY 80-84 Program Objective Memorandum (U)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass. Div, NND
Date: SEP 15 2015

(S) The Army's FY 80-84 program reinforces the NATO First priority articulated in last year's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Budget. In consonance with the Consolidated Guidance (CG), we have intensified our focus on improving immediate combat capability and deployability of forces arriving in Europe through M+30. Since maximum early combat capability is our primary objective, we have applied resources to selected initiatives designed to enhance soldier support, force structure, training, and near term logistical and materiel readiness. Concurrently, we have maintained a reasonably balanced investment in mid-range modernization, since a modernized force markedly improves the NATO to Pact force ratio even in the early days of combat.

(S) In spite of our early readiness initiatives, we still are concerned about maintaining force combat capabilities beyond D+30 days in Europe. Fiscal constraints preclude us from meeting the CG war reserve goals for modern equipment and consumables now in production. Moreover, our supporting force structure--both combat support and combat service support--remains marginal to support the deployed divisions. We have taken steps to reduce these deficiencies; however, we are unable to go nearly far enough.

(S) It is important to note that despite the growth of U. S. and Allied capability in AFCEM, the FY 84 U. S. force level is appreciably below the approved JCS planning force for a Central European conflict. The extent of the risk to our national military objectives inherent in this smaller force is significant.

(U) There are four features of our base program which merit your attention--NATO combat readiness, training base, soldier support and manpower management. The POM Executive Summary contains additional details about our program and I recommend you scan it.

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NATO COMBAT READINESS (U)

(S) The Army program initiates and continues numerous actions to enhance Army forces for NATO, both forward deployed and those units arriving by M+30. The program is based on a more accurate requirements computation to support expected combat intensities in the early phases of a NATO conflict. We increase current combat power by mechanizing two divisions, adding battalions to divisions and adding howitzers to battalions. Faster deployability is achieved by POMCUS and high manning levels. Early combat support is improved by prepositioning war reserve equipment and ammunition and adding essential combat service support units. A positive program to achieve practical early readiness for Reserve Component (RC) M to M+30 day units is initiated. Collectively these initiatives substantially improve our contribution to the NATO Long Term Defence Programme.

(S) To afford these actions, we have eliminated the fourth brigade headquarters of two divisions and adjusted downward, or delayed, our aviation structure activations to align them with our aviator inventory and training output. We also have maintained essentially a status quo in facilities Backlog of Essential Maintenance and Repairs (BMAR) and procured less than the CG logistics sizing goal of modern equipment and consumables.

(S) We have programed a modest rise in military end strength to accommodate the force increases--774.6 thousand in FY 80 rising to 789.8 thousand in FY 84. Commensurate with the additional missions and forces, we also have programed an increase in both direct and indirect hire civilian end strengths in FY 80. The direct hire end strength declines after FY 81 primarily attributable to the Korean withdrawal.

TRAINING BASE (U)

(S) The Army initially developed the POM on the basis that the training base would remain at the levels associated with the FY 79 budget decision adjusted only for load changes. However, during our final POM review, Bernie Rogers and I felt this did not provide adequately trained soldiers to units. Therefore, we have restored nearly 1400 trainers, about half of the budget cut, primarily to maintain essential specialized skill and officer acquisition training in the training establishment. We did this by trading off structure without changing the force initiatives we have programed or the end strength profile already developed.

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~~(S)~~ Further, to properly train European bound battalions and brigades in a realistic battle environment, the Army begins a long term investment in a National Training Center at Fort Irwin. This center will provide high intensity war engagement simulation where units and commanders can employ the tools of modern battle while exposed to a hostile environment. This type training is not affordable at numerous home station training areas.

SOLDIER SUPPORT (U)

(U) Complementing force improvements are our investments in the Army's commitment to its soldiers and their dependents. Our initiatives build upon the Enhancement of Life Support, Europe (ELIFE) program by providing improved facilities and services in community Recreation Centers, additional housing leases and furniture, and new sports and recreation facilities at isolated sites such as communications and radar sites. For our soldiers and dependents worldwide we are expanding our services for child care and financial counselling. These actions will improve the soldiers' living conditions, especially overseas, and are positive indications that we are meeting our responsibility. The net result is higher soldier morale--a basic ingredient of readiness.

(U) Despite several unresolved policy issues pertinent to Congressional concern about travel entitlements for our junior enlisted personnel, the program expands those essential entitlements to all of our lower ranking men and women. We are reviewing those policies now, to include eligibility for housing in both Europe and CONUS. To the extent policy changes will change resource levels, we will recommend adjustments during the program review.

MANPOWER MANAGEMENT (U)

~~(S)~~ The investment in RC readiness initiatives is coupled with legislative proposals for which we solicit your strong support. In the long term these RC investments and certain no cost legislative proposals should improve our RC force readiness as well as Individual Ready Reserve posture.

(U) Active component accession requirements to support our program are increased over FY 78 without any real growth in recruiting resources. We believe that the constrained but balanced recruiting package submitted will produce the desired results and solicit your support for the full program.

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(S) I would like to point out two items with national policy implications--Binary Facility and POMCUS acceleration.

(S) The Army supports construction and facilitization of a modern chemical warfare integrated binary production facility. The present U. S. chemical weapons stockpile is inadequate in both quantity and composition. A new facility, which will require about two years to complete, would provide standby capability to commence production of munitions compatible with modern delivery systems and with improved safety, storage, and deployability characteristics. However, in view of our prior discussions, we have placed this in the enhanced case for your decision.

(S) The Army base program establishes the major portions of two division sets of POMCUS in FY 82. Analysis indicates that acceleration of one set to FY 81 would increase our combat potential earlier and would permit a more efficient construction, shipping and receiving process. However, this would require prefinancing the construction since NATO infrastructure funds would not be available. In the event you should opt for prefinancing, we urge you to select the acceleration package in the enhanced case.

(U) You also should be aware that a POM supplement will be forthcoming shortly to support the decisions associated with the Panama Canal Treaties. Support of that package will be important if readiness of Army forces in Panama is to be maintained.

(S) In summary, I believe, within the bounds of the CG, the Army has developed a reasonably balanced program that focuses on the M to M+30 day force. However, I must reiterate our profound concern that we had to forego necessary combat support beyond D+30 days. In procurement alone, the Army program falls short of the CG logistics sizing goal by approximately \$3.3 billion in FY 80 and \$20.2 billion over the POM period. To this end, we have designed a number of enhanced case packages that would substantially contribute to reducing this shortfall. We strongly urge their consideration.

Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.

Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.

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
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FY-80

- Army Perm
- Ex Sum

ARMY PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM

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FISCAL YEARS 1980 - 1984

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~~SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652~~
~~EXEMPTION CATEGORY(3)~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON DECEMBER 31, 1988~~

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SECTION I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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~~(S)~~ SOVIET GROUND FORCE DIVISIONS (u)




Figure I-A-1

~~(S)~~ Capability... SOVIET RAPID OFFENSIVE (u)




Figure I-A-2

~~(S)~~ Inventory... SOVIET GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT (u)




Figure I-A-3

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SECTION I. ~~(S)~~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U)

A. ~~(S)~~ OVERVIEW (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ The Threat.

SOVIET CONVENTIONAL
FORCE ADVANTAGES
(Figure I-A-1)

a. ~~(S)~~ Three aspects of the Soviet ground forces are of growing concern: their capability to conduct intense offensive operations with only a brief period of preparation, the increasing improvement in the quantity and quality of their weapons and the continued growth in their general purpose force capabilities.

RAPID OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS
(Figure I-A-2)

b. ~~(S)~~ Today, the Warsaw Pact has the capability to launch a 40 division attack against NATO with only 4 days of preparation. Twenty additional divisions could be added to the attacking force in 4 days and 30 more in another week (for a total of 90 divisions in 14 days). Significantly, in 14 days this 90 division force could be effectively supported by Soviet-based ballistic missiles, combat service support, and C³I.

QUANTITY AND
QUALITY
(Figure I-A-3)

c. ~~(S)~~ The Warsaw Pact has significant advantages in numbers in most major items of ground force equipment. Soviet weapons technology is also improving--tanks, artillery, APC's, and SAM's are all rated as qualitatively competitive with comparable Western equipment. The Soviets have significant advantages in such areas as chemical and electronic warfare capabilities.

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


Figure I-A-4

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SOVIET MILITARY
GROWTH
(Figure I-A-4)


d. (S) In terms of military hardware the Soviets are out-producing the United States. One reason for their production advantage is that they are out-spending the West--the Soviets devote about 12% of their GNP to the military, and their defense spending is expected to continue to grow at about 4-5% a year.

CAPABILITIES AND
INTENTIONS
(Figure I-A-5)

e. (S) As President Carter pointed out in his Wake Forest speech, the central question is why the Soviets continue to build their military forces in Europe far beyond reasonable levels necessary for defense. In an age of strategic parity, continued improvements in Soviet conventional force capabilities raise serious questions about Soviet intentions both in Europe and elsewhere. The U.S. must maintain contingency forces capable of utilization either on the flanks of NATO or elsewhere in the world, together with the Army's NATO forces, because of these uncertainties.

Figure I-A-5

Deployment of WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS (u)



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Figure I-A-6





Figure I-A-7



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CG
REQUIREMENTS

2. ~~(S)~~ Consolidated Guidance (CG).

a. ~~(S)~~ All CG initiatives, if fully funded and implemented by end FY 84 funded delivery period (FDP) would provide, among other things, a capability for: a non-NATO warfighting contingency of 60 days duration; a force of 16 divisions deployed to Europe by M+30 if not engaged in a contingency; and sufficient combat consumption for 60 days of equipment, 90 days of ammunition and Special Contingency Stocks. Specific CG initiatives for which OSD provided discrete funding guidance are programmed at the decremented level; e.g., activation of 9 heavy battalions with Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) for 6, conversion of the 9th Infantry Division to mechanized and expansion of the current POMCUS program (4 1/3 division equivalent (DEs) to 7 1/3 DEs). However, the POM force does not meet the combat consumption requirement for 60 days equipment and 90 days ammunition by the end FY 84 FDP.

ADDITIONAL \$26.2B
REQUIRED
(Figure I-A-6)

b. ~~(S)~~ The Army could program¹ full achievement of CG requirements if an additional \$26.2B were provided over the program years.

3. ~~(S)~~ The Army Program.

FOCUS ON EARLY
NATO COMBAT
READINESS
(Figure I-A-7)

a. ~~(S)~~ The FY 80-84 Army program places primary emphasis on improving the combat readiness of forces which must fight the early battle in Europe. Consistent with the thrust of the CG and the threat, programs have been structured and resources allocated to man, equip, modernize, train, and sustain the forward deployed and early deploying forces to NATO while providing warfighting capability for contingency operations outside the European theater.

COMMITMENT TO THE
SOLDIER . . .
EQUIPMENT
TRAINING
LIFE SUPPORT

b. (U) Focusing on the fundamental objective of early force readiness and considering the reality that the American soldier is outnumbered in both equipment and manpower, the U.S. has a moral commitment to provide its volunteer soldiers the best equipment and training

¹Throughout the POM the term "program" refers to the program funded at the basic level of fiscal guidance unless specifically identified to the decremented or enhanced levels.

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(S) NATO REINFORCEMENT (u)
ARMORED DIVISION EQUIVALENTS




Figure I-A-8

(S) Methodology...
FORCE PACKAGING (u)

• ESTABLISH FORCE PRIORITIES (MC + KC)

- 1 • NATO FWD DEPLOYED... 0 DAY... UNILATERAL CONTINGENCY FORCES
- 2 • NATO D+30 FORCE
- 3 • OTHER UNILATERAL CORPS ELEMENTS
- 4 • SUSTAINING BASE FOR D+30 FORCE
- 5 • NATO D+31 TO D+60 FORCE & SUSTAINING BASE
- 6 • REMAINING FORCES / SUSTAINING BASE

• PROVIDE WITH BALANCED LEVELS OF MANNING... EQUIPPING... SUSTAINING... TRAINING... OPERATING

• MOVE TOWARD TOTAL RQMT INCREMENTALLY... (4 PACKAGES)

Figure I-A-9

(S) Force Capability...
DAYS OF SUSTAINMENT (u)

ITEM	CG RQMT	BASIC LEVEL	50% LEVEL
CARRIERS IFV/CFV	60	8	18
B1... MOUNTAIN CARRIER	60	54	82
107 AIRBORNE CARRIER	60	29	58
PV 5 (MTE WITH GOSSELS)	60	0	30
PPE 15 RADAR	60	0	30
PAW... 8" ISM (AP)	90	26	57
PAW... 8" RAP	90	60	80
PAW... 165mm ISM (AP)	90	53	64
PAW... 165mm RAP	90	60	70

Figure I-A-10

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possible. Resources have been applied to soldier life support programs essential to maintaining the volunteer Army, force structure, individual and unit training, and near term materiel and logistics readiness initiatives.

MID-RANGE
MODERNIZATION
IMPROVES NATO
TO PACT FORCE
RATIOS
(Figure I-A-8)

c. ~~(S)~~ Mid-range modernization has been sustained because a modernized force demonstrably improves the NATO to Pact force ratio even in the early days of combat. However, our attempt to improve force ratios is partially offset by the enhanced quality of equipment recently fielded by the Soviets.

FORCE
PACKAGING
METHODOLOGY
EMPHASIZES
DEPLOYED AND
EARLY DEPLOYING
FORCES
(Figure I-A-9)

d. ~~(S)~~ The "Force Packaging Methodology" utilized in the FY 79 Budget development continues to provide the basis for program prioritization and balanced allocation of resources within a constrained funding environment. This methodology reflects refined and expanded force packaging rules which assure resource emphasis is placed on forward deployed and early deploying (M to M+30) Active and Reserve Component (RC) forces at the expense of the sustaining base, later deploying forces and less time sensitive missions. The capability to deploy and sustain substantial force in a non-NATO contingency on short notice will be maintained.

FORCE CAPABILITY
BEYOND D+30 IS A
MATTER OF GRAVE
CONCERN
(Figure I-A-10)

e. ~~(S)~~ Force capability beyond D+30 days is a matter of grave concern. At the basic program level, CG NATO warfighting objectives of 60 days equipment and 90 days consumables are not achieved. The five year POM program for modernized equipment and consumables reach approximately 40 and 48 days respectively by the end of the FY 84 funded delivery period. However, several items surpass these objectives while others remain at zero balance. This is illustrated by the sustainability chart for selected items on the opposite page. Considering realistic production capabilities, \$20.2B would be needed to satisfy the CG goals of 60 days modernized equipment, 90 days modernized consumables, a Special Contingency Stockpile and war reserves for the Republic of Korea

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
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(Figure I-A-11)

forces. Materiel acquisition packages valued at \$6.2B for the five year period are located in the enhanced case and if selected would raise modern equipment and consumable levels to approximately 46 (+6 days) and 57 (+9 days) days respectively.

Figure I-A-11



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Figure I-B-1





Figure I-B-2



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B. ~~(S)~~ PROGRAM TRENDS AND CHANGES (U)

CHANGED TO
MEET
CHALLENGE

1. ~~(S)~~ The Army program for FY 80-84 contains significant initiatives to enhance the M to M+30 days reinforcing forces. Program changes are consistent with the threat assessment previously described and the thrust of the CG.

REALISTIC
REQUIREMENTS
COMPUTATION
(Figure I-B-1&2)

2. ~~(S)~~ The program is based on more realistic and accurate computation of requirements to support an intense battle in the early days of a NATO-Pact conflict. The impact of using variable rates and daily deployment schedules on ammunition Army Acquisition Objectives (AAOs) is displayed on the facing page.

3. ~~(S)~~ NATO.

IMPROVED STRATEGIC
MOBILITY/DEPLOY-
ABILITY THROUGH
INCREASED
POMCUS

a. ~~(S)~~ POMCUS. The program reconstitutes current POMCUS to 100% fill by end FY 80. Equipment is programed for prepositioning an additional DE in FY 80 and one and one-third more DEs by FY 82. This additional POMCUS will be earmarked as AFCENT reserve and oriented on NORTHAG. In order to meet POMCUS requirements, equipment must be withdrawn from CONUS forces with resultant training and readiness impact. The potential magnitude of these impacts must be fully assessed. Funds are also programed to ensure that adequate storage facilities are available for POMCUS, and that the combat units of these POMCUS packages can deploy to Europe, be issued their equipment, and be prepared to start moving to their battle positions within seven days of a decision to reinforce Europe. An initial analysis has been made of the CG tentative plan to expand the 4 1/3 DE of POMCUS in FY 82 to 7 1/3 DE by end FY 86. The Army will conduct a comprehensive study of this plan to include POMCUS of Reserve Component support units.

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HEAVIER FORCE
STRUCTURE
THROUGH MECHANI-
ZATION OF
CURRENT INFANTRY
DIVISIONS AND...

b. ~~(S)~~ Division Conversions. Pending decisions based on the analysis of limited contingencies and other studies, 9th Infantry Division is programed to convert to mechanized beginning in FY 81 with a maneuver battalion mix of three tank, three mechanized, and three infantry battalions. The 2d Infantry Division will convert to mechanized with two active and one RC round-out brigade as it redeploys from Korea to CONUS.

ADDITION OF
NEW HEAVY
BATTALIONS
TO ACTIVE
FORCE

c. ~~(S)~~ Nine Active Heavy Battalions. Nine active heavy battalions are programed for activation; three each in FY 80, 81 and 82. Seven maneuver battalions are added to selected CONUS heavy divisions to structure four early deploying divisions with 11 maneuver battalions each according to the pattern of our European divisions. Structuring early deploying heavy divisions provides significant improvement in our reinforcement capability to NATO. The remaining two battalions are added to the 194th and 197th Brigades. The 5th and 24th Mechanized Divisions each remain at two Active Component (AC) brigades and one RC round-out brigade.

INCREASED
ARTILLERY
FIRE POWER

d. ~~(S)~~ 3X8 Artillery Battalions. Direct support 155mm field artillery battalions which are deployed in Europe and CONUS based early deploying artillery units which currently have POMCUS equipment (REFORGER and 2+10) are programed to increase to eight howitzers per battery (3X8).

INCREASED UNIT
MANNING

e. ~~(S)~~ The Army's program distributes resources to maintain readiness of units to meet their most demanding deployment schedules. Forward deployed forces and CONUS based early deployed units (both AC and RC) have received the highest priority. The program provides unit activations and increased manning of all forward deployed forces in Europe by approximately 8,500 soldiers by FY 84.

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This includes increased manning of European division/brigade forces. The REFORGER and 2+10 division combat units are manned at 105% since these divisions deploy first on short notice, are required in NATO by M+4 days, and their POMCUS is currently on the ground in Europe. The five percent over-manning assures 95% manning when deployed so the units can perform missions for which they are organized. Remaining CONUS-based POMCUS divisions are manned at 100% pending location of new POMCUS on the ground in Europe.

IMPROVED
NBC
CAPABILITY

f. ~~(S)~~ NBC.

(1) ~~(S)~~ The Army's CW/NBC program continues movement toward providing an ability to meet the NBC threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. NBC Defense Companies will provide divisions modest decontamination and NBC reconnaissance support. Additional NBC reconnaissance and decontamination teams support ACR, separate brigades and rear areas. Concurrent actions are being taken to add NBC specialists down to company level and provide required stock funded NBC defensive equipment. Further effort in doctrine, training, and RDTE will improve operability in an NBC environment through provision of vehicular collective protection, improved protection and detection devices and faster large scale decontamination capabilities. The effectiveness of the Army's retaliatory chemical capability must be improved through a comprehensive maintenance program and replacement of the obsolescent inventory by new chemical weapons. Refined total Army NBC needs to meet the threat are being developed and will be included in the next POM.

BINARY
FACILITY

(2) ~~(S)~~ Binary Facility. Because of national policy implications, an integrated binary facility is programed in the enhanced level. The facility will provide a stand-by capability to produce binary munitions when directed. Binary munitions will improve credibility of deterrent stockpile and provide modern, less costly, safely transportable and easily deployable munitions which are "fail safe" until use and are compatible with modern weapons systems.

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Figure I-B-3

(U) TRAINING BASE (U)

+ 1398 STRUCTURE SPACES

	DPS 40 MILITARY STRUCTURE CUT	ARMY STRUCTURE ADD BACK
RECRUIT TRAINING	319	169
SPECIALIZED SKILL TNG (COURSES/COURSE FEED LENGTH)	2008	908
ROTC	187	187
BASE OPERATIONS	350	134
	2864	1398

Trade off from Army Base ← 1 FA BN
3 MIKE HELL BATT
NON-STRAP MP

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