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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

August 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE RESOURCES BOARD

SUBJECT: Manpower Issue Book (BK-6)

Attached is the final version of the Manpower Issue Book, developed after reviewing the Service POMs and your written comments to the preliminary draft Issue Book.

We have attempted to resolve as many contentious points as possible on the issues, and to incorporate those formal and informal comments that seemed appropriate. Significant changes from the first draft are highlighted by double vertical lines in the margin. A complete set of the comments received on drafts of these issues is also included.

In my cover letter to the draft Issue Books I mentioned that classified sections of the Defense Guidance had appeared in the Washington Post and requested your cooperation in protecting the draft Issue Books from improper disclosure. Nonetheless, it is my understanding that a Congressman had possession of a copy of Conventional Forces Book III on July 23, one day after internal publication. Let me urge you as strongly as I possibly can to restrict and control the distribution of this final book. These are internal working documents which will be used by the Secretary to make important decisions on the DoD FY83-87 program. After decision by the President, it is appropriate that Congress - and the public - then take their crack at it. Until then however, we ought to be able to discuss all important alternatives internally and frankly before the final decisions are made. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense are determined that these illegal and highly damaging leaks must cease, even at the expense of foregoing full participation in the making of major defense decisions.

The DRB is scheduled to meet on August 14, 1981 to discuss and decide these issues.

Vincent P.
Vincent Puritano
The Executive Secretary
to The Defense Resources Board

Attachment

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Authority: EO 13526
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5 U.S.C. § 552

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Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 16-M-0956

16-M-0956

BOOK 6 - MANPOWER

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MANPOWER ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

Defense Guidance Highlights

The Defense Guidance states that the provision of sufficient numbers of trained military and civilians is our foremost manpower planning goal. It states that military manpower may become our most constrained resource and that we must take action to assure the success of the AVF. Provision of pay comparability, maintenance of quality of life programs, and substitution of reserves and civilians for active military are identified as ways to maintain the AVF.

The Defense Guidance states that adequately manning current forces should take precedence over force expansion and that Service accessions programs should recognize the coming decline in the supply of high school graduates. To offset this decline the Services are directed: (1) to attempt to reduce their end strength by converting functions to civilian or contract and by seeking base consolidations; (2) to improve retention and reduce attrition; and (3) to emphasize recruiting prior service personnel and women.

The Defense Guidance also emphasizes the full manning of Guard and Reserve forces and the incorporation of civilians into peacetime and wartime planning. Although the Military Departments are told to program enough civilians to do necessary work, they are also directed to emphasize contracting out and other efficiencies in order to reduce the need for civilians.

Major Manpower Issues

The POMs propose increasing active duty military end strength by 230 thousand (11 percent) between FY 1981-1987. Analysis indicates that the Navy and Marine Corps can meet their goals if recent success in recruiting and retention continues. The Air Force program is sustainable since Air Force has increased its female accession and retention program and improved first-term attrition relative to the POM. The Army program is likely to produce a shortfall in enlisted end strength of 80 thousand by FY 1987. Improvements in force management to capitalize on recent retention successes can eliminate the Army shortfalls through FY 1984. Changes necessary to meet the shortfall, in FY 1985 and beyond, will be addressed by the Manpower Task Force.

Another major issue is the adequacy of Reserve and mobilization manpower programs. The POMs show shortfalls by FY 1987 of around 80 thousand in the Selected Reserve, and over 130 thousand in the IRR. The issue paper identifies ways to correct these shortfalls.

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There are two major issues involving DoD civilians. The first is the conflict between the need for more civilians to do essential work and the decreasing OMB ceiling. It is possible to meet the OMB ceiling in FY 1986 through an ambitious contracting program and major investments in labor saving equipment. The only way to reach the OMB ceiling prior to FY 1986 is to make major cuts in Service and Agency programs.

The second issue addresses the use of civilians to reduce the need for non-prior service, male high school graduate accessions. Every service has large numbers of jobs that could be converted to civilian without threatening the Service mission or their rotation and mobilization bases. Employing civilians in jobs now held by military people would reduce recruiting requirements and could greatly enhance the viability of the AVF.

The issue on Living and Working Conditions is a combination of the Defense Family Housing Issue and the Military Construction Issue from Book 5. The intent of this change is to respond to Secretary Weinberger's concerns and to focus attention on questions of living and working conditions in Europe, the United States and the rest of the world. Selection of any of the alternatives will lead to changes in the family housing and the repair and replacement programs.

The Defense Family Housing issue that was prepared by the Army is also included. This issue paper provides more detail on the family housing problem. The DRB may choose to select one of the alternatives in the Living and Working Conditions issue paper (both alternatives provides additional funds for family housing) or it may choose to select one of the issues in the Defense Family Housing issue paper.

The final issue addresses three medical programs: (1) expansion of CHAMPUS benefits to include dental care for dependents of active duty members; (2) closing the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and elimination of the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program as sources of military physicians; and (3) charging a nominal fee for outpatient visits to military medical facilities.

All of these issue papers have undergone major revisions since originally published. The issue on Military Compensation has been deleted and will be addressed by the Manpower Task Force. Only the Living and Working Conditions issue paper is new. The changes in the other papers reflect attempts to respond to comments, to take account of changes in the Service programs, and to focus the issue papers more directly on DRB concerns.

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MILITARY MANPOWER

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Issue

Have the Service programs provided appropriate resources to satisfy both peacetime and mobilization manpower requirements?

Background

The issue paper addresses three aspects of military manpower: (A) Active duty manpower; (B) Unit strengths in the Selected Reserve; and (C) Pretrained mobilization manpower. This paper does not address the validity of Service-stated manpower requirements. Program and force level decisions in other issue papers could change those requirements, in turn affecting the analysis of this paper. The analysis of Army manpower program is based upon the submission of July 23, 1981.

The OMB has recommended that this paper include an alternative holding military manpower strength at FY 82 approved levels "until requested increases can be validated." This did not prove to be a practical alternative because military strength requirements are derived from force structure. Force structure issues are addressed in Books 2 and 3, Strategic Nuclear and General Purpose Forces. Questions of manpower requirements for specific programs can and will be addressed during the budget review.

A. Active Duty Manpower

The Services have programmed active duty end-strengths to increase by 230,000 (11 percent) between FY 81 and FY 87. Of this increase, almost 200,000 are programmed as additions to the enlisted end-strengths.

Programmed Officer and Enlisted End-Strength
(000)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>Change</u>	
						<u>FY 81-87</u>	
						<u>000</u>	<u>%</u>
Army	778	786	786	812	852	74	10
Navy	540	559	587	610	620	80	15
Air Force	569	582	605	622	634	65	11
Marine Corps	191	192	195	199	202	11	6
DoD Total	2078	2119	2173	2243	2308	230	11

The programmed end-strength is the largest in our peacetime history. By FY 87 it will result in larger US active duty military forces than at any time since FY 72, or at any time since the inception of the All Volunteer Force.

MRA&L staff analysis concludes that the Navy and Marine Corps can sustain the manpower programs that they have proposed. The Air Force program is sustainable provided that the Air Force increases its female accession and retention program and improves first-term attrition. The Army's manpower program is neither sustainable nor balanced.

1. Army Active Duty Manpower

The Army active duty manpower program relies very heavily on recruiting a larger number of high quality male high school graduates.

Staff analysis indicates that the Army will be unable to recruit those numbers of high quality enlistments. The staff alternative proposed below ensures that Army meets current Congressional quality constraints throughout the program years.

Army has made several decisions in its manpower program which increase its demand for new recruits. These include:

- Programming force-wide retention rates which are lower than could be expected and sustained in light of recent compensation improvements.
- Depressing retention rates specifically to control entry into the career force of those recruits who were accepted into the Army under the misnormed entrance examinations.
- Reducing the number of prior service enlistments from 18 thousand in FY 81 to 13 thousand in FY 82-84, after which time the number increases to 18 thousand again.
- Creating high turnover and high demand for new recruits by expanding the share of two-year enlistments, and by offering enhanced educational benefits to these two-year enlistees.
- Programming first-term attrition during the FY 82-84 period at levels slightly higher than experienced in FY 80 and programmed for FY 81. This appears to reflect a worsening in first-term attrition performance in spite of substantial improvements in pay and benefits, and in spite of higher quality recruits now being enlisted.

The combined effect of these decisions is to increase total NPS demand by 83 thousand (13 percent) during the program period.

The Army states that it can achieve these requirements given:

- A 14.3 percent pay raise in October, 1981, and pay comparability thereafter.
- Additional bonus funds and higher maximum bonus award levels beginning in FY 82. (\$80 million is funded in the DoD contingency.)
- Enhanced educational benefits (so-called Ultra-VEAP), including expansion of these benefits to two-year enlistees, beginning in FY 82. (These are not funded by Army.)
- Additional recruiters (250) and advertising resources (\$10 million) beginning in FY 82. (These are funded in the Army program.)

The Army states that these conditions are both necessary and sufficient to achieve the proposed manpower program. However, MRA&L staff analysis concludes that these additional bonuses and benefits in combination are not necessary in the early part of the program years, and that they may not be sufficient by the latter part of the FYDP period given the structure of the entire Army program. These results are presented in the Evaluation of Alternatives.

2. Air Force Active Duty Manpower

The "for comment" draft of this issue paper raised the problem of whether the Air Force program was achievable given Air Force quality preferences. The major issues were the impact of the reduction of female accessions and the increase in first-term attrition, which the Air Force had programmed. The Air Force has now reexamined its program assumptions in the light of recent data on female accession requirements and retention behavior, and concluded it can support programming for increased accessions and retention during the program years. We expect these changes to result in Air Force female enlisted and officer end-strengths growing from 63 thousand in FY 81 to over 70 thousand in FY 87. In addition, the Air Force now expects to improve its first-term attrition rate over the POM years. As a result of these Air Force changes, we now are confident that the Air Force does not overstate its ability to recruit high quality male accessions, and that the Air Force manpower program is executable as revised. The Air Force has concurred in these changes.

Alternatives

Alternative 1a: The POM. This is the Army's 15 June submission. The Army manpower program was withdrawn by the Secretary of the Army in a letter to the Secretary of Defense dated 15 June.

Alternative 1b: This is the POM including the alternative manpower program that Army submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 23 July.

Alternative 2: (MRA&L) This alternative programs no-cost force management improvements to moderate the Army's demand for new recruits. It increases prior service accessions to 18 thousand per year in FY 83-84, improves retention and attrition rates to reflect the higher quality of incoming recruits and improved pay and benefits. This alternative yields an executable Army manpower program in the near years, but leaves small end-strength shortfalls in FY 85-87. This gap could be closed with all or some of the following: a modest enlistment bonus increase, an educational incentives program, increased female accessions, civilianization, or further career force increases. The small size of the shortfall, and the fact that it does not occur until FY 85, allows a decision to be deferred until more information is available on the effects of recent compensation increases, on the educational test program, and on the findings of the Military Manpower Task Force.

Evaluation of Alternatives

Alternative 1a: The manpower portion of the original Army POM was withdrawn by the Secretary of the Army on the day it was submitted. (See Tab A.) It is not a live option for consideration, but it is included (as an accounting convention) as the baseline against which the cost and manpower changes of the other alternatives are measured.

Alternative 1b: The resubmitted Army program is not executable for the following reasons:

- (1) Manpower supply is inadequate within the Congressionally-established quality constraints for the Army. The following table compares the number of high quality recruits implied by the Army program, the minimum number of high quality recruits required by the Army program to meet Congressional guidance and sustain end-strength requirements, and the staff estimate of the achievable number of high quality recruits if the Army program fully funded the VEAP and Ultra-VEAP programs.

Male High School Diploma Graduate Mental Category I-III

	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>
Army Program	53	56	56	56	55
Minimum Requirement to Achieve Program	50	48	55	55	55
OSD Estimated Achievable	52	50	48	48	48

- (2) Supply is further constrained (though retention is improved) because educational benefits (VEAP and Ultra-VEAP) are not funded in the program.
- (3) Substantial reprogramming (\$1.2 billion) is required in the FY 82-87 period. Details as to the reprogramming action have not been provided by the Army.

Analysis suggests the following shortfalls in sustainable enlisted end-strength will result from this alternative as funded:

Army Enlisted End-Strength (000)

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>
Program	680.1	678.8	680.8	700.4	715.9	733.7
Sustainable	680.1	666.2	661.0	657.9	653.4	653.6
Shortfall	-	12.6	19.8	42.5	62.5	80.1

Even if this alternative were completely funded (adding around \$1 billion during the program years for VEAP and Ultra-VEAP), it still would not yield an executable manpower program:

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- (1) The proposed educational benefits program would not eliminate the shortfall.
- (2) Lower retention that results from educational benefits would partially offset the effect of the increased supply.
- (3) The reduction in career retention fails to build the base for further Army end-strength increases beyond FY 87.

As a result, end-strength shortfalls, even with the additional funds, are still substantial:

Army Enlisted End-Strength (000)


	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>
Program	680.1	678.8	680.8	700.4	715.9	733.7
Sustainable	680.1	674.0	670.8	670.1	666.8	667.0
Shortfall	-	4.8	10.0	30.3	49.1	66.7

Alternative 2: The MRA&L staff alternative allows the Army to achieve its programmed end-strength in FY 83-84 with a combination of no-cost force management improvements. The major thrust of the staff proposal is to reduce Army's demand for new recruits by increasing its career content. This is done by: programming higher retention rates force-wide through the FYDP, (though allowing lower first-term retention rates through FY 84 to control for the misnormed cohorts); maintaining prior service accessions at the FY 80-81 level; and programming gradual reductions in first-term attrition during FY 83-84.

The Army programmed force-wide retention fails to account fully for the compensation initiatives of the 96th Congress and the anticipated gains from a 1 October 81 across-the-board pay raise of 14.3%. In this way, Army does not let its career content grow as much as it could and thereby increases its demand for NPS accessions by around 83 thousand over the program years. These demands cannot be met with currently programmed resources. In addition, a specific Army program to implement its more selective retention policy has yet to be developed.

Alternative 2 builds Army's career force by programming higher retention rates throughout the force at the level suggested by analysis to be sustainable. It allows Army to be more selective during FY 82-84 in retaining those recruits who entered the force as the result of the misnormed ASVAB test between FY 76-80, but returns to the higher achievable first-term retention rates in FY 85 and thereafter. The result is a career force that is larger than what the Army would achieve (if its program were executable). The biggest part of this increased career content is in the 4 to 8 years of service groups. The Army career force grows from 42 percent of the enlisted force in FY 81 to 48 percent by FY 87. The career structure of the Army program and the staff alternative are portrayed graphically in the following figure.

**ARMY
FORCE STRUCTURE
FY 87**



The staff alternative career force in the Army is desirable for the following reasons:

- Based on improved retention, the career content is sustainable according to OSD analysis. As the graph shows, the staff alternative builds the second term force strength during the FYDP, thus building the base for the expanded career force which the Army will require as its enlisted end-strength builds to 1.1 million by FY 97.
- It provides the Army an experience base to support the many new complex weapon systems which will be entering service in the FYDP period.

This combination of force management changes will reduce the Army's enlisted end-strength shortfall as follows:

	<u>Army Enlisted Shortfall (000)</u>				
	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>
Alternative 1b: Army	12.6	19.9	42.5	62.5	80.1
Alternative 2: MRA&L	-	-	9.3	16.8	24.2

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The remaining shortfall does not occur until FY 85, and amounts to only a 3 percent shortfall by FY 87. The outyear shortfall can be eliminated with some combination of: increased career content; increased recruiting incentives, particularly enlistment bonuses and/or educational benefits; changes in quality of recruits; or changes in prior service accessions, enlistment of female recruits, or civilianization.

The staff recommendation is to defer the decision regarding the specific solutions to solve these outyear problems. These solutions could cost up to \$2 billion a year, depending on the mix of incentives. An appropriate forum for this evaluation is the Presidential Task Force on Military Manpower. The Army has specifically endorsed this solution in its comments on the draft of this issue paper. The following sections describe the choices that the Task Force might consider.

Career Content. By increasing first-term retention rates, and retention rates in general throughout the entire enlisted force, the Army can increase its career content and correspondingly reduce its demand for new accessions. Career servicemembers are more stable and productive, though their cost is higher due to higher pay grades and greater likelihood of drawing retirement benefits after service.

Bonuses vs. Pay Raises. Bonuses are more efficient in recruitment than raises in pay because pay raises would go to every servicemember, whereas bonuses can be directed at only those skills in which additional recruitment is required. Also, bonus levels can be reduced as the manning situation improves, whereas pay cannot. Since bonus levels may be reaching their political limits, it may be desirable to begin emphasizing special or incentive pays for the difficult-to-recruit skills in lieu of larger enlistment bonuses. The cost would be comparable, and the special pay rates can be adjusted to meet demand.

Educational Benefits vs. Enlistment Bonuses. An enlistment bonus which provides the same incentive to enlist as Ultra-VEAP will be a less costly program. The benefits of Ultra-VEAP are paid to the recruit only in future periods, while the enlistment bonus is received immediately. Because individuals tend to value current benefits more highly than deferred benefits, higher levels of educational benefits are necessary to provide the same enlistment incentive as a bonus. Hence, a dollar's worth of enlistment bonus will provide a greater enlistment incentive than a dollar's worth of educational benefits.

The principal argument in support of an educational incentive program such as Ultra-VEAP is that it appeals to a segment of the youth market that would not enlist for a bonus. We have at present very limited evidence for that argument, but we expect a more definitive answer when the data from the current test program becomes available this Fall. However, educational benefits will have a negative impact on retention as individuals leave the Service to take advantage of the benefit which induced them to enter.

Analysis indicates that offering the Ultra-VEAP to two-year enlistees significantly reduces the effectiveness of the Ultra-VEAP in reducing the Army end-strength shortfall. According to staff analysis, by programming Ultra-VEAP for 15 thousand two-year enlistees per year beginning in FY 82, the Army has added approximately 8 thousand to its enlisted end-strength shortfall by FY 87, compared to offering it only to three-year and four-year enlistees. However, it creates a corresponding increase in the IRR manpower pool beginning in FY 84.

Quality. Congress has directed that at least 65 percent of Army male NPS accessions be high school graduates and that, beginning in FY 83, no more than 20 percent in each Service score in Category IV. This compares with a 25 percent restriction on low-scoring recruits in effect for each Service during FY 82. This more restrictive Category IV constraint (given Army's programmed rates of attrition and retention) would cost the Department an average of 200 million dollars per year if bonuses were used to attract the additional high quality recruits. If educational benefits, pay, or other incentives were used to recruit these personnel, these costs would be from 40 to 1000 percent greater. Alternatively, a 25% Category IV constraint combined with the force management changes in Alternative 2 would eliminate the remaining shortfalls through FY 87.

Prior Service Accessions. According to current programs, the Services will continue to rely on the prior service market for roughly 8 to 10 percent of their total accession demand. Because of their previous military experience, prior service accessions are often direct additions to the career force. As a result, they have lower attrition rates and probably higher productivity than NPS recruits. Presently and throughout the program years, there are an estimated 500 thousand military veterans that may be eligible for reenlistment as prior service accessions.

Female NPS Accessions. The number of enlisted women has grown dramatically since the beginning of the All Volunteer Force: from 32 thousand in FY 72 (or 1.6 percent of enlisted strength) to 154 thousand halfway through FY 81 (or 8.6 percent of enlisted strength). By FY 87, enlisted female end-strengths are programmed to increase to 182 thousand (about 9.2 percent of enlisted strength). Though the Department of Defense recruits a far smaller share of the female youth market (2.4 percent in FY 80) than of the corresponding male market (14.4 percent), entrance quality and subsequent promotion patterns are roughly the same between male and female recruits at the margin.

The Army and the Military Manpower Task Force are currently reviewing the utilization of women in both traditional and non-traditional skills. It may be possible to increase the proportion of women beyond even the currently programmed growth, and if so this increase will further reduce the pressure on the male high school graduate market.

Civilianization. Civilianization is a term used to denote either the replacement of military spaces with civilians or with contractor employees. OSD has identified a large number of military spaces that could be civilianized. Generally, civilianization can be expected to produce short-term budget costs, but long-term economic savings. This issue, and the related issue of civilian space ceilings, are discussed in more detail in the Civilian End-Strength issue paper.

B. Selected Reserve Unit Strength

Background

Program guidance requires that the Selected Reserve structure be fully-manned by FY 86. Only the Marine Corps Reserve meets this guidance. The other components fail to achieve a trained strength in units which equals the wartime structure requirement. Other elements of the Selected Reserve (trainees, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and full-time personnel who do not deploy with the unit upon mobilization) should not be counted against the wartime structure requirement.

A separate issue deals with the determination of Reserve requirements rather than achieving stated requirements. Due to funding constraints and other manning priorities, the Navy has not programmed the Selected Reserve structure requirements established by the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS). Congress continues to support higher Navy authorizations than requested.

The table on the next page shows the programmed shortfall for each Reserve component. The Service programs increase unit strengths in the Selected Reserve from 860 thousand to 995 thousand between FY 82-87 (16 percent). However, a shortfall of 85 thousand (8 percent) still remains by FY 87, compared to the FY 82 shortfall of 186 thousand (18 percent). Wartime requirements themselves grow by 35 thousand (3 percent) during this period. The alternative proposes elimination of this shortfall by FY 86.

Alternatives

Alternative 1: The POM. This alternative (except in the case of the Marine Corps) fails to meet program guidance that all Selected Reserve components be fully-manned by FY 86.

Alternative 2: This alternative recognizes the NAMMOS process as the basis for determining the Naval Reserve force structure requirement. In addition, for all Reserve Components, only the number of trained personnel assigned to units will be credited toward fulfilling wartime structure requirements.

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SELECTED RESERVE TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTHS (000)

	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>Change</u>	
							<u>FY82-87</u>	<u>FY82-87</u>
<u>Army National Guard</u>								
Objective	445.7	447.6	448.4	449.6	450.3	452.7	7.0	1.6
Program	364.4	374.7	385.4	394.9	400.4	406.6	42.2	11.6
Shortfall	81.3	72.9	63.0	54.7	49.9	46.1	-	-
<u>Army Reserve</u>								
Objective	285.8	287.4	290.1	295.0	298.5	303.0	17.2	6.0
Program	215.5	228.4	239.9	253.4	267.0	279.4	63.9	29.7
Shortfall	70.3	59.0	50.2	41.6	31.5	23.6	-	-
<u>Navy Reserve</u>								
Objective	119.9	118.3	116.1	113.4	114.2	113.0	-6.9	-5.8
Program	94.0	93.5	95.6	97.0	100.1	103.1	9.1	9.7
Shortfall	25.9	24.8	20.5	16.4	14.1	9.9	-	-
<u>Marine Corps Reserve</u>								
Objective	40.3	40.3	40.3	40.9	41.1	41.3	1.0	2.5
Program	37.5	38.7	39.9	40.9	41.1	41.3	3.8	10.1
Shortfall	2.8	1.6	0.4	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Air National Guard</u>								
Objective	100.9	102.8	104.0	104.6	105.8	106.9	6.0	5.9
Program	95.8	98.3	99.8	100.4	101.4	102.9	7.1	7.4
Shortfall	5.1	4.5	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.0	-	-
<u>Air Force Reserve</u>								
Objective	52.8	54.7	56.8	60.0	61.6	63.2	10.4	19.7
Program	51.8	53.6	55.6	58.0	60.4	61.9	10.1	19.5
Shortfall	1.0	1.1	1.2	2.0	1.2	1.3	-	-
<u>Total Reserve Shortfall</u>	186.4	163.9	139.5	118.9	101.1	84.9	-	-