



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

RDF

148

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 21 2015

SEP 18 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PROGRAM  
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION)

SUBJECT: Planning and Programming for the PG/IO Area (U)

(S) As I discussed with the JCS on September 16, our planning and programming for the PG/IO area, which is considering primarily the non-fully mobilized 3 1/3 division RDF force, should also focus on the 6 1/3 division core RDF that the FY 82-86 Consolidated Guidance called for in event of a Soviet contingency. I do not believe we would engage the Soviets directly without mobilization (e.g., Stage III CRAF), and this needs to be taken into account.

(S) I recognize that current lift and other constraints would limit early RDF deployability to 3 1/3 divisions or less, but it is important that our planning and programming also take into account our evolving capability and the possible need for larger deployments--even if delayed. For example, we should think in terms of planning and programming for three additional divisions (and associated tacair) to deploy as a follow-on force under mobilization conditions after the initial force has deployed.

(S) I also recognize that such added deployments would severely strain our war reserve stocks and support capabilities, and inevitably be at considerable expense to our NATO support capabilities. However, realism dictates that we (and our allies) may have to assume these risks. We in DoD must continue to work with State to get our European allies to provide greater compensatory capabilities in NATO.

(S) Therefore, in addition to planning and programming for the 3 1/3 division baseline RDF, the JCS, working with OSD and the Services, should examine how to deploy the additional three divisions of a full 6 1/3 division RDF in a follow-on mode, in the time frame beginning with end-FY 1982. This examination should also include how to sustain the force through D+90 days as an interim goal. It should specify: (1) how much of the

0  
2  
0  
4  
7  
0  
7

~~Classified by: Sec Def  
Review on: Sep 18, 1990  
Reason: 2-301c 6.~~

EXEMPT PER EO 12958 as amended  
Date: 14 Mar 2006 Sec 1.1.4  
OSD FS 210 Other Agency Equiv TBD  
Review/Declassify On: 11 Dec 2031  
EXEMPT PER EO 12958 as amended

15-M-1721



needed lift and support could be generated via mobilization; (2) how much would have to be taken from resources currently earmarked for NATO and other contingencies; and (3) what residual resources would be required beyond the APDM level. Since we will have to take more from NATO in the end-FY 1982 case than later, I suggest examining two cases, end-FY 1982 and the end of the FYDP period.

(S) In particular I would like the JCS to define for me by December 15:

- Those steps they would recommend to enhance our ability to deploy a 6 1/3 division force beginning in end-FY 1982, and sustain it through D+90 (as an interim goal).
- The impact on our NATO and other commitments if we use all available expedients to minimize this impact. (Assume that we would mobilize whatever resources are necessary to permit this contingency deployment.)

*Harold Brown*

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 21 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense +  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 21 Sep 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
 Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
 MDR: 18 -M- 1721

*S U.S.C. § 552*