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Cables/Papers on Assistance to USSR  
and Preventing Military Disintegration

Tab A Original request from Hadley/Shali  
Tab B JCS response  
Tab C OSD Backchannel  
Tab D USNATO ideas  
Tab E JCS paper on humanitarian aid (with ISP attachment)  
Tab F Latest incoming from Gen. Shali with talking points

REDACT STATE EQUITIES AS SHOWN  
25X6. OSD CONCURRENCE  
REQUIRED.

CIA EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs  
EO 13526 3.5(c)

DECLASSIFIED BY CIA, DIA, JS,  
DOS + OUSD(S)  
DATE 02 OCT 2017  
FOIA CASE # 12-F-1306

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FM LTG BEALIKASHVILI  
ASD MADLEY  
TO NMCC/EA  
BT  
UNCLAS E F T O  
PLEASE DELIVER SUNDAY MORNING TO:  
DJS  
J-5  
MR J.D. CROUCH (PDASD/ISF)  
MR SCOOTER LIEBY (PDUSD(P) (S&R)

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

1. IN PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS ON WHAT NATO'S ROLE SHOULD BE IN HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, SEC BAKER ASKED THAT WE PROVIDE WITH SOME IDEAS THAT HE COULD EITHER PUT ON THE TABLE OR USE IN RESPONSE SHOULD HE BE ASKED HIS THOUGHTS ON HOW THE U.S. ENVISIONS HOW NATO COULD BE USEFUL. ANYTHING YOU COULD PROVIDE WOULD BE HELPFUL. WOULD APPRECIATE ANSWER SOONEST BUT NOT LATER THAN WEDNESDAY P.M.

2. WE WERE ALSO ASKED OUR THOUGHTS ON STEPS THAT U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE TO HELP PREVENT DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY. ONE IDEA ADVANCED WAS PLAYING UP TO THEIR PROFESSIONALISM. ON ONE LEVEL THIS COULD BE DONE BY INVITING REPUBLIC DEFENSE AND MILITARY LEADERS TO VISIT U.S. COUNTERPARTS. ON A DIFFERENT LEVEL, THEIR MILITARY COULD BE INVOLVED IN DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN AID. NEED AND USEFUL THOUGHTS SOONEST.

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**THE JOINT STAFF**  
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)  
Office of the Director  
Washington, D.C. 20318-5000

MEMO TO: ACJCS *John*

*15 Dec 91*

In response to your message requesting thoughts on steps the US could take to prevent the disintegration of the Soviet military, we've prepared the attached paper.

It was produced in a few hours so it could be provided before your first day in Moscow. Additional thoughts will be forwarded as appropriate.

We will get you some ideas on NATO participation prior to your arrival in Brussels.

E. S. LELAND, JR.  
Lieutenant General, USA

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15 December 1991

POSITION PAPER

Subject: US Steps to Prevent Disintegration of the Soviet Military (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide ACJCS with initial J-5 thoughts on steps the United States could take to help prevent the disintegration of the Soviet military.

2. (U) Background

a. ~~(S)~~ The magnitude and momentum of change in the former Soviet Union gives rise to serious questions about the ability of outsiders to exert significant influence across the broad spectrum of political and economic events. This is also a factor in developing US policy steps concerning the Soviet military.

b. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] the military appears to be maintaining its composure and remaining obedient to orders, but there is anecdotal evidence suggesting it is breaking up more rapidly than general appearances would indicate.

c. ~~(S)~~ While the Soviet military is the one remaining "central" institution that still seems to function, the turmoil in the former Soviet Union is in the process of destroying this institution also. Pay, housing, and food problems, the rise of nationalism, and competing calls for soldiers' loyalty are eroding the formerly monolithic institution and could possibly lead to mutiny and rogue behavior as conditions worsen.

d. ~~(S)~~ The United States is most concerned about developments in Russian and Ukrainian military forces (when established), although we have an interest in other republican forces, e.g. Moldova, Tajikistan.

3. (U) Desired Outcomes

a. ~~(S)~~ The people of the former Soviet Union democratically determine their own fate without undue interference from outsiders.

b. ~~(S)~~ Nuclear weapons remain under the control of a single, common entity, with republic participation in the decision making process on employment at one end of the spectrum, and significant reductions, dismantlement and destruction on the other end.

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CIA S U.S.C. § 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(c), 3.5(c)

~~Classified by Multiple Sources~~  
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

c. ~~400~~ Eventual destruction of all nuclear weapons in the non-Russian republics (states) or their withdrawal to Russia. US and allied efforts to assist such measures will continue.

d. ~~400~~ The present "central" General Staff ultimately becomes the Russian General Staff. Independent republics (states) create their own General Staff equivalents.

e. ~~400~~ Over time, conventional Soviet forces divide into republic-controlled armed forces.

#### 4. (U) US Policy Goals and Objectives

a. ~~400~~ The immediate goal is to help prevent the disintegration of the Soviet military into factions competing along ethnic/republic lines or fragmenting into rogue "warlord" entities threatening the peaceful consummation of democratic devolution of power to the independent republics (states). At its most basic level, this could entail helping keep the Soviet military fed, clothed, and content.

b. ~~400~~ While there are things the United States can do to influence developments on the margins of the current tumultuous changes, we should strive to ensure that whatever we do does not hasten the demise of the only remaining functioning institution in the former Soviet Union--the military. We should be seen as helping the Soviet military accomplish this transition, not as seeking to take advantage of it.

c. ~~400~~ It is in the US interest to have the Soviet (Russian and Ukrainian) military engaged in meaningful nation-building activities--a mission to keep them occupied and cooperating, if not unified--to help ensure the peaceful transition to the democratic rule of independent states.

5. ~~400~~ Options for US to Help Prevent Disintegration. In considering steps the United States would be prepared to take to help prevent disintegration of the Soviet military structure, the most promising actions are connected with direct engagement between US and Soviet military people--soldier-to-soldier--from the highest levels to the lowest, unit-level contacts. Such contacts play to common aspects of military professionalism and, equally important, demonstrate respect and recognition from one powerful military organization to another. Through contacts at all levels--senior to junior, "central" to republic--the United States could establish an across-the-board engagement with military counterparts that would

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OUUSD(P) S U.S.C. § 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(b), (d)

serve to emphasize common themes of military life and provide an opportunity to stress the role of the military in a democratic society, including military support to the broader community. Contacts would also provide an opportunity to stress the importance of a peaceful transition to republic control of conventional military forces and encourage civilian control over the military. In this regard, the following ideas on military actions represent some of the limited tools we have available to bring about the desired end state of peaceful devolution of power to independent republics, while preventing the destabilizing fragmentation of the Soviet military.

a. ~~gap~~ As an outgrowth of our present, largely symbolic, program of military-to-military contacts with the central military authorities, the United States could seek to establish a broad-based program at all levels. The present Soviet General Staff represents a conduit to all military forces now (and the Russian military in the future). Accordingly, we should seek to expand relations with the General Staff across the board as an entry point to lower level contacts, which will ultimately be the most useful and best promote our interests. The CJCS welcome letter to General-Colonel Samsonov represents the first step in this process.

b. ~~gap~~ Through across-the-board military contacts the United States will demonstrate a kind of "solidarity" with Soviet counterparts and possibly engender a feeling that we are standing beside our counterparts as they work through the current difficulties. Among the alternatives for creating an atmosphere of cooperation could be sports programs and other athletic competitions that mix Soviet and US soldiers in a way that promotes visible teamwork. A limiting factor in any idea such as this, however, will be the lack of appropriate language skills.

  
As the remaining organization with any degree of centralized control over vast personnel and material resources throughout the former Soviet Union, the military forces represent the best candidate to carry out the distribution of humanitarian assistance provided by other countries. For example, with their extensive truck, aircraft, and shipping resources, the military could help in food distribution and delivery of medical supplies. Military construction organizations could assist in the provision of shelter for military families. Where appropriate and feasible, US military personnel could join in the distribution of such

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humanitarian assistance, thereby further demonstrating US solidarity with Soviet military counterparts.

d. ~~444~~ The United States could consider sponsoring an internationally-funded financial effort to facilitate the transition (on a large scale) of the Soviet military to non-defense related occupations. This could be included as part of the broader initiative of overall defense conversion. Included in this large-scale effort to retrain the Soviet military for productive participation in civilian life, would be the implied mission of underwriting basic subsistence support for the Soviet military and their families while the program is underway. A NATO effort with Japanese assistance could be explored. The primary objection to providing financial support would be the domestic political reaction in a time of economic hardship in the United States.

5. (U) Recommendations.

a. (U) ACJCS consider these options in discussions with SECSTATE, ASD Hadley, and, eventually, Soviet military counterparts.

b. (U) ACJCS and SECSTATE party solicit AMEMB Moscow, as well as Soviet military views and ideas concerning what USG actions would be most effective in slowing or preventing disintegration of the Soviet military.

Prepared by: Ted Wilson, LTC, USA  
EURDIV, J-5, Ext. 49428

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PLEASE PASS TO ASD HADLEY ON VISITING SECSTATE DEL. FROM PDUSD LIBBY  
AND PDASD CROUCH

SUBJ: DISCUSSIONS ON FORMER SOVIET UNION (U)

REF: A. YOUR MSG 1500799Z DEC 71 B. USMISSION NATO 05811

3. ~~WE~~ WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DISINTEGRATION  
AND CONTROLLED/MANAGED BREAKUP OF THE SOVIET MILITARY. IT WOULD NOT  
BE IN OUR INTEREST IF THERE WAS UNCONTROLLED DISINTEGRATION OF THE  
MILITARY INTO MANY PIECES WITH POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT AMONG THE  
VARIOUS PIECES, OR ACTIONS BY PIECES OF THE MILITARY AGAINST LEGITI-  
MATE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, AGAINST NEIGH-  
BORING STATES, OR WITH IRRESPONSIBLE FOREIGN COUNTRIES OR ORGANIZA-  
TIONS. SOME WAYS OF HELPING AVOID UNCONTROLLED DISINTEGRATION MIGHT  
INCLUDE SHORTENING THE TERMS OF CONSCRIPTION AND MOVING SERVICE AGE  
MEN OUT OF THE MILITARY AND INTO A CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS-TYPE  
ORGANIZATION TO WORK ON BUILDING HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, PERHAPS  
ASSISTED BY USG TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES AND  
METHODS. THIS IS AN AREA THAT MERITS FURTHER THOUGHT.

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S.FREEMAN,0USD(P)/SEE-57421

J. MORRISON, DIR/SEE, X77202

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DOS 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b)(6)




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2. ~~000~~ WE WANT A SINGLE MILITARY AUTHORITY EXERCISING PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FSU. BUT BEYOND THIS, WE DO NOT SEE AS A USG OBJECTIVE PREVENTION OF THE BREAKUP OF THE SOVIET MILITARY IF THE BREAKUP IS PEACEFUL AND ALONG THE LINES OF THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER TO THE REPUBLICS. AS POWER CONTINUES TO DEVOLVE TO THE REPUBLICS, IT IS LIKELY THE REPUBLICS WILL INCREASINGLY ESTABLISH THEIR OWN ARMED FORCES.



3. ~~000~~ WE WILL WANT NOT ONLY TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH EXISTING CENTRAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES (E.G., WE ARE WORKING ON SETTING A DATE FOR A VISIT TO THE U.S. BY MOD SHAPOSHNIKOV) BUT ALSO TO ESTABLISH CONTACTS WITH DEFENSE/MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS IN REPUBLICS THAT MEET CERTAIN CRITERIA, SUCH AS THE FIVE PRINCIPLES AND THE CRITERIA IDENTIFIED FOR RECOGNITION OF THE UKRAINE. WE ARE WORKING INTERAGENCY ON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AND A RANGE OF STEPS WE COULD TAKE TO ENHANCE OUR DEFENSE AND MILITARY RELATIONS.



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[REDACTED] WE ARE LOOKING AT

TYPES OF CONTACTS THAT COULD HELP ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES. WE DO NOT WANT TO HELP THEM WITH COMBAT TRAINING BUT ARE LOOKING AT POSSIBILITIES FOR SOME FORM OF INET-LIKE TRAINING IN NON-COMBAT AREAS. WE ARE ALSO LOOKING AT CONTACTS THAT WOULD HELP SHOW THEM WHAT WE DO IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND HOW WE TAKE CARE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEIR FAMILIES, AS WELL AS PROMOTE RESPONSIBLE ACTIVITIES SUCH AS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND CORPS OF ENGINEER-TYPE ACTIVITIES, AND HOW WE PLAN AND BUDGET FOR OUR FORCES.

4. ~~WE~~ WE PREFER AT THIS POINT TO AVOID USING SOVIET MILITARY FORCES FOR DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. FOOD ASSISTANCE. STATE IS TRYING TO LINE UP PRIVATE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS (E.G., RED CROSS AND SALVATION ARMY) TO ADMINISTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THE PSU, AND WE BELIEVE THIS IS THE BEST APPROACH.

5. ~~WE~~ GENERAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR NATO: NATO HAS CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES IN CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND MILITARY LOGISTICS THAT COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IN SUPPORT OF COORDINATED HUMANITARIAN AID EFFORTS BY NATO'S 16 MEMBERS. WE WOULD NOT FORESEE MUCH HUMANITARIAN

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AID FROM EAST EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL, BUT THERE COULD BE AT LEAST DISCUSSION OF HUMANITARIAN AID IN THE NACC. NATO COULD EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND HELP SERVE AS A CLEARING HOUSE ON HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE FSU, HELPING TO STIMULATE PROVISION OF AID AND ENSURING THAT AID EFFORTS MEET NEEDS AND THAT ALLIES DO NOT DUPLICATE EACH OTHERS EFFORTS. WE HOPE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES BEYOND NATO WILL PARTICIPATE IN HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE FSU; NATO'S ROLE WOULD BE PRIMARILY RELATED TO THE 36 MEMBERS, BUT COULD CONCEIVABLY PLAY A BROADER ROLE, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO OVERALL COORDINATION.

L. ~~000~~ MORE SPECIFICALLY, A KEY NATO CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE TO USE THE SENIOR EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE (SCEPC) AS A CLEARING HOUSE FOR INFORMATION - INCLUDING INFORMATION FROM OUTSIDE NATO - CONSULTING AND COORDINATING ON THE DETAILS OF LOCATING POTENTIAL SUPPLY STOCKS, AND PLANNING FOR DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES.

- THE SCEPC, AND ITS SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES - PARTICULARLY THE CIVIL DEFENSE COMMITTEE, HAVE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE PLANNING FOR HANDLING DISASTERS AND HAVE THE MECHANISMS IN PLACE AND THE CONTACTS IN EUROPE TO COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE FSU.
- THE SCEPC COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, ASK FOR NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF

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CRITICAL SUPPLIES SUCH AS BLANKETS, FOOD, MEDICINE. IT HAS THE KNOWLEDGE TO HELP LOCATE STOCKS THROUGHOUT EUROPE AND COULD BUILD ON ITS EXPERIENCE IN SUPPORTING OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT TO LOCATE AND MOVE SHELTERS AND HEATING TO THE EAST.

- THE SCEPC, THROUGH ITS CONTACTS IN ALL ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN TRANSPORT INDUSTRY - AIR, SEA, RAIL, TRUCK, AND CANALS, HAS THE ABILITY TO SERVE AS A CLEARING HOUSE FOR MOVING SUPPLIES TO DESTINATIONS IN THE FSU.

- NATO COULD BUILD ON ITS YEARS OF PRACTICE FOR REINFORCEMENT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE TO COORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF MATERIAL AND SUPPLIES RAPIDLY TO THE EAST.

- NATO ALSO CAN PROVIDE EXPERT ADVICE ON DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES ONCE THEY ARRIVE IN THE EAST. IT COULD PROVIDE KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS TO AN INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE HUMANITARIAN AID REACHED ITS INTENDED RECIPIENTS.

- NATO MIGHT ALSO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE LANGUAGE-CAPABLE OFFICERS TO ASSIST AS NECESSARY.

7. (U) YOU SHOULD ALSO SEE NATO MESSAGE ON THIS SAME TOPIC, REF B. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK THE ISSUE OVERNIGHT AND WILL ADVISE.

SSO NOTE: PLEASE DELIVER 008 17 DECEMBER.

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
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TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7121 FMA WASHDC//J// IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC// IMMEDIATE  
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

TO: RUMWASG11 000430

~~SECTION 01 OF 02 USDAO 00011~~

3/5 -- PASS TO THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR TST

STATE ALSO FOR P. C. T. AND EUN, PASS SEC FOR COMPT; CSD FOR HAWLEY AND JSP, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING; EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE ALSO FOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING OFFICERS

HELINSKI PASS TO RIGA, TALLINN AND VILNUS, MOSCOW FOR KRY

~~SECTION 02 OF 02 USDAO 00011~~

TAGS: NATO, CEP, PHEL, OVP  
SUBJECT: (U) NATO'S ROLE IN DELIVERING RELIEF TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

2. ~~SECTION 02 OF 02 USDAO 00011~~

SUMMARY

2. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE TO WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS THAT THE CURRENT UNWELLING OF THE SOVIET UNION REPRESENTS; IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PREMIER WESTERN SECURITY ALLIANCE, NATO, ACTIVELY SEEK TO MITIGATE THE FORCES OF INSTABILITY. IN PARTICULAR, THE CURRENT WINTER, WITH THE INCREASING LIKELIHOOD OF SEVERE FOOD AND FUEL SHORTAGES, REPRESENTS BOTH A CHALLENGE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO WHICH THE ALLIANCE CAN AND SHOULD RESPOND WITH PROMPTNESS AND VIGOR. THE ALLIANCE HAS CONSIDERABLE CIVIL AND MILITARY ASSETS THAT CAN HELP BRIDGE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROSPECTIVE CHAOS AND A MORE CONTROLLED TRANSITION TO A NEW ORDER.

3. THIS CLEARLY CANNOT BE DONE IN A VACUUM. THE EFFORT NEEDS TO BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER GROUPS SUCH AS THE EC AND G-24, THE UN HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, AND PRIVATE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS (PVO) AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO). IT NEEDS TO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE PROCESS PROPOSED IN YOUR PRINCETON SPEECH. HOWEVER, NATO HAS THE UNIQUE COMBINATION OF BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY EXPERTISE THAT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT RELIEF EFFORTS ARE DELIVERED TO THOSE WHO REALLY NEED THEM.

4. AS INDICATED IN MY REPTEL OVERVIEW OF THE MAC, I SUGGEST YOU PROPOSE TO ALLIANCE MEMBERS THAT NATO TAKE THE PREDOMINANT COORDINATING ROLE IN DELIVERING THE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THE SOVIET UNION AND INSURING ITS EFFECTIVE DISTRIBUTION. I BELIEVE THAT THIS MUST BE DECIDED BY NATO MEMBERS. IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE FIRST MEETING OF THE MAC, IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FRENCH TO BLOCK THIS INITIATIVE.

THE CONCEPT

5. NATO'S SENIOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE (SEPEC), IN CONJUNCTION WITH NATO'S MILITARY LOGISTIC STRUCTURE, CONTAIN THE CORE CAPABILITY NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A SUCCESSFUL RELIEF OPERATION. IN SEPEC'S SUBORDINATE BODIES THERE EXISTS A COMBINATION OF GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE-SECTOR EXPERTISE THAT CAN QUICKLY BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. ONE OF THE GREATEST PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING EFFECTIVE RELIEF IS THE

OR. WASHDC//JSP-1SP; OR. WOLFOWITZ//JSP

ACTION  
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USDP-PH(1) USDP-CH(1)

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TOR-01000/14102

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FAILURE OF THE INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OF THE SOVIET UNION. NATO'S CIVIL TRANSPORTATION EXPERTS (AIR, SURFACE, AND WATERWAYS) CAN MAKE AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PREFERRED METHODS OF TRANSPORTATION. NATO'S ENERGY AND FOOD AND AGRICULTURE EXPERTS CAN MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL NEEDS AND IDENTIFY WAYS TO FILL THE MOST URGENT NEEDS. AND NATO'S JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY MEDICAL COMMUNITY CAN IDENTIFY PROBLEM AREAS AND WORK TO MEET THESE NEEDS.

6. NATO'S MILITARY LOGISTIC ASSETS CAN BE EMPLOYED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO WHAT HAS DONE TO ASSIST THE ARMS IN THE TURKEY/IRAQ BORDER AREA IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, ON WHATEVER SCALE IS ULTIMATELY REQUIRED BY THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT RELIEF SUPPLIES REACH THE APPROPRIATE DESTINATION, AT LEAST INITIALLY, THE NATO LOGISTIC STRUCTURE, OPERATING IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH SOVIET THROPS, CAN PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COMMUNICATIONS, REFUELING REPORTS, SUPPLY CENTERS TO SUPPORT THE RELIEF OPERATION, AND COMMO ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE MOST URGENT NEEDS. AS IN THE CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA, THE LONG-TERM EFFORT MUST BE SUSTAINED BY CIVIL AUTHORITIES.

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~~SECTION 02 OF 02 USDAO 00011~~

3/5 -- PASS TO THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR TST

STATE ALSO FOR P. C. T. AND EUN, PASS SEC FOR COMPT; CSD FOR HAWLEY AND JSP, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING; EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE ALSO FOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING OFFICERS

HELINSKI PASS TO RIGA, TALLINN AND VILNUS, MOSCOW FOR KRY

~~SECTION 02 OF 02 USDAO 00011~~

TAGS: NATO, CEP, PHEL, OVP  
SUBJECT: (U) NATO'S ROLE IN DELIVERING RELIEF TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

NOOS AND PUG.

7. NATO OFFERS THE CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGES OF ITS DUAL CIVIL-MILITARY NATURE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRIVATE SECTOR WILL HAVE ACCESS TO TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITIES THAT ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THE MILITARY, BUT WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY WELL SUITED TO OPERATION ON THE INLAND WATERWAYS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THESE COULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN SETTING UP AND OPERATING REFUELING DEPOTS. FURTHERMORE, THE CIVIL EXPERTISE CAN BE USED TO PROVIDE THE INITIAL ASSESSMENTS AND PROPOSE A SET OF FEASIBLE APPROACHES; THE MILITARY LOGISTICS CAPABILITY CAN PROVIDE RAPID, INITIAL EXECUTION.

8. THE BENEFITS OF THIS APPROACH ARE MANY.

-- NATO MILITARY ALREADY HAVE ACQUIRED VALUABLE EXPERIENCE IN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT.

-- NATO CIVIL EXPERTISE HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY USED IN BOTH DESERT THREAT/DESERT STORM OPERATIONS AS WELL AS IN CONSULTING WITH THE EAST ON SPECIFIC PROBLEMS.

-- ONE OF THE COOPERATIVE AREAS IDENTIFIED IN THE HOME SUMMIT DECLARATION WAS CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION. IT WOULD BE HARD TO ILLUSTRATE THIS IN A BETTER WAY.

-- NATO AND SOVIET MILITARY FORCES OPERATING TOGETHER IN A HUMANITARIAN OPERATION CONVEYS EXACTLY THE RIGHT SIGNAL TO BOTH EAST AND WEST.

-- NO OTHER ORGANIZATION, NOT THE EC, THE UN, THE IO, OR THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, CAN REACT AS QUICKLY OR AS EFFECTIVELY AS NATO. WITHIN THE EC EFFORTS IN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.

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— 27 SUMMARIZES NATO'S ROLE AS A SECURITY ALLIANCE.

THE WAY AHEAD

9. YOU MAY WISH TO SURVEY THIS IDEA DURING YOUR DISCUSSIONS IN THE JOINT STAFF. IF THESE AUTHORITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS APPROACH, THIS COULD BE A MAJOR PART OF YOUR INTERVENTION IN THE MAC. NATO, AS AN ORGANIZATION, SHOULD BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JOINT STAFF CONFERENCE PROPOSED IN YOUR PROTECTIVE SPEECH.

10. GENERAL GALTIER, AS SACRIN, SHOULD BE TASKED, BY NATO, TO DEVELOP AN OPERATIONAL PLAN THAT COULD BE PUT INTO PLACE IMMEDIATELY. NATO CIVIL EMERGENCY DESIGNS SHOULD BE SELECTIVELY ACTIVATED TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT. CLEARLY THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND CIVIL EXPERTS MUST BE CLOSE, FREQUENT AND EXTENSIVE, AND CAN BE JOINT-STARTED USING US CHANNELS. USRUCON AND THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY COULD START INITIAL PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT BEFORE THE MAC MEETING NEXT THURSDAY.

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FAX'D TO SHAL

16 December 1991

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: NATO Humanitarian Assistance to the Soviet Union (U)

1. (U) **Purpose.** To provide information to LTG Shalikashvili on possible NATO activities in humanitarian assistance.

2. ~~(S)~~ **Key Points.**

- AMB Taft has suggested Secretary Baker propose to Alliance Ministers at the NAC that NATO take the predominant coordinating role for all humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union and ensure its proper and effective distribution. AMB Taft also proposed tasking SACEUR to develop an operational plan for immediate execution, with support from USEUCOM and the FEMA.
- At this point, NATO activity should be limited to surveying potential shortages, coordinating donations through NATO's Senior Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC), and providing support to the Soviet military to undertake humanitarian aid missions.
- NATO should initiate a survey of humanitarian assistance needs in the former Soviet Union, using results of USDA and AID surveys completed in the Fall\* as a starting point.
  - The survey could be done in conjunction with the Soviet military.
  - The Senior Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) could function as a clearing house for survey information.
- Distribution of food, medical, and other material assistance should be accomplished by the Soviet military, with NATO assistance, as appropriate.
  - The Soviet military is the most efficient remaining organization in the former Soviet Union and has convincingly demonstrated its ability to move large amounts of equipment in relatively short periods of time, e.g. withdrawals of the Southern and Central Groups of Forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and continuing withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany.
  - The military is capable of this mission, assuming present fuel shortages are relieved.
  - NATO might have to provide fuel for Soviet aircraft and vehicles, in order for them to be able to effect distribution.

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Prepared by: Kori Schake  
J-5/EURDIV/NATO x49424

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#### NATO Role in Humanitarian Assistance for Former Soviet Union

##### Background and Talking Points for NAC

NATO has considerable resources in civil emergency planning and military logistics that could be brought to bear in support of an international effort to provide short-term humanitarian assistance to the peoples of the former Soviet Union. The alliance could build on its performance in Desert Storm and Provide Comfort to coordinate transport and other aspects of an international assistance effort.

A key NATO contribution would be to use the Senior Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) as a clearing house for information -- including information from outside NATO -- consulting and coordinating on the details of locating potential supply stocks, and planning for distribution of supplies.

- The SCEPC, and its subordinate committees -- particularly the Civil Defense Committee, have years of experience planning for handling disasters and have the mechanisms in place and the contacts in Europe to coordinate humanitarian aid to the countries of the former Soviet Union.
- The SCEPC could, for example, ask for national contributions of critical supplies such as blankets, food, medicine. It has the knowledge to help locate stocks throughout Europe and could build on its experience in supporting Operation Provide Comfort to locate and move shelters and heating to the East.
- The SCEPC, through its contacts in all aspects of European transport industry -- air, sea, rail, truck, and canals -- has the ability to serve as a clearing house for moving supplies to destinations in the former Soviet Union.
- NATO could build on its years of practice for reinforcement of combat operations in Europe to coordinate the movement of materiel and supplies rapidly to the East.

NATO also can provide expert advice on distribution of supplies once they arrive in the East. It could provide knowledgeable observers to an international supervisory effort to ensure that the humanitarian aid reached its intended recipients.

Prepared by: Phil Roundtree OASD/ISP (NATO Policy) x71386, 16 Dec 91

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CIRCLE ONE BELOW:IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:SECURE FAX

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

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HL LelandFROM / LOCATION: SECSTATE / MOSCOW VIA WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

## ACTION / LOCATION:

1. LTG LELAND
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_

(TIME OF RECEIPT)

## INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_

## REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

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(CLASSIFICATION)

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TO: J-5, JCS (703) 697-1801  
JTH ED LELAND

Ed—

These are the words I  
propose giving Sea State  
to use.

Please check with  
Gen Powell (and provide  
to J.D. Cronin)

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TO: J-5, JCS (LTG LELAND)

Ed-

These are the words I and Steve Hadley propose to give Gen Stahl.

I think I followed guidance as you explained it.

Please provide to J.D. Crouch (for Paul Wolfowitz) and clear with Gen Powell.

I need your response ASAP. Thanks.

Jeb.

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Proposed Dec 19 UAC  
Presentations on "Soviet"  
Humanitarian Relief

005D(P) 5U.S.C. § 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(b), (d)

- o One of the most striking aspects of my talks in the former Soviet Union was the extraordinary prestige and respect our Alliance enjoys in that part of the world.
- o President Teltson told me he hopes the Commonwealth's Defense Union can someday join NATO. Marshall Shaposhnikov drew heavily on NATO in developing his plans for new defensive structures for the Commonwealth.

wherever

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Democratic

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and free market reforms are to  
have a chance.

o Fortunately, NATO has  
~~considerable resources and~~  
the organizations, expertise and  
resources that could be brought  
to bear in support of an  
international effort to provide  
such badly needed short-term  
humanitarian assistance to  
the peoples of the former Soviet  
Union.

o NATO's Senior Civil Emergency  
Planning Committee (SCEPC) contains  
the core capability necessary to  
support a successful relief  
operation.

o In SCEPC's subordinate  
bodies there exists a combination  
of government and private-sector  
expertise that can be brought  
to bear in the current  
situation.

o Working on USDA and AID

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(4)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Surveys completed in the Fall, NATO's energy, food and agriculture experts can quickly assess ~~needs~~ <sup>requirements</sup> critical needs and identify ways to <sup>help</sup> fill them.

• NATO's joint civil-military medical community could do the same in <sup>rapidly</sup> identifying critical medical needs.

• NATO's civil transportation experts (air, surface and waterway) can <sup>quickly</sup> make assessments of the preferred methods of transportation, both to and within the Republics.

• These surveys and assessments <sup>could</sup> be done accomplished working hand-in-hand with the leaders of the republics and where appropriate in conjunction with the Soviet military... and working together... could be quickly translated into plans for action. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- o The SCEPC is also well suited to help identify potential national contributions of critical supplies such as food, medicine and blankets.
- o Through its contacts in all aspects of the European transport industry-- air, rail, road and canal -- the SCEPC has the ability to serve as a clearing house for moving supplies to the republics.
- o And finally, ~~NATO should~~ drawing on Republic leaders and Soviet military capabilities, NATO should assess what support it could provide in the distribution of humanitarian assistance within the region.

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