

#98

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING



Date 30 July

Memo for OSD Division

Lost one from HASC

1 Mar 84 SDI

84-T-1072

Please Expedite

Frank

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FOR OPEN PUBLICATION

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DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
AND SECURITY REVIEW (DASO-PA)  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: FEB 24 2016

16-M-0968

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HOUSE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	Y	HOUSE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE	OTHER
SENATE			SENATE		SENATE	
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INERTY NO.			
1 MAR 84			Q. 3			

ABM Treaty

Questions: How does the Defense Department define the following terms, which are utilized in the ABM treaty:

- a. Space-Based
- b. Other Physical Principles
- c. Research
- d. Test
- e. Develop, and
- f. Component

Answer: a. Space-Based - Systems which are in orbit are clearly space-based. Because the ABM treaty places prohibitions on both air-based and space-based systems, there is no need to make fine distinctions such as the point where systems cease being air-based and become space-based.

b. Other Physical Principles - Other physical principles refer to principles different from those of the ABM components - radars, interceptors, and launchers - which existed at the time of the signing of the ABM treaty and are listed in Article II of the Treaty.

c. Research (See below)

d. Test (See below)

e. Develop (see below)

c.d.e. Gerard Smith gave the U.S. view of the distinction between research and testing and development as used in the ABM Treaty. He said:

The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on "development" applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed. The fact that early stages of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would pose problems for verification by national technical means is an important consideration in reaching this definition.

f. ABM components are explicitly referred to in the ABM Treaty as ABM radars, ABM interceptor missiles and ABM launchers. Article II of the Treaty states: System

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

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OFFICE							
Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION				DATE PREPARED			
LtCol Boykin, X70030				22 JUN 84			
COORDINATION							
OFFICE	SDIO	BAAC	OSD/GC				
NAME	Conline	Minnick	Haddock				
DATE	24 July 84	25 July 84	7/30/84				

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HOUSE SENATE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	X	HOUSE SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE SENATE	OTHER
HEARING DATE 1 Mar 84	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	HEARING NO. Q.3			

**ABM Treaty**

[classification]

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- Space-Based
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- Test
- Develop, and
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- Research (See below)
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- ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
- ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION  
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[classification]

OFFICE Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP		DATE PREPARED 22 JUN 84	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION LTCOL Boykin, X70030			
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HOUSE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	Y	HOUSE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE	OTHER
SENATE			SENATE		SENATE	
HEARING DATE		TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.		LINE NO.	INSERT NO.	
1 MAR 84					Q. 3	

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- (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

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Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION				DATE PREPARED			
LtCol Boykin, X70030				22 JUN 84			
COORDINATION							
OFFICE	SDSO	EAAC	OASD/IC				
NAME	Lawline	Mimick	Haddock				
DATE	21 July 84	25 July 84	7/30/84				

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1 MAR 84					Q. 3	

ABM Treaty

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) under construction;
- (c) undergoing testing;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
- (e) mothballed.

TRANSIT

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TRANSIT

OFFICE							
Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION				DATE PREPARED			
LtCol Boykin, X70030				22 JUN 84			
COORDINATION							
OFFICE			35D/oc				
NAME	ML	G	RH				
DATE			7/30/84				

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HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		
1 MAR 84			Q. 51		

ABM Treaty

Question: While you are not spending a dime in this budget to violate any aspect of the ABM Treaty, you can't say the same for the Soviets. Can you address that in open session?

Answer: Yes, the issue can be addressed in open session. In January of this year the President submitted to the Congress his report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. The following finding, with respect to the ABM Treaty, was reported:

The 1972 ABM Treaty and its subsequent Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each party can deploy one ABM system around the national capital or at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are therefore a violation of a legal obligation.

A study was conducted to examine the evidence on whether the Soviet deployment of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia is in violation of the legal obligation to limit the location and orientation of such radars.

The study concluded that the new radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk almost certainly constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty.

In addition to the Krasnoyarsk radar, additional Soviet activities are being investigated to determine if these activities represent a violation of the ABM Treaty.

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Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION				DATE PREPARED			
LtCol Boykin, X70030				22 JUN 84			
COORDINATION							
OFFICE	SDIO	SAC	W/IC				
NAME	Runkin	[Signature]	RH				
DATE	21 July 84	27 July 84	7/30/84				

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HOUSE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE	OTHER
SENATE		SENATE		SENATE	
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	HEARING NO.		
1 MAR 84	51	115	Q. 51		

ABM Treaty

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
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Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION				DATE PREPARED			
LtCol Boykin, X70030				22 JUN 84			
COORDINATION							
OFFICE	SDIO	SAC	US/OC				
NAME	Rankine	HR	RH				
DATE	21 July 84	27 July 84	7/30/84				

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SENATE		SENATE		SENATE	
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		
1 MAR 1984			0. 4		

ASAT

[classification]

Question: How does the Air Force reconcile the SDI "technical demonstrations" with the statement made by (then) Director of ACDA, Gerard Smith, when testifying before the Armed Services Committee in the other body on July 18, 1972:

"The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on "development" applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed. The fact that early stages of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would pose problems for verification by national technical means is an important consideration in reaching this definition".

Answer: With regard to the obligation contained in Article V of the ABM Treaty "... not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.", we subscribe to the definition of "development" given by Ambassador Smith. "Experiments" or "demonstrations" will be conducted by the SDI program only if they are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

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OFFICE		QAEO/ISF/STRT		DATE PREPARED	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION		LtCol Sam Boykin - 70030		16 July 1984	
COORDINATION					
OFFICE	SDIO	SWK	CSMOC		
NAME	Rankine	Shaw	RH		
DATE	2 July 84	25 July 84	7/30/84		



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SENATE			SENATE		SENATE	
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.			
1 MAR 84			Q.12			

ABM Treaty

Question: The research, development, or testing of anti-satellite weapons is not prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty, yet many of the technologies being investigated for advanced ASAT systems are the same as those under study for BMD development. Because of this, do you feel that the development of ASATs will inevitably result in a progressive erosion of the treaty?

Answer: The development of ASAT systems should not result in erosion of the ABM Treaty. This is because the US ASAT system currently under development would have no practical utility for defense against ballistic missiles. The US has no plans to develop a more advanced system. Theoretical concepts for advanced ASAT systems could have some applications to ballistic missile defense, but generally, the technical capabilities required of conceptual ASAT systems, such as power level and tracking accuracy for directed energy weapons, and the number of systems available would not be adequate for BMD.

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OFFICE				Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP			
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION				DATE PREPARED			
LtCol Boykin, X70030				22 JUN 84			
COORDINATION							
OFFICE	SDIO	STAR	620/oc				
NAME	Ranking	for	RH				
DATE	21 July 84	25 July 84	1/30/84				

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HOUSE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	X	HOUSE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE	OTHER
SENATE			SENATE		SENATE	
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.			
1 MAR 84			0.13			

ABM Treaty

Question: Does the Air Force support the ABM Treaty, or does it feel the treaty should be abandoned or modified?

Answer: The Air Force, as well as the other military services and the Administration, supports continued adherence to the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program has been structured to remain fully consistent with that Treaty.

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Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP							
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION				DATE PREPARED			
LtCol Boykin, X70030				22 JUN 84			
COORDINATION							
OFFICE	SDIO	SFAC	AD/66				
NAME	Carline	for	RD				
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SENATE			SENATE		SENATE	
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OFFICE				Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP			
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION				DATE PREPARED			
LtCol Boykin, X70030				22 JUN 84			
COORDINATION							
OFFICE	SDIO	SFAC	15/66				
NAME	Carline	dr	12/11				
DATE	21 July 84	25 July 84	1/30/94				

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HOUSE	APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE	OTHER
SENATE		SENATE		SENATE	
HEARING DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.		
1 MAR 84			Q.14		

AEM Treaty

Question: If the treaty is abandoned due to an accelerated U.S. program in ballistic missile defenses, how will the Soviet Union most likely respond and in what ways could this adversely affect U.S. national security?

Answer: The SDI program will remain consistent with all U.S. treaty commitments, including the AEM Treaty. If, in the future, the SDI research program proves successful in identifying technologies capable of supporting an effective defense against ballistic missiles, the U.S. may wish to exploit these technologies to enhance deterrence and stability. Should this be the case, and recognizing that the Soviet Union has for many years pursued an extensive advanced ballistic missile defense technology program, we would hope that the Soviet Union could be engaged in discussions which could lead to agreements that would regulate the offensive and defensive deployments of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

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OFFICE		Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP		DATE PREPARED	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION		LtCol Boykin, X70030		6 July 1984	
COORDINATION					
OFFICE	SDIO	SAC	ASD/IC		
NAME	Rankine	Ln	RH		
DATE	21 July 84	25 July 84	7/30/84		

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HEARING DATE 1 MAR 84	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO.	LINE NO.	INSERT NO.	Q.15	

ABM Treaty

Question: When the 1972 ABM Treaty was signed, there was widespread consensus that defensive systems were destabilizing. It was felt that possession of an area defense might induce a nation to wage a first strike attack, thinking it could survive the campaign by knocking down the enemy's diminished retaliatory response. It was also felt that by increasing the plausibility of a first strike, pressures would be created to strike preemptively during a crisis. Now we hear that defensive weapons systems are potentially stabilizing. Please explain this change of opinion.

Answer: The SDI program is not based on a change of opinion, but on a potential change in technological capability. The question mistakenly asserts that in 1972 there was a widespread consensus that defense systems were destabilizing. This is not true; the principal concern was that effective defenses were at that time not technologically feasible. The current SDI program is investigating the prospect of systems with sufficient defensive capability to eliminate the effectiveness of ballistic missiles, particularly against military targets. This is because even if an attacker believed some of his missiles would leak through the defense, he would not know which ones. Therefore, he could not plan a useful counter-military first strike, and thus a more stable balance would exist. We are concurrently studying the strategic implications of an effective defense against ballistic missiles. Any deployment decision would be based on both the strategic and technological factors.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 24 Feb 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
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 Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
 MDR: 16-M-0468

5 O.S.L. § 552

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OFFICE Strategic Arms Control Policy, OASD/ISP				DATE PREPARED 22 JUN 84	
ACTION OFFICER/EXTENSION LtCol Boykin, X70030					
COORDINATION					
OFFICE	SDIO	SAAC	OSD/OC		
NAME	Rankine	SR	RB		
DATE	21 July 84	25 Jul 84	7/30/84		