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SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

✓ #6

15 June 1981

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: FEB 01 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: The Army's New Direction--INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U) The Army's FY 1983-1987 Program Objective Memorandum is a dramatic change from programs approved in prior years. There is a growing threat posed by the continuing build-up of Soviet power. Present strategy and forces cannot cope with that threat, and resources are insufficient to equip, man and support a force structure that can solve the problem in the near future. This Administration's objective of committing critical resources to national defense requirements will allow us to start building the balanced, flexible force necessary to correct the current imbalance.

(U) Our national security for the 1980's and beyond requires us to meet three essential conditions:

a. First, working with our allies, we must restore a favorable military balance with the Soviets in areas of vital interest -- Western Europe and Northeast Asia.

b. Second, we must contain the surge of Soviet power into other areas of vital interests, particularly the Western Hemisphere and areas containing critical strategic resources.

c. Third, we must maintain credible deterrence against Soviet nuclear attack and coercion.

✓ To accomplish the national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success, we need an Army of 33 fully-structured, fully-supported divisions and 7 theater defense brigades prior to commencement of hostilities. The current 24 division force cannot fulfill our national security requirements. If we are to prevent conflict, it must be obvious that we have the means to win if deterrence fails.

(U) Bold and innovative approaches to the way we structure, man, and equip our Army are required to establish the ability to act effectively against global threats. The Army's FY 1983-1987 program outlines a new direction that will provide:

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
SUBJECT: The Army's New Direction

- o Greater global focus and capability.
- o Increased strategic deployability.
- o A strengthened Reserve Component.
- o Improved firepower.
- o Higher tactical mobility.

(U) The resource levels provided are not sufficient to meet all requirements, and there remain risks associated with the program we are submitting. Near-year constraints continue delay of force expansions and the procurement of the equipment needed to equip units and fill war reserves. Funding no less than the Defense Guidance levels, increased Army end-strength, and airlift and fast sealift to support global deployments are keys to our overall success.

(U) We cannot afford to delay corrective action any longer. POM initiatives concurrently exploit technology, add combat and support structure, and increase the role and readiness of the Reserve Components. All of these initiatives are addressed in the attached overview which provides supporting rationale as to why each is essential to success. Though we cannot fully achieve the necessary force in the POM years, we must begin now.

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John O. Marsh, Jr.

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PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The capability of the Army to meet successfully the challenge it will confront in the decades ahead is dependent in large measure on the decisions that will be made during the current programing period. Bold and innovative approaches to the way we structure, man, and equip our ground forces are required to break out of the constraints that severely hamper our capability to effectively respond to global threats to our vital interests. The Army's FY 83-87 program outlines a new direction which provides for a more global focus, increased strategic deployability and tactical mobility, and greater combat capability.

Enhancements are to be achieved through a combination of initiatives that concurrently exploit technology, equip and modernize our forces, increase sustainability, add combat and support structure, improve force deployability, and increase the role and readiness of the Reserve Components. Attainment of that goal is dependent upon an increased end strength (870K by FY87), stable funding not less than that provided for programing in the Defense Guidance, and an airlift and fast sealift capability to support global deployments.

Strategic Perspective

The challenges ahead will be even more complex and dangerous than those confronting us in today's troubled times. The international environment will likely be characterized by extraordinarily diverse threats to US national security. The US security problem will continue to have three essential dimensions. First is the need to correct the unfavorable military balance with the Soviet Union and the resultant surge of Soviet power in areas of vital interest to Western security. This surge of power, combined with other proliferating instabilities, has produced the second basic dimension of our security problem: the erosion of Western power and position in areas where scarce resources are located. These two reflect the continuing development of the Soviet Union's continental objectives. The salient features of this challenge are represented by the geostrategic position of the Soviet Union in Europe, the Far East, and Southwest Asia. Soviet military power remains predominately poised on the Eurasian landmass with upwards of 102 standing divisions against Western Europe, 42 divisions against the PRC and our Pacific allies and more than 20 divisions capable of pushing forward into SWA. These forces are supplemented by an extremely impressive mobilization capability. Of particular note, the Soviet threat to vital Western interests in the Arabian Gulf is continentally based and therefore provides the Soviet Union inherent advantages. The Soviets also enjoy an alliance structure (e.g., India, Syria, Ethiopia, Vietnam) which in many cases supports and furthers the outward push of the continental base from which the USSR is more capable of denying Western access to critical resources and markets. The final dimension is credible deterrence from Soviet nuclear attack--and nuclear coercion--the foundation of our defense posture. Credible nuclear deterrence may be enhanced through recent advances in ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology. BMD should not, however, be viewed as an independent option but as a key element within the strategic equation.

These strategic imperatives mandate a land combat force that will, in conjunction with air and naval forces, deter the USSR from launching an attack on NATO or the Persian Gulf and, if deterrence fails, defeat the attack; that maintains the balance of power in Asia and the Pacific; that maintains access to critical strategic materials; and that is capable of neutralizing hostile military forces in the Western Hemisphere.

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The breadth and certainty of these imperatives demand a modern, ready Army, with staying power and extraordinary flexibility that is able to meet the most demanding challenges as well as the most likely. The Army must be:

- Able to defeat armored threats in Europe yet rapidly deploy worldwide to meet any type conflict.
- Able to operate in a variety of environments across the full spectrum of conflict from terrorism and insurgency through high intensity conventional to nuclear war.
- Able to contribute to termination of crises or conflict on terms favorable to the United States.

The Army's current 24 division force is not capable of accomplishing fully these objectives. To meet these challenges, the Army must have a more robust, adequately manned and equipped force structure that exploits the complementary qualities of our Active and Reserve Components. If we are to have a reasonable chance of deterring conflict, it must be clearly evident that the Army is ready for conflict. Only then will our national leaders possess the flexibility and freedom of action that our national security demands. The Army's FY 83-87 program is singularly focused on building toward that objective.

#### Force Requirements

Army analyses of the challenges likely to confront us in the decade ahead reveal requirements to confront multiple threats to our national interests and to meet those threats in conjunction with other Services and our allies. We believe the force level necessary to execute the national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success is 33 fully structured, fully supported divisions and 7 theater defense brigades which must be in existence prior to commencement of hostilities. This Army force level reflects the requirement to cope with a global war and takes into account the land force contributions of the US Marine Corps. It is based upon the need to maintain a secure Western Hemisphere while securing our two principal security anchors abroad: Europe, our major theater, and Northeast Asia, an economy-of-force theater. At the same time we must be capable of deploying to Southwest Asia, or elsewhere, a force to protect Western access to vital resources.

The Army force requirement for NATO, 24 fully structured and supported divisions, represents the force necessary to stop a Warsaw Pact attack at the Ems-Rhine in NATO's Central Region in conjunction with our allies. This force requirement, which includes an 11 division D-day force, must be supported by forward deployments, an established theater support structure, and substantial reinforcement by Active and Reserve Components. It does not, however, provide forces for the defense of the flank regions nor consider forces necessary to restore NATO's boundaries. Rapid total mobilization of the US economy and military will be required to achieve those objectives.

US forces and allies must be able to defend strategic interests and in time of war insure that USSR does not have a secure flank in East Asia. Our force requirement of two fully structured and supported divisions for the Northeast Asia/Pacific theater relies heavily upon supporting allies to provide the bulk of required forces. US forces must have in place sustainability to assure their viability during the initial stages of a worldwide war. This force provides reasonable assurance of retaining control over some portion of the Korean Peninsula.



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A non-theater specific force of six fully supported and structured divisions, initially oriented on Southwest Asia but capable of responding to other contingencies, is required to conduct operations in varied areas of the world where access to critical resources or other vital Western interests are threatened. This force requirement, sized upon defense of Arabian Gulf oil resources, must be capable of rapidly deploying to threatened regions and conducting sustained land combat without an established theater infrastructure.

Lastly, one fully structured and supported division is required as a strategic reserve in CONUS to respond to threats within the Western Hemisphere while providing the capability of responding to any additional overseas threat or reinforcing requirement.

#### Programed Forces

The Army's FY 83-87 program force has been developed in full consideration of global requirements and the forces needed to execute those requirements. Special Forces, Mobile Training Teams, and Ranger Battalions are included to operate at the lower end of the conflict spectrum; an enhanced Rapid Deployment Force is designed to meet requirements of low and mid-intensity conflicts of a regional nature; and a phased build-up of the total force is designed to improve our deterrence posture, and should deterrence fail, to enable us to respond effectively at any level of conflict. Force structure initiatives for the mid-range period in both the Active and Reserve Components are outlined below.

(1) Active Components. In FY83, the Active force will remain at sixteen divisions, four of which have two Active brigades and one RC roundout brigade. In FY85 and 86, the Army will begin to add two new divisions to the Active structure, one an air assault division, the other a light infantry division. By FY87 the air assault division will be structured with two Active and one RC roundout brigade; the infantry division will have one Active and one RC roundout brigade, with the second Active brigade programed for FY88. Another significant force structure adjustment is the forward deployment of the 6th Cavalry Brigade Air Combat (CBAC) to USAREUR in FY85 to replace a forward deployed brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division and the subsequent inactivation of that brigade. Additionally, one CONUS based brigade will be inactivated in FY86. These two brigade inactivations will: (a) provide structure spaces to support other initiatives; (b) free up heavy unit equipment for transfer to high priority Reserve Component organizations; and (c) expand the Active/RC roundout program by adding roundout brigades to two active divisions that presently have three active brigades.

The Army has been aggressively pursuing high technology improvements which can be applied within the light divisions of the Army to make these organizations significantly more lethal and survivable while preserving their rapid deployability characteristics. The 9th Infantry Division is the test bed for high technology initiatives. By FY85, the 9th is expected to be deployable in its hi-tech configuration, and the Army envisions that two other heavy Active divisions will also be converted to hi-tech by FY87. As the hi-tech conversions occur, the equipment which is uncovered in the Active divisions will be transferred to RC combat units. The net result of these changes will be an active force structure of 8 heavy, 7 light, and 3 hi-tech divisions by FY87.

The program also provides significant increases in Army forces for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). By FY87, five Army divisions are included in the RDF package: 82d Abn, 101st Air Aslt, 9th Inf, 24th Mech, and 5th Mech Divisions. Additionally, sufficient structure spaces have been programed to raise the authorized level of organization (ALO) of all Army RDF units to ALO 1. Ten thousand spaces have been

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applied for activation of approximately 80 Active combat service support (CSS) units to deploy with and provide support for the RDF fighting forces. The additional support units (ammunition, POL, water, medical, transportation, maintenance, and engineers), coupled with already existing support units, enable the Active Army to provide approximately 65 percent of the support needed, with the remainder coming from the Reserve Components. However, many of the Active support units programmed to support the RDF are planned for early deployment to Europe in the event of a NATO war, and a high percentage of these units have equipment in POMCUS in Europe. The Army is identifying RC support units that will need to be mobilized immediately upon deployment of the RDF to (a) meet the support requirements for the RDF that cannot be provided by Active CSS units, and (b) replace Active support units that would be needed in the early days of a NATO war. During the Extended Planning Annex (EPA) period, the Army intends to add an additional 72K Active support structure spaces to reduce the risks associated with reliance on early mobilization of RC support.

(2) Reserve Components. The FY 83-87 program reflects the great reliance the Army places on its Reserve Component forces. As discussed above, both new Active divisions will include a RC roundout brigade and the 1st Cavalry and 4th Mechanized Divisions will receive roundout brigades as inactivations occur within those divisions. In all, there will be eight RC roundout brigades with Active divisions by FY87. Additionally, two new Reserve Component divisions will be added (through consolidation of separate brigades) in FY86 and FY87, raising the RC division count to ten; the RC major force composition at end FY87 will include 4 heavy and 6 light divisions. The combat potential associated with the new divisions will contribute to deterrence as well as additional warfighting potential for the total force. However, to realize the full potential of these force structure initiatives, Reserve Component equipment shortages need to be rectified. The impetus associated with going to lighter forces in the Active component will begin to solve that problem by freeing modern equipment for high priority Reserve Component armored and mechanized units. Additionally the Army is in the process of assessing the potential of providing selected items of modern equipment for specialized organizations within the RC. The alternatives being examined include light, easily deployable anti-tank and air defense units equipped with modern weapons systems (TOW II and Stinger) and divisional air defense organizations equipped with ROLAND and/or DIVAD.

#### Reserve Component Readiness

A major thrust of this program is to improve the readiness of Army National Guard and US Army Reserve units. The manning levels of both Reserve Components are significantly improved in this program. The paid strength of the USAR increases 55,000 over the program years, reaching the wartime required level of 303,000 in FY87. The paid strength of the ARNG increases 32,000 over the program years, but will remain 12,000 below the 453,000 wartime requirement at the end of FY87.

One of the most important readiness initiatives in recent years has been the increase in full-time manning in selected units. Although still well below full-time manning levels in other Services, the current program increases full-time unit support levels to 6 percent of total wartime manning by FY86. This will improve training by placing full-time training NCOs in company size units. Other training and readiness initiatives include extension of annual training to three weeks for selected units, an expanded

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cold weather and desert training program, and the acquisition of simulators and training aids to maximize the effectiveness of training.

Readiness is further enhanced through significant improvements in chemical defensive equipment and in organizational clothing and equipment. With this equipment, the individual soldier in early deploying units of both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve will be equipped as is his counterpart in the Active Component.

#### Manpower and Training

An Active Army end strength of 870,000 by FY87 is required to man the substantially increased force structure associated with the two new divisions and the RDF enhancements. This end strength is dependent on extraordinary manpower policies and will require substantial additional resources. These policies and resources should also assist in achieving the manpower increases needed to bring the Reserve Components to the 744,000 level reflected in this program. Civilian end strength is increased to: (a) replace military personnel in selected general support positions; (b) support a portion of current mission shortfalls; and (c) improve near-term readiness, wholesale logistics, and sustainability. Additional civilian manpower to support the new force increases is omitted from the program pending a review of civilian manpower alternatives.

The FY 83-87 program begins to provide funding to support the onetime and recurring training requirements associated with new unit activations as well as expansion of the training base. Additionally, funding has been programed to support adequately the increased number of combat units in the Rapid Deployment Force and to provide them the necessary environmental and deployment training required to meet potential global missions. Partial funding has been programed to support unit training requirements for the expanded Active Component combat service support force structure required to support RDF contingencies.

#### Strategic Mobility

The capability to project power rapidly is key to achievement of US strategic objectives. This capability provides not only deterrence, but, if deterrence fails, is essential to the successful conduct of military operations to protect vital US interests. Current and programed strategic mobility forces are clearly inadequate to execute the US global strategy. Future mobility forces must possess a range of capability and flexibility from which to apply a proper force mix for global deployments with less reliance on additional prepositioning. The Army is taking positive steps to mitigate against the limitation in strategic lift, now and during the program years. One initiative is development of lighter hi-tech forces--forces which are more capable of both rapid deployability and potential combat.

In the near term, the accelerated acquisition and conversion of the SL-7s to full Roll-on/Roll-off configuration is the most important and achievable mobility enhancement. Simply stated, achievement of our NATO D-day goal and other deployment requirements is dependent on the availability of fast sealift for the simultaneous lift of a two division corps. Our appraisal of mobility requirements indicates that additional outsized/oversized airlift, eight fully converted SL-7s, and approximately 24 Maine Class or faster Roll-on/Roll-off ships are needed to meet minimum deployment requirements over the next several years.

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Equipping and Modernizing

The FY 83-87 program preserves the minimum essential growth in funding for equipment and materiel established by supplemental and amendment changes to the FY81 and FY82 Budgets. This increased funding restores many critical programs to efficient development schedules and procurement rates, and provides for earlier delivery of certain needed systems. Critical Army equipment currently funded remains inferior in quality in many cases to that of the Soviet Union. Shortfalls in quantities of existing equipment and materiel also exist and degrade our efforts to improve readiness and sustainability. It is therefore essential that funding levels currently programmed for FY83 through FY87 be maintained. The stability gained from this fundamental step should offer the opportunity to manage efficiently the increased support items necessary for an expanded RDF and the expeditious fielding of high technology items to equip forces for global mission capability. Even with these improvements in equipping our forces, there are systems which could be procured more efficiently; equipment and materiel, particularly supporting items, whose fielding can and should be accelerated; and technological developments which need to be pursued aggressively to keep pace with a heavily-funded Soviet research effort.

Summary

We believe that the FY 83-87 program is an imaginative step toward providing the Army that our nation needs to meet the threats and challenges of the decade of the 1980s and beyond. It has been constructed with full consideration of the diverse threats to US national security and the global nature of any conflict involving this nation and the Soviet Union. The program builds toward combat forces that are more lethal, more survivable and more rapidly deployable than those we now have--forces that will provide a high degree of flexibility in that they will be capable of fighting effectively on any battlefield. These forces will be armed with modern weapons on par with or superior to those of any foe we may encounter. One of our imperatives will be to assure that we have adequate quantities of those weapons to arm a more integrated, truly Total Force of Active and Reserve Component fighting units. Another imperative will be to ensure the provision of adequate manpower to fill the 1.7 million positions required in the Active and Reserve Component organizations. Thus, the FY 83-87 program is clearly dependent on extraordinary manpower policies and may require substantial additional resources. The program does not provide all that we need--in fact, in certain areas it falls short of accommodating important requirements. On the other hand, it is a bold step in the right direction, charting a course that can lead to an Army that signals to both allies and potential foes that the United States is both capable and willing to defend its vital interests.

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