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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

USDP HAS SEEN
APR -8 1992
[Signature]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

SUBJECT: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Missile Systems (U)

As you know, few national security challenges in the years ahead are more daunting than the prospect of the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. The President has called on all nations to redouble their efforts to stem the proliferation of these weapons. The United States has engaged in a wide-ranging effort to thwart proliferation on all fronts, an effort that has produced the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, and other actions. *[initials]*

In order to establish a clear record of all U.S. efforts in this field and to ensure proper coordination among them, I would like to ask each of you to provide a succinct report on accomplishments of the past three years and ongoing efforts by April 10, 1992. *[initials]*

[Signature]
Brent Scowcroft

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 25 Oct 2017 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(4), (6)
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Date:

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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY

APR 13 1992

Jon Howe -

The tone is more self-serving than I would like, but this is not a bad list of some of the Administration's non-prohibited accomplishments, focused on those in which DoD plays a larger role.

Paul W.

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covered by the Annex. These revisions were incorporated into the regulations of all MTCR member states.

~~(S)~~ **Blocking the French from Exporting Missile Technology Exports to Brazil.** In 1990 and 1991 OSD took the lead among USG agencies calling for demarches to the French to block their sale of rocket motor, guidance and stage separation equipment to support Brazil's space launch vehicle (SLV). OSD also used its French MoD contacts particularly with the Delegation Generale des Armements (DGA) to get the French MoD to support the USG position. This helped in keeping Brazil from possibly reexporting this technology to Iraq and kept the French and other MTCR members in line with USG policy, which is to treat SLV exports as restrictively as ballistic missile exports.

~~(S)~~ **Persuading Taiwan to Forego Space Launch Vehicle Development.** OSD resisted initial suggestions to approve the export of private U.S. assistance to a Taiwanese space launch vehicle program and privately convinced the U.S. contractor who was planning to sell the assistance to get the Taiwanese to reconsider. As a result, the Taiwanese announced that they would forego the development of a sounding rocket or space launch vehicle (which would have been equivalent to developing an IRBM) to protect their access to technology for justified defense programs that use the same type of technology.

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ **Tightening Iran Export Policy.** OSD, in early July 1991, requested that the interagency evaluate its nuclear dual-use export policy for Iran. As a result of this evaluation the U.S. no longer permits the export to Iran of any item on the NRL except low-level computers and oscilloscopes; these items will not be approved unless it can be shown that the export will not be diverted. The USG is now demarching our allies to act in accordance with our policy.

[REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ **Ending U.S. Sales of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Non-Euratom Members.** Convinced that HEU to Romania posed too great a proliferation risk and after verifying that a lightly

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SUMMARY OF OSD NON-PROLIFERATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS

~~(S)~~ **Turning the Corner in Korea.** An early OSD recommendation that Korea be made an enrichment and reprocessing free zone culminated in Korean agreement to the same this year. OSD has long argued that sole reliance on implementation of IAEA safeguards will not be sufficient to ensure stability on the peninsula. The Japanese have agreed to this and are now conditioning aid on a North Korean pledge to forego reprocessing.

~~(S)~~ **Capping Condor II's Development.** OSD's development of an accounting and on-site inspection strategy was instrumental in capping Argentina's Condor II program and in convincing the GoA of the need to gain control of their program by creating an export control system. The GOA has now agreed to adhere to MTCR guidelines, has frozen the Condor program and is about to destroy the first stage rocket motors. Our early efforts kept Condor from going into production in Iraq before Desert Storm; had these modern missiles gone into production, [REDACTED]

(U) **Furnace controls and EPCI.** In 1989 and 1990, respectively, OSD was instrumental in blocking the shipment of a Consarc skull induction furnace destined for missile and nuclear production facilities in Iraq. OSD's proposal to extend already existing nuclear regulations which cover many non-controlled items if an exporter had reason to know that his export would help a nuclear project of concern resulted in interagency agreement to extend these regulations to missile and CBW-related exports. This, in turn, was adopted by the President and announced as the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). Since then, several other countries have announced similar regulations. Further, the Consarc matter provided the necessary ammunition to get agreement to multilateral controls on key dual-use nuclear items in the 27-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group .

[REDACTED]

(U) **Extended Coverage of the MTCR Annex.** OSD chaired interagency and multilateral groups that revised the MTCR annex to cover more items and to more clearly define what is and is not

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enriched uranium (LEU) substitute could be used, the interagency agreed with OSD strong support to U.S. HEU sales outside EURATOM.

~~(S)~~ **Establishing DoD Proliferation Threat Bilaterals with the French and British MoDs.** The SECDEF and the DEPSECDEF personally established with the French MoD Joxe a new set of proliferation threat bilaterals between DoD and the French MoD, which were first held in 1991. These were subsequently expanded to include similar talks with the British MoD. The focus of these talks has been on missile proliferation threat analysis, space technology proliferation and Iran.

~~(S)~~ **Halting Export of Equipment to Libyan Missile Program** In December 1991 US and German authorities halted export of induction furnace. While the furnace was not controlled under German law, the incident prompted them to bring it under export control. They did this under a "safety net" provision which was based on USG regulations. Additional incidents involving Pakistan prompted tighter German export controls to projects of concern as well as stricter USG review of munitions and dual use licences to that country.

~~(S)~~ **Cooperative Investigations of Diversions to Iraqi Nuclear Programs.** Four German and three USG investigations on possible export violations are based on recent IAEA findings on the Iraqi nuclear program. DoD reviews include a German company with a history of diversion of sensitive technology to Third World development programs in Pakistan, North Korea, and Libya.

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