



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400

In reply refer to:
I-92/09051

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
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

THROUGH: ASD (ISA) *127* OCT 1992

SUBJECT: North Korea Nuclear Issue—Where Are We Now? (U)

The IAEA now has visited Yongbyon three times, and it is currently in there again to look at some facilities. What is becoming clear is that North Korean non-cooperation is more evident as IAEA becomes more aggressive in its inspections. Compounding the problem is that there is a sense that, after several fruitless JMCC meetings, the ROKs may be on the verge of adopting quickly a bilateral inspection regime which either falls short of satisfying our concerns or may not be implemented rigorously by the ROKs. Given these two developments, it is time to review where we are and what steps to take next on the North Korea nuclear issue.



Therefore, unless IAEA becomes even more intrusive, and unless better and more properly trained experts appear on IAEA teams, we must have the bilateral inspection regime to provide a credible determination, with higher confidence, of whether the North ~~is~~ Just as worrisome, however, is the ~~advice~~ from Embassy Seoul that perhaps as early as the end of this year, the ROKs may hurriedly conclude a bilateral agreement before Roh Tae Woo steps down. And it could very well be an agreement which not only lacks credibility but in fact may be difficult to be implemented in the future for "political" reasons.

CIA 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(c)

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DATE 04OCT2017
FOIA CASE # 12-F-1306-1

13-M-4338

REDACTIONS APPLIED TO THIS PAGE ON THE BASIS OF

EO 13526 § 1.4(c)

It is in this environment recently that I met with several people from State/EAP, FN, ACDA and NSC. Everyone present at this small group meeting agreed with the concern that a very diluted bilateral inspection regime may be signed which does not satisfy our concerns and which may provide undeserved respectability to the North on this issue.

I expressed my concern that the execution of any "challenge inspection", may be difficult to invoke if the South does not have the political will to do so. A decision to perform a challenge inspection may, for the South, be as difficult a decision as doing TEAM SPIRIT. State/EAP, as usual, is not as alarmed over the intentions of either the North or the South. However, the following steps were agreed to by this small group:

-- We need to define for the ROKs some essential principles in the bilateral inspection proposal now on the table that must not be compromised. They range from the necessity for adequate number of challenge inspections, to access to any site--military or civilian, to commitment to conduct a minimum number of inspections each year. These have now been presented to the ROKs to prevent the principles from being excluded from whatever final bilateral inspection regime is negotiated.

-- Examine potential alternatives to incorporate these principles in some sort of "new" or "hybrid" inspection regime so that perhaps IAEA, with more credible or even American inspectors, can initiate and administer intrusive challenge inspections mandated by this new regime. This has the advantage of insulating these inspections from the domestic political pressures within the ROK during implementation. Results of such negotiations would be provided to all parties. ACDA is writing a paper on the feasibility of this thinking.

-- A PCC will be convened this week to discuss this approach, the timing and the ways to carefully raise the idea with the South and the IAEA if a new bilateral regime involves IAEA. This PCC will also start looking at what our policy should be if the nuclear issue is "resolved"--beginning with a definition of what "resolved" really means.

-- Everyone agrees that we should be very careful not to compromise our critical requirements in any new approach. Furthermore, we cannot have either the ROKs or DPRK perceive us as weakening on our basic objective to stop any DPRK weapons program with a credible challenge inspection regime.

-- If there is agreement on a new approach, then we would have to convince the ROKs--who may not agree with the possibility of including third parties such as the IAEA in its bilateral inspection agreement with the North.

-- Whatever the ROK proposes to break the current impasse with the DPRK, it should be clear that no movement in diplomatic dialogue

CIA 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(c)


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and no economic assistance from Japan would occur without acceptance of a challenge inspection regime which contains our critical principles.



*Very,
Bill*


William T. Fendley

USDP) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 1.4 (d)

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USDP INTEROFFICE COORDINATION SHEET				1. DATE (YYMMDD) 92/10/26		2. I- 92/09051	
3. SUBJECT North Korea Nuclear Issue (U)						4. CURRENT SUSPENSE DATE (YYMMDD)	
5. SUMMARY (Describe briefly the origin, purpose, action recommended and coordination - (Attach original tracking - SD Form 14, etc.)) Origin: Self-initiated Purpose: To provide USDP with thoughts on the status of the North Korea nuclear issue Recommendation: That ASD (ISA) initial attached memorandum							
6. ROUTING							
SEQ NO.	DIR/OPC	INITIAL	DATE (MMDD)	SEQ NO.	DIR/OPC	INITIAL	DATE (MMDD)
	CDUSD/P				SP (Contract)		
4	USD/P				RA		
	AT USDP				PD EUR-NATO		
	MA				NATO POL		
	SA				EUR POL		
	ADMIN						
	COMM MGT				DASD/INSPAC		
	ISA				MA		
3	ASD/ISA				TRF		
	MA		10/27		STRAT FORCES		
	SA				SACP		
	PDASD/ISA						
	MA				DASD/SDBVP		
					MA		
	FMRA				VERIF POL		
					SD & SPACE		
	DASD/APR				SPACE POLICY		
	APR						
					DASD/CFMACP		
2	DASD/EAP		10/27		MA		
1	EAP		REC 10/26		EUR SEC NEGOT		
					MULT-NEGOT		
	DASD/LA				SO-LIC		
	LA				ASD/SO-LIC		
					EA		
	DASD/NESA				MA		
	NESA				PDASD/SO-LIC		
	DASD/PW/MIA				DASD/F&R		
	PW/MIA				R&P		
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	DASD/EA				A		
	HUMAN ASSIST						
	NON-PROLIF				DASD/P&M		
	ISP				SS		
	ASD/ISP				PP		
	MA				CT		
	SBC DEF REPS				PDUSD/EBR		
	PDASD/ISP				PDUSD/SBR		
	MA				AT PDUSD/SBR		
					MA		
	DASD/EUR-NATO				ADUSD/PP		
7. NAME OF ORIGINATOR COL Eden Y. Woon				8. DIRECTORATE/OFFICE ISA/EAPR		9. EXTENSION z57005	
						10. SIGNATURE 	

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