



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

*See Bill  
Back - up  
in Chair*

DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1);  
E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b)(6)

October 13, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THRU: USD/P — *I think the time has come*  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Mubarak - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

*FFA OCT 1980  
Mubarak in turn - about NPW  
and Res Baras. Egypt wanted  
us to help meet Soviet threat  
why has it STALLED on NPW  
pretext for 2-3 years?  
And how is  
we get money  
from Congress  
for Res Baras  
of Cairo even  
sign even  
secretly  
understanding  
on direction of  
access?  
Tell  
him Egypt's  
decision  
pretext  
show him  
show them  
sure!*

Mubarak's preliminary guidance from Sadat is to discuss the autonomy negotiations, the regional situation, and Egypt's need for additional aid. He may (as usual) berate us in private for not doing more, sooner, to strengthen our (and Egypt's) position in the area vis-a-vis the Soviets but publicly he is likely to want to say and do things that provide election-year support for the President as a statesman.

IRAQ-IRAN: See talking points for President (TAB A).

*[Redacted]* He told CJCS recently in Cairo that we should not make release of the hostages a condition to our support -- the Iranians would understand the price.

Specifically with respect to Persian Gulf security, the Egyptians should be impressed with our pledge to keep the Straits open and our action to buttress the air defense of Saudi Arabia. We should express appreciation for Egypt's offer of facilities, if needed. (FYI: The idea of forward-deploying F-15s to Egypt probably isn't a good one. It would not significantly improve meaningful deployment time unless the (quite large) tail was also prepositioned. To preposition the tail -- assuming that is feasible -- seems hardly warranted when F-14s are already in the Gulf area. Finally, we should further burden the Egyptians politically only for a clearer case of need than this.)

Aid: The aid requests are likely to be high and include: food aid, coproduction of the F-5, more air defense missile systems and long-range transport aircraft. Mubarak will probably either ask for financial parity with Israel\*, or make a request for specific equipment, or both.

\*In FY 1981 Israel is getting \$1.4B FMS credits plus \$.785B in ESF. Egypt is getting \$.550B FMS credits and \$.785B ESF. Preliminary planning for FY 1982 contemplates equal amounts of ESF, and \$1.2B for Israel and \$.800B for Egypt (as promised) in FMS credits.

~~Classified by [redacted]  
Declassify on: OLC 13, 1980~~

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DATE 02 Oct 2017  
FOIA CASE # 10-F-0195

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Our stance should be to hear out Mubarak. Even if we were willing to increase our aid, before the Summit is not the time to do so. With respect to particular items, we should suggest that they will need to be prioritized against other needs within the framework of whatever further credits may eventually be made available, and should therefore not be dealt with seriatim in advance.

Ras Banas (TAB B): Our team just returned to Cairo where they tabled draft agreements, but were not able to have substantive discussions. Both Sadat and Mubarak are resisting any signed agreement (particularly one with a 10-year duration) for political reasons, internally because it would appear that Egypt is granting the US base rights and externally because Egypt's credentials in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) would be seriously questioned. For our part, we have always needed a firm agreement with at least some tenure to get appropriations from the Congress. You should tell Mubarak that we need to work very hard to find a solution as it is in our mutual strategic interest to do so. (As you know, Atherton has recommended we try to get Congress to permit a more relaxed approach in this case; this is also the Egyptian view. It may well turn out that we should test this thesis after the election -- perhaps asking senior Egyptian officials to join us in the meetings with the Committees; but in the meantime we should keep the pressure on.)

NPW: Backup, including Atherton's comprehensive letter of August 27, is at TAB C. Even with the approval in principle that Sadat gave you in February 1979, we have yet to have an NPW transit the Canal. The Egyptians bureaucracy opposes granting transits and is dragging its feet on implementation. Atherton has kept the issue on the front burner but it will need another strong push from the political level. You should tell Mubarak that these transits are truly necessary if we are to continue to improve our strategic posture in the region and that we need his assistance on this matter. (We have, in fact, proposed a reasonable monitoring systems not to include on-board monitoring, safety regulations which the Soviets probably can't meet, and assurances that our liability includes that for the radioactive effects stemming from a peacetime conventional attack on NPW in the Canal by a third party -- the ball is in Egypt's court and should not be allowed to drift back into ours.)

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*DM*

David E. McGiffert  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
International Security Affairs

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