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CG

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WMS
Date: OCT 07 2015

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CM 1814-78
15 February 1978
Very useful comments, which should get careful attention in redraft.
cc: ASD/PAS

DOC 196

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Comments by Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands on the Draft Consolidated Guidance (U)

1. (U) During our earlier discussions on the draft Consolidated Guidance (CG), I stated I would provide copies to the unified and specified commanders and would solicit their comments. I have done so and, in preparing the JCS comments and recommendations on the draft CG, have considered their views.

2. (S) It was interesting to note that the concerns from the field were similar to those expressed in Washington, particularly in the following areas:

a. The need for a clear statement of policy, military strategy and planning guidance in the CG upon which to base defense programs.

b. The need to better define the measures of "essential equivalence," if it is to be used as a basis for strategic force structuring.

c. The impression that the CG through numerous assumptions is underestimating force requirements, and through specific program guidance is altering national military strategy.

d. The impression that the CG downplays Soviet capabilities, while overstating the capabilities of our allies particularly in the naval context.

e. The overly specific guidance provided by the CG not only in the area of force structuring, but also in the area of force employment and deployment.

ISA also made these points

this needs to be faced up to; if done, it should not be done inadvertently

Perhaps CIA plus OSD/PAS could resolve this.

If deployment & employment are not set forth here, they will to some degree have to be in other documents. Think in USDP?

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (3)
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
f. The thrust of the CG which emphasizes a short conflict in the Central Region of Europe as the basis for general purpose force structuring at the expense of the NATO flanks, of the worldwide aspects of a conventional war with the Soviets, and of the requirement for extensive SLOC protection.

3. (U) I believe it important that you have a feel for the reactions of the commanders of the unified and specified commands to the CG. To this end, the Appendix contains selected extracts of the CINC inputs, expressing the thrust of their major concerns.

4. (S) I would be less than candid were I not to report to you the controversy and concern which the Draft CG has raised. I view the paper as do the Services and the CINCs as the expression of one view of the world by well intended but ~~clearly inexperienced analysts~~. The Consolidated Guidance cannot strengthen coherence and teamwork within the Department of Defense without extensive revision in content and form before it is issued as a directive.

I agree that it needs extensive revision; it was meant to get to Harsh revision.

5. (U) Without attachments, this memorandum is ~~SECRET~~.


GEORGE S. BROWN, General, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50S.C.G 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 07 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526
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APPENDIX
EXTRACT OF COMMENTS OF
COMMANDERS OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
ON
17 JAN 1978 DRAFT CONSOLIDATED GUIDANCE
(9 Pages)

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Appendix

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EXTRACT OF CINCLANT COMMENTS

- CG is basically a programming document that would drive strategy and policy....no clear and concise statement of national security policies and objectives, against which program alternatives can be compared.... only provides for evaluation of options on the basis of comparative costs... should lead off with a clear statement of national policy, objectives, and strategy.
- There appears to have been no consideration given US commitments to NATO in the form of the DPQ.
- Assumptions, not analysis, form the basis for the guidance and certain CG assumptions are highly questionable. For example, ... SLOC interdiction will not be a primary mission of the Soviet Navy.... To assume an enemy will not interdict the SLOCs is to give that enemy a strong strategic option; or to assume that the enemy will only make a half-hearted or short-lived attack on the SLOCs is to give away the war before it starts....
- It could be a tragic mistake to assume that the submarine menace in the Atlantic will be significantly reduced...
- ... The forces programmed for SLOC protection are not nearly enough. Simplifying the problem by assuming only 5 reinforcement convoys in the Atlantic, and denying responsibility for protection of allied shipping, area or independent sailings, appear to be easy ways to make requirements meet programmed forces, but these hardly form sound military strategy.
- ... The weight of the threat from the Kola Peninsula is such that both shore based and sea based air forces will be needed in Norway and over the Norwegian Sea. Sea based air in support of the land battle as well as land based air in support of the forces at sea will be required....
- ... CG places excessive weight on the Central Front and forecloses capabilities for offensive operations against the Pact....

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I've now seen some plans for offensive counter-attacks for PAC - are there any for Lant?

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- ... Additional POMCUS will give us a stronger defensive position in Europe, but to sustain our forces, large quantities of reinforcement and resupply shipping are needed....
- ... Rationalization, standardization and interoperability while important, cannot act as substitutes for adequate numbers of naval forces....
- ... The guidance appears overly constrained by budgetary considerations to where dollars are driving the strategy to meet the perceived threat, and force building programs....
- Points of concern ... on Marine force structure and planning:
 - Marine Forces are not recognized as combined arms teams. Marine ground and air forces are considered as separate entities...
 - Naval character and potential contribution of Marine forces to the naval campaign are, for the most part, not recognized....
 - Ignores the fact that amphibious forces are the only large scale forces capable of reinforcing or restoring NATO flanks.
 - Ignores the deterrent value of a force which can be postured without commitment, and, if deterrence fails, can be immediately employed in the area of conflict.
- Direction is set forth in the guidance which requires that planning for TACAIR operations in Europe should include possible use of USMC and Navy aircraft... This is an unsupported effort to reduce the TACAIR shortage in Central Europe, without having to resort to the high cost option of procuring more US aircraft or pressing our NATO allies to do so....
depends on where else USMC/ Navy etc could be used, or where they would be more useful
- Theater nuclear force policy ... does not reflect fully the requirements of national policy for planning the employment of nuclear weapons....

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EXTRACT OF CINCPAC COMMENTS

- Overall impression of the CG is that it does not provide an adequate basis for the development of a defense program. Fundamental concerns are that in an effort to replace three documents with one, there is too much under one cover and it lacks the quality of the three documents to be replaced; dollars dictate strategy and force structure without adequate attention to requirements; and it is too heavily oriented toward Europe...
- ... In the past, the Defense Guidance (DG) provided a relatively straightforward compilation of fundamental US security policy, defense strategy and related planning guidance... represented important element in shaping not only programming guidance but also contingency planning tasks. It also provided a meaningful defense policy baseline to measure the risk level associated with resource-constrained forces and programs....
- Earlier Presidential/SECDEF involvement in defense issues logically would lead to earlier top level guidance. The corollary, however, is that the President/SECDEF may make detailed program decisions before key defense issues are thoroughly examined by the Services and without a good fix on what the impact might be....
- Some of the CG information to the Services is too specific...
- ... my major reservation about the draft CG: the planning process has been reversed; key inputs are generated from the top rather than from the working level, which virtually guarantees that decisions will be made without benefit of best available information. *This is indeed a mistake. Let's now see the quality of the field inputs. If they're better, by all means, they should be used.*
- ... the draft guidance... risks major major strategy changes through the programming and budgeting process, without the careful consideration which such changes should receive at the highest national level....
- CG emphasizes what can be done with programmed forces without reference to whether those forces are adequate to protect vital US security interests or to cope with Soviet military capabilities.

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- The CG should review the US capability to fight a global war so that deficiencies can be identified, risks assessed, and appropriate planning and programming priorities assigned. The narrow focus of the draft precludes such actions.
- The CG tends to postulate a passive or defensive role for US Forces. This could result in structuring of General Purpose Forces in a manner which would impede offensive employment of US Forces and cede the initiative to the Soviets....
- The CG assumes that Soviet actions will focus essentially on Central Europe. It is highly unlikely, however, that other vital US worldwide interests will not be targeted... More important, the CG does not identify the primary objective of the Soviet Union in a global war: Defeat of the US. Similarly, the CG does not describe the US objectives and desired outcome of such a war. The objectives which are discussed in the CG relate primarily to the Central European Region... This limited scenario appears to be driven by fiscal objectives rather than by basic US security interests. *(not by fiscal objectives but by need to state priorities)*
- ... there is a clear risk in sizing/structuring US Forces for the next 10-20 years on the assumption that the nature of the threat will remain essentially static, and that the Soviets will remain a continental power without global ambitions.
- News media publication of purported extracts from the draft CG increases apprehension by Asians that we are unsure of our place in the world. Their apprehension is understandable. The tone of the CG strikes me as defeatist. Self-doubt as to our capability to carry out a 1 1/2 war strategy runs like a thread throughout the paper.
- The draft CG will unnecessarily add to the uneasiness of our friends and allies, and fuel the arguments of critics who charge that we cannot afford to and need not match Soviet capabilities....
- ... statement that allied ... forces are adequate to protect... shipping ignores requirement to protect Europe-bound tankers on Indian Ocean and South Atlantic SLOCs...
- Use of (amphibious) forces to pose a threat to Soviet Far East... or to seize Soviet islands, which would complicate Soviet defense problems and inhibit Soviet redeployment, warrants serious consideration. ✓

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EXTRACT OF CINCSAC COMMENTS

- My fundamental concern is that the draft CG relying on very limited and very narrow comparative analyses is unduly optimistic in its conclusion that "planned U.S. Forces will maintain equivalence with projected Soviet nuclear forces through 1987." With that perception, it is not surprising that the CG outlines a measured pace for our own strategic modernization. I am much less sanguine....
- ... the CG should express in unequivocal terms the need for strategic modernization programs of sufficient vigor and scope to insure that true and unambiguous essential equivalence is maintained. ✓
-
specifics?
- ... I am struck by the limited discussion of overall policy and military strategic guidance. In this regard, it is difficult to see the draft CG as a real substitute for the Defense Guidance which presumably it supplants...
- ... programmatic guidance is often unnecessarily specific; e.g., precisely directing the initial employment of cruise missiles (twenty on one B-52G) and specifying which aircraft are to penetrate and which are not ... This introduces at the beginning of the process a level of detail which could serve to limit Service initiative and search for management efficiencies.... *Alternative suggestions would be welcome*
- ... concerned with the prospects of a system that too early introduces detailed fiscal and programmatic guidance. I continue to believe it is of prime importance to begin the PPB cycle with a fiscally unconstrained military assessment of the requirement based on the evaluation and professional judgments of the responsible field commanders and the JCS. Only with this essential first step can we reasonably expect to strike that delicate and crucial balance between real military requirements and equally real fiscal limitations. *At least, I hope the JCS taking on CINCSAC having to take any responsibility for the consequences. We need to assume both a decent responsibility and a limit responsibility for the balance between funds & needs*
- ... nothing in the above should be construed as a recommendation to lessen the commendable programs strengthening our NATO conventional forces. In an era of questionable strategic sufficiency, it would be unwise indeed to lower the nuclear threshold....

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EXTRACT OF USCINCEUR COMMENTS

- ... The review process is made more complex by the lack of a comprehensive statement of philosophy and assumptions underlying United States national security policy, military strategy and planning guidance. As a result, decisions of significant and long-range impact will tend to be based upon narrow programmatic considerations. Such a process increases the risk that force structures adopted will not be addressed to our fundamental security requirements. ✓
- One result of the absence of a broad strategic framework is a failure to devote adequate attention to NATO's flanks at a time when the extension of Soviet global power and its challenge to NATO's periphery has made the outbreak of conflict in those areas increasingly more likely.... Equally significant is the apparent overemphasis placed upon a narrow, short-conflict, warfighting scenario. It is not possible to predict with any degree of certainty either the process through which a future conflict will occur or the manner in which it will be conducted. We must, therefore, be extremely cautious of force posture decisions driven by a single scenario. *A correct observation*
- Firm estimates are lacking within the document to ensure that proposed programs will maintain essential equivalence. In this regard, experience over the past decade indicates we have repeatedly underestimated Soviet accomplishments. *Sometimes, sometimes the several.*
- Theater Nuclear Forces
 - ... It is essential that necessary modernization programs proceed. Although deployment is now a political decision, from a military point of view the ER/RB weapon would substantially improve US and Alliance TNF.
 - It is essential to maintain a balance between short range tactical nuclear systems, land based defensive systems, and proposed longer range systems....
- Conventional Capabilities
 - Key assumptions ... made which would appear to warrant more careful review....

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--- NATO tactical air totals used in the Central Region analysis of the CG are far higher than can be justified by either US or NATO planners....

-- Land Forces:

--- Our continued reduction of support forces... provides more instantly available combat power but has simultaneously reduced capability to sustain combat operations to a level which is clearly unacceptable....no longer productive to further increase forward deployed or early reinforcement combat units unless essential increased combat service support provided from within force structure....

--- ... proposed relationship between POMCUS and PWRMS... needs to be more closely examined and explicitly stated.... we must insure that we have the capability in our PWRMC to provide the essential replenishment to our forward stationed units....

--- The cumulative effect of decisions affecting USMC assets requires further examination.... decisions include: ... proposal to... tailor (USMC) forces for employment in the Central Region.... proposed establishment of POMCUS for 2 MAFs... proposal to reduce amphibious lift capability.

-- Naval Capabilities:

--- Use of NATO sea LOCs may be further degraded by failure to maintain a naval capability to counter growing Soviet capability to neutralize our naval forces and interdict/disrupt NATO sea LOCs.

-- Air Forces:

--- Proposed removal of F-111 aircraft after GLCM IOC should be carefully reviewed....

--- The decision to defer procurement of an additional F-15 wing may not be prudent...

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EXTRACT OF USCINCRD COMMENTS

- Consolidating...separate elements of guidance into a single document unavoidably results in essentially a programming document....
- Increased commitment to "heavy" Army forces, and the associated reliance on European positioned POMCUS, will affect adversely the capability of the CONUS Reserve to deploy to locations other than NATO.... *needs a look*
- ... concerned about an irreversible reliance on POMCUS stocks without an adequate strategic airlift alternative. *" "*
- The draft guidance reflects an apparent abandonment of the "total force" concept....
- The suggested guidance for ... two units training on one set of equipment will, if implemented, reduce further the effective combat ready units available to respond to contingencies other than NATO.
- The conversion of Army units from "light" to "heavy" will aggravate an already significant training problem....

EXTRACT OF CINCMAC COMMENTS

- ... Of major concern... is the AMST/tactical airlift modernization issue, the viability of our airlift enhancement program in light of the revised force sizing guidance, and the impact on CRAF passenger aircraft of the increased passenger airlift requirements under the proposed 10 POMCUS division NATO scenario.
- Regarding the guidance for a NATO conflict, heavy reliance is placed upon prepositioned Army forces. We should not allow this decision to lull us into a false sense of security--a belief that we can offset any Soviet advantage. The past indicates that Soviet probes are not aimed at our strength, but at our weaknesses. The need for rapid force mobility remains, and our airlift force must meet that need.
- ... the airlift requirement has not been analyzed and defined thoroughly. We know of no indepth analysis of our ability to respond to the other referenced contingencies.
- DOD should include AMST as a viable option for tactical airlift modernization. *we should look at this again*

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EXTRACT OF CINCAD COMMENTS

- ... The Soviets have the capability not only to launch a bomber attack on North America following a missile exchange, but to mount limited attacks in conjunction with a NATO or other scenario to deter our further involvement....

*seems to be
unlike any
tactic*

- ... the assertion that civil defense offers a low cost but effective approach for reducing US population casualties in a crisis is misleading.... The problems associated with transportation, health care, feeding, housing, and control of such numbers away from urban areas are massive and costly.... to characterize it as "relatively low cost" is incorrect....

It's cost-effective if we can do it

- Recommend... Air Force provide a nucleus of dedicated interceptors for the North American Air Defense mission augmented during times of crisis by air defense capable forces not committed to other contingencies....

*structure
of 1 wing
of dedicated
F-15s will
do it as a
response to
Bomber*

EXTRACT OF USCINCSO COMMENTS

- ... Latin America has not received adequate attention....

- The importance of the Panama Canal should be recognized in naval planning....

- The importance of Latin America in the overall national security picture is missing. A Latin American area section similar to Sections D, E and F, should be included....

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