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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4

24 October 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL CARL SMITH

Subject: CINCSAC's Study on Strategic Nuclear Balance  
in the 1980s

General Jones has asked that Secretary Brown receive  
for his information a copy of the attached CINCSAC study  
on the strategic nuclear balance.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 16 2016

*John S. Pustay*  
JOHN S. PUSTAY  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Assistant to the Chairman

Attachment:  
a/s

~~DEGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL  
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA  
Unsanitized disclosure subject to  
administrative and criminal sanctions  
Handle as Restricted Data on foreign  
dissemination. Section 112, Atomic  
Energy Act 1954~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT DATE:  
21-Apr-2016

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1. REVIEW DATE: <u>5/18/86</u>	2. DECLASSIFICATION (CIRCULAR) NUMBER:
AUTHORITY: <u>EO 13526</u>	3. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: <u>FRD</u>
NAME: <u>John S. Pustay</u>	4. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
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AUTHORITY: <u>EO 13526</u>	7. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
NAME: <u>John S. Pustay</u>	8. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
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See Def Cont Nr. 104741

14-M-4195-A1

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1st  
1 copy to WGA

THE PROJECTED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE  
AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. FORCE MODERNIZATION

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Chief, Records & Declass. Div, WWS  
Date: DEC 16 2016

[REDACTED]

-- As we review our strategic posture today, it is  
worthwhile to remember that judgments concerning  
relative strategic postures depend upon accurate  
intelligence estimates.

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3 (b)(5)

--- ~~(S)~~ More important perhaps than weapon inven-  
tory is the increased efficiency of Soviet  
weapons. Table II compares counter military  
potential (CMP) or hard target kill potential.

OPR: HQ SAC/XPS  
DATE: 20 Sep 79

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Based upon information available in 1977, OSD under-  
took a study to reexamine the cost-effectiveness of modernizing  
the airbreathing element of the TRIAD in light of the  
then existing strategic situation.

-- The motivation for the study came first from a percep-  
tion that the cost of a cruise missile carrier force  
would be substantially less than the cost of the B-1  
program, and secondly that the Soviet threat did not  
require deployment of both [REDACTED] and  
a cruise missile force.

-- The OSD study concluded that cruise missiles offered a  
more cost-effective way to modernize the bomber leg  
of the TRIAD with the assumption that the B-52  
could adequately penetrate in the mid-late 1980s.

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As a result of the strategic balance projected in 1977,  
B-1 production was cancelled on 30 June 1977.

JS 3.3 (b)(5)


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- (b) In the following paragraphs it can be demonstrated how unforeseen changes in the rate of Soviet modernization have dramatically altered the strategic relationship between the USSR and the US since 1977. Before proceeding with this analysis, let us first establish changes that also occurred in the US program estimates between 1977 and today.

-- Table III shows the impact of US program changes on warhead inventories.\*

TABLE III  
Number of Weapons Programmed

	For 1982		For 1985	
	Jan 77 FYDP	Current FYDP	Jan 77 FYDP	Current FYDP
Bomber Force				
ICBMs				
SLBMs				
Total				

\*Changes resulted from both cancellation and slippage in major programs. For example, in the January 1977 FYDP we estimated Trident, M-X, B-1 and ALCM-A<sup>1/</sup> in the force by 1985. Our current estimates for 1985 are Trident, M-X, B-1, and ALCM-B.

<sup>1/</sup> Reduced to ALCM-A in May 77 FYDP.


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Section  
OSD 6.2(a)


Section  
DOE 6.2(a)  
JS 3.3(b)(5)

JS 3.3(b)(5) DOE section 6.2(a)

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)



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JS 3.3(b)(5)


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Another way of demonstrating the shift in strategic balance is to count residual weapons after a simulated counterforce exchange of the alert force as shown in Figure III.

FIGURE III  
RESIDUAL WEAPONS AFTER COUNTER-FORCE EXCHANGE



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- ~~(S)~~ The compound effect of accelerating Soviet modernization and delaying/cancelling U.S. modernization has created major deficits [REDACTED]

in the 1980s.

- ~~(S)~~ Had today's tremendous increase in Soviet capability been predicted in 1977, the OSD study should have shown a need for both a [REDACTED] and a cruise missile force — not a choice between the two.


- ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] U.S. strategic forces must be improved now.

- The only viable near-term option lies in the modernization of the airbreathing force.

JS 3.3(b)(5)

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- The best near-term option is a force of stretched FB-111B/C as shown in Figure IV. Although the FB-111B/C does not totally correct the deficiencies, it does provide an interim capability that is more significant than any other alternative proposal SAC has examined.\*
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\*At Chief of Staff's direction, a board of Air Force General officers met in December 1978 to review all possible force improvement options. The most promising of the other alternatives are shown in Table IV.

JS 3.3 (b)(5)

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
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TABLE IV

OPTIONS

CAPABILITY INCREASE  
(PERCENT MDE)  
FY 82 FY 85



JS 3.3 (b)(5)  
DOE <sup>section</sup> 6.2(a)

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

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