



PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SECRET

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21 FEB 1978

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

2/21
This memo is for the
and general staff
Save for 2/23-4 mtg HB

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February 21, 1978

cc:IRM (see comments)

CG-78 *Kob*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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SUBJECT: Major Issues Raised in Comments on the Draft CG
ACTION MEMORANDUM

23 FEB 1978

- Murray on
Screen

The Services and Chiefs have sent you their written comments on the January 17th version of the Consolidated Guidance, and are scheduled to meet with you for further discussions on February 23rd and 24th.

To alert you to possible subjects for discussion at those meetings, this memo lists and very briefly describes what appear to me to be the major issues that the Services and Chiefs have raised -- issues that clearly merit face-to-face discussion.

This listing is not meant to serve as any sort of agenda for those meetings; the Services and Chiefs must be free to bring up whatever they feel should be brought up. Nor are the brief descriptions of the issues intended to do more than identify their general nature; you should refer to the written comments for a full development of the Services' arguments. And, obviously, the distinction between what constitutes a major issue and what does not is entirely subjective; the Services and Chiefs have raised many other points that are not in this list. My list provides about ten major issues for each of the meetings.

I've divided the list into four parts; the first covers issues affecting more than one Service, and the other three cover issues unique to each Service. Within each part, I've arranged the issues in what strikes me as roughly descending order of priority. The list is as follows.

MULTI-SERVICE ISSUES

1. The Fiscal Guidance Total This refers not to the allocation of the fiscal guidance between the Services, but to proposed Defense expenditures in total. Reference is made to PD-18's guidance that "the United States will maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as that that now exists". The issue is whether the fiscal guidance is or is not high enough to allow that.

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~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF~~
~~EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED~~
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2. Concentration on the NATO Central Front The issue is whether we are overconcentrating our attention and resources on the Central Front, to the detriment not only of the flanks and the other areas of the world that might play a part in a NATO/Pact war (e.g., the Western Pacific), but also of our capabilities for non-NATO contingencies. The point is made that weakened flanks may invite coercion or attack, and the piecemeal dissolution of NATO. The point is also made that non-NATO contingencies, though perhaps of less consequence, are far more likely than the NATO attack on which we are concentrating.

Some of the strength in NATO AFBENT is reportedly being deployed elsewhere.



3. The Pace of POMCUS The issue is not whether POMCUS is a good idea, but whether our plans are too aggressive. Concern is expressed regarding its survivability, its effect on our capability in other areas of the world (both in terms of equipment and the mobility forces to move it), possible degradation in our CONUS training, etc. The question is whether we should hold to this ambitious program, or restrict it to the 3 additional divisions already programmed pending further study.

How about our more specified units 82, 5, with more a possibility.



4. The Pollyanna Problem The issue is whether the CG discusses alternatives for lesser forces or less ambitious objectives without adequately noting the risks we would be taking or the real capabilities we would be sacrificing. As Secretary Claytor put it in his memo to me: "there is, I suppose, an inevitable bureaucratic tendency to rationalize that our strategy need not be cut back to fit budget cutbacks. I firmly feel, however, that where we will have to redefine our national strategy now or in the future to match force programming reductions, we should explicitly say so".

5. Additive Forces PD-18 says that "In addition, the United States will maintain ...forces...designed for use...in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Korea.... supplemented by forces in the United States primarily oriented toward NATO defense" (emphasis added). The CG does not so identify the forces for non-NATO contingencies. It says (p.H-1) "We would like a compelling rationale and a rigorous analysis to define for us the degree to which the forces for a non-NATO contingency need to be additive to the forces planned for Europe", and (on page H-2) "the issue...is more accurately phrased as 'how much of the total force should be capable of use in a variety of locations and contingencies, and how much can be specialized for Central Europe.'"



6. Strategic Calculations The issue is whether the analysis presented in Section B of the CG is misleading. The charge is that the analysis specifies precise damage levels which it equates to essential equivalence, excludes important targets, doesn't follow national nuclear weapons

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employment guidance, assumes a high penetration probability for the ALCM while not targeting the Soviet air defenses, ignores weapon footprint and range limitations, etc. ✓

7. Separate Policy Section The issue is whether the CG should contain a separate section on policy, strategy, and objectives. Drafts of such a section have been submitted by the Chairman, the Air Force, and ISA. Though there is some objection that the policy statements contained in the CG are too scattered (they appear in the applicable sections rather than together), a more serious concern is the allegation that, e.g., "The draft CG also has implicitly altered or obscured existing strategy without providing an explicit statement identifying changes for high-level consideration" (CJCS). *These criticisms still not as unconvincing when the purpose of the comparison is considered.*

ARMY ISSUES

8. Army Fiscal Guidance Cliff Alexander says that all the Army actions called for by the CG cannot be funded within the basic fiscal guidance level for the Army. Army analysis indicates that \$3-5 billion would be required above the base level in FY 80 alone. The Army indicates that the enhanced level appears to be necessary to implement the guidance. ✓

The CG specifies the following additions to the Army program: (1) activation of 9 heavy battalions; (2) mechanization of the 9th Infantry Division; (3) POMCUS for 3 more divisions over and above the 5 sets; (4) enough active support units to provide support simultaneously for the first 30 days of combat in Europe and indefinite support of a one corps contingency force; and (5) 100% manning for all divisions in Europe and divisions with POMCUS. In addition, the CG confirms the 1978 APDM decision to procure consumables for 90 days and equipment for 60 days for Europe and Korea and to provide for a specific contingency stockpile.

The CG added funds to the Army's fiscal guidance for the first three additions only. The Army estimates that the additional active support units would require an additional \$1-2.5 billion per year (and an increase of 100-200,000 in active end strength). Moreover, the consumables and equipment would require an additional \$1 billion per year over the five year period. This latter requirement arises because the Army estimates the FYDP contains only 30 days of modern equipment and 60 days of consumables for NATO. Moreover, if the funds explicitly added for the program additions are removed from the Army's fiscal guidance, the basic level is below the FYDP. As a result the Army believes that insufficient funds are provided for the consumables and equipment levels specified by the CG.

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9. Mechanization of the 9th Division The CG contains guidance to convert the 9th infantry division to mechanized by FY 82, with not less than 6 heavy and not more than 3 light maneuver battalions. (The Army's fiscal guidance was increased at all three levels by \$554 million for this action.)

The Army recommends deferral of this mechanization until needs for local contingencies have been studied. The Army indicates that the current division mix of 11 heavy and five light divisions already reflects NATO emphasis. The heavy divisions counter the tank threat and the light divisions are for fighting in rugged terrain and extensively built-up areas. Light divisions possess about 70 percent of the antitank capability of a mechanized division and yet provide quick reaction forces for contingencies less than war in Europe. Of the Army's five active light divisions, the 9th is the only fully structured infantry division-- the 82nd and 101st have unique employment capabilities and the 7th and the 25th have only two active brigades each. The Army believes the 9th is a logical Korean reentry force because of its location (Fort Lewis, Washington) and light configuration.

10. Support Forces The CG provides for substantial increases in early deployment of combat forces to Europe through additional POMCUS. It also discusses rapid deployment of US forces for other contingencies such as the Persian Gulf. In addition it indicates that all support units for the first 30 days of combat in Europe and a simultaneous corps sized contingency elsewhere should be in the active force.

The Army and the Chairman, JCS, believe that additional combat forces deployed early must be accompanied by additional support units not provided for in the CG. The active support units needed would add 100-200,000 to the active duty strength (and \$1-2.5 billion per year as noted in the Army Fiscal Guidance Issue). The Army believes that the support units for contingencies outside Central Europe should be in the active force but that the Army should address support requirements as part of its consideration of increased rapid deployment to Europe. Moreover, the Army believes that support for the first 30 days of combat in Europe should come from both active and reserve units and from increases in host nation support. ✓

11. Total Force Concept The Army believes that the CG is unclear about the role of the reserves. The CG provides guidance for adding 9 active heavy battalions to increase capability for early deployment to Europe and calls for active support units for the first 30 days of combat in Europe. However, the CG analysis still assumes deployment

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of some reserve units by M+21 and assumes that reserve units provide one-third of the capability of units deployed by M+60. Thus, the Army is unsure whether policy for the reserves is being changed and in particular is unsure about the role for reserves in early deployments to Europe. *not necessarily*

NAVY ISSUES

12. Navy Fiscal Guidance Secretary Claytor (see his memo to me) expresses three concerns with his fiscal guidance. First, the Congress is liable to cut the budget even below what is allowed in the CG. Next, what growth is permitted the Navy will be absorbed in merely maintaining our current capability in the face of advancing technology. And third, the mandatory elements of the guidance (viz., Trident building rate, reduction of overhaul backlog, maintenance of Polaris in caretaker status, etc.) will eat up all the growth in any event. The net effect will be a cut in SCN which, though having no near-term effect, will seriously damage our future capability. ✓
13. Impact of the Navy Force Planning Study The CG was drafted prior to completion of the Navy's Force Planning Study. Secretary Claytor has volunteered to submit a new version of those sections in light of that study, which he expects to have finished by the first of March. The issue is whether to try to incorporate such revisions before transmission to the President (scheduled for March 7th) or, failing that, how to accommodate whatever new insights the study may provide.
14. Carrier Force Levels The issue is whether the CG is misleading in discussing the alternative of a 10-carrier Navy in that 1) the alternative of more overseas homeporting is infeasible, and 2) the analysis of the use of land-based instead of sea-based air to defend against Backfires ignores the political vulnerability of Iceland. The concern is that the CG implies a change from "selective sea control worldwide to the defense of a sea lane from Norfolk to the English Channel" and that "the naval equivalent of the Maginot Line has been constructed -- betting that the future is so predictable that the Navy can be sized for a specific scenario without regard for a global strategy and the uncertainty of the real world". ✓
15. Heavying Up the Active Marine Divisions The CG directs the transfer of 2 tank battalions and 2 self-propelled artillery battalions from the reserves to the active Marine forces. The issue is whether this guidance should be overturned on grounds that "it is incompatible with the force posture necessary to satisfy the guidance which orients these forces to the requirements of a war in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf or Korea".

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that it ignores costs, alternatives, and the impact on the Marine Reserves, and that it increases amphibious lift requirements at a time when we are proposing to reduce amphibious lift capability.

AIR FORCE ISSUES

16. Air Force Fiscal Guidance The Air Force believes its fiscal guidance should be higher. Since the guidance at even the enhanced level is below the FYDP level, the Air Force anticipates a tendency to maintain the status quo. Moreover, the Air Force points out that approximately 10% of its total budget is related to national intelligence under the control of DCI and that planned growth in this area will absorb a disproportionate share of the real growth in its fiscal guidance. Finally, the Air Force indicates that the funds provided in FY 80 above the 2.7% real growth to allow for budget reductions should also be provided for the years after FY 80.

17. F-111/F-15 The CG suggested that the Air Force consider early deactivation of the F-111D wing followed, as soon as GLCMs can take over the nuclear strike mission, by the other three F-111 wings, the savings to be applied to further increases in A-10 or F-16 wings. The Air Force believes that the CG does not adequately consider the F-111's conventional role, in particular its unique all weather and deep strike capability, or that replacement aircraft would cost much more than the reliability modifications needed for the F-111.

The CG also suggested that the last wing of F-15s be traded for a larger number of F-16s. The Air Force believes that the F-15's superior capabilities (especially Beyond Visual Range) argue against the trade. Moreover, the F-15s could be acquired in FY 80 whereas the F-16s would not be available until FY 85.

18. Dedicated F-15 Wing for CONUS Defense The issue is whether to buy an additional wing of F-15s and dedicate it to CONUS air defense or to plan to provide a capability for CONUS air defense using a wing (or the equivalent of a wing) of F-15s bought for tactical missions but available in CONUS even during a NATO war. *AF also considers these two detailed for Ctr, more appropriate for budget purposes for current year.*

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