

Ronald D. Coleman
March 1, 1984

#99

5-2 F 1. Do any of the budget requests entail programs which might violate the 1972 U.S.--Soviet ABM Treaty?

JEF W 2. The SDI reportedly calls for a number of technical demonstrations of key technologies. What will these tests entail, and when are they scheduled? Would any of them violate the ABM treaty's provision not to "develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based?"

3. How does the Defense Department define the following terms, which are utilized in the ABM treaty:

- P.2
- a. space based;
 - b. other physical principles;
 - c. research;
 - d. test;
 - e. develop; and
 - f. component.

4. How does the Air Force reconcile the SDI "technical demonstrations" with the statement made by (then) director of ACDA, Gerard Smith, when testifying before the Armed Services Committee in the other body on July 18, 1972:

P.2

The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard mode. It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on "development" applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed. The fact that early stages of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would pose problems for verification by national technical means is an important consideration in reaching this definition.

5-2 F 5. It has been reported that one of the technical demonstrations called for by the SDI is a test of the newly named Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Intercept System (ERIS) formerly called the Homing Overlay Experiment. This test is to involve the use of an airborne sensor, the Airborne Optical Adjunct, to provide guidance information to the intercept component of ERIS. Would such a test violate the ABM treaty provision not to utilize systems that substitute for ABM radars? (Include in your response a description of the ERIS program, and how it differs from HOE).

5-2 F 6. Is ERIS being developed to carry multiple interceptors? If so, would this violate the ABM Treaty restriction on MIRVed ABM systems?

5-2 F 7. Do any of the budget requests composing the SDI entail programs which might violate other treaty commitments, such as those contained in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, or the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty?

JEF W 8. For example, would development, testing, and/or deployment of BMD satellites carrying the Excalibur nuclear-pumped X-ray laser system violate any of our current treaty obligations? If so, please specify which provisions of which treaties would be violated.

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9. Would an on-orbit test of TALON GOLD of the DARPA TRIAD violate the ABM Treaty?
When is a test of TALON GOLD scheduled?
JEW

10. Is the Air Force interested in conducting an integrated on-orbit feasibility demonstration of the DARPA TRIAD Space Laser? If the program proceeds on schedule, when could such a test be conducted?
DFW

11. How would a test of the DARPA TRIAD be conducted (i.e., how would it be placed in orbit, what test vehicle would be used, over what range would it be tested, etc.)?
DFW

12. The research, development, or testing of anti-satellite weapons is not prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty, yet many of the technologies being investigated for advanced ASAT systems are the same as those under study for BMD development. Because of this, do you feel that the development of ASATs will inevitably result in a progressive erosion of the treaty?
PJL

13. Does the Air Force support the ABM treaty, or does it feel the treaty should be abandoned or modified?
PJL

14. If the treaty is abandoned due to an accelerated US program in ballistic missile defenses, how will the Soviet Union most likely respond and in what ways could this adversely effect US national security?
PJL

15. When the 1972 ABM Treaty was signed, there was widespread consensus that defensive systems were destabilizing. It was felt that possession of an area defense might induce a nation to wage a first strike attack, thinking it could survive the campaign by knocking down the enemy's diminished retaliatory response. It was also felt that by increasing the plausibility of a first strike, pressures would be created to strike preemptively during a crisis. Now we hear that defensive weapons systems are potentially stabilizing. Please explain this change of opinion.
PJL

By MR. McCLOSKEY for Dr. DELAUER (R&D Subcommittee hearing of 5/1/54)

16
DFW If the Committee would permit only a 5 percent real growth in the programs now encompassed by the SDI, how would this change the structure of the program and what shift in priorities, if any, would occur?

DFW 17 What would the answer be if the Committee held the program to nominal growth?

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Questions regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative
Ronald D. Coleman
March 1, 1984

STAF 1. Do any of the budget requests entail programs which might violate the 1972 U.S.--Soviet ABM Treaty?

DFW 2. The SDI reportedly calls for a number of technical demonstrations of key technologies. What will these tests entail, and when are they scheduled? Would any of them violate the ABM treaty's provision not to "develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based?"

3. How does the Defense Department define the following terms, which are utilized in the ABM treaty:

- 1-12
- a. space based;
 - b. other physical principles;
 - c. research;
 - d. test;
 - e. develop; and
 - f. component.

4. How does the Air Force reconcile the SDI "technical demonstrations" with the statement made by (then) director of ACDA, Gerard Smith, when testifying before the Armed Services Committee in the other body on July 18, 1972:

1-12

The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard mode. It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on "development" applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed. The fact that early stages of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would pose problems for verification by national technical means is an important consideration in reaching this definition.

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By MR. MCCLOSKEY for Dr. DELAUER (R&D Subcommittee hearing of 3/1/84)

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5 U.S.C. § 552
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