


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SECTION I. (U) SUMMARY

A. (U) OVERVIEW

1. (U) INTRODUCTION

(S) The Army's FY 83-87 Program Objective Memorandum reflects a significant departure from programs presented in past years. While strategic assessments and plans have long tracked with the growing threat posed by the continued buildup of Soviet military power, fiscally constrained programs and budgets resulted in a widening US strategy-forces-resources mismatch. The Administration's commitment to national defense provides sufficient resources to begin to link programs with plans which have consistently cited the need for more powerful forces. This POM describes how the Army will apply its resources to improve the existing establishment and then begin a long overdue expansion. The central focus is to build a balanced, flexible force more closely matched with the global strategy outlined in the Defense Guidance.

(S) The POM is submitted at the prescribed single level within TOA controls. The follow-on costs of programs begun, restored or expanded by virtue of the FY 81 Supplemental and FY 82 Amended Budgets forced a reduction in scope of a number of programs in the near years. The impact of near year fiscal constraints is indicated in the annex on Risk Reduction Measures. The major impact of these constraints is the delay caused in the force expansions described herein, and the achievement of unit equipment fill and war reserve levels considered minimum essential for sustained combat.

2. (U) PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

(S) A bold and innovative approach to the way we structure, man and equip our ground forces is required to break the constraints that severely hamper US capability to respond effectively to threats to our vital interests. The Army's FY 83-87 program outlines a new direction that will provide a more global focus, increased strategic deployability and tactical mobility, and a greater combat capability.

(S) These objectives are to be achieved through a combination of initiatives that concurrently lighten the force, exploit technology, add combat and support structure, equip and modernize our forces, increase sustainability and increase the role and readiness of the Reserve Components. Attainment of our goal depends on increased end strength (870K by FY 87), funding to meet readiness and modernization requirements, and an airlift and fast sealift capability to support global deployments.

3. (U) STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

(S) The challenges ahead will be more complex and dangerous than those confronting us in today's troubled times. The international environment will be characterized by extraordinarily diverse threats to US national security. In essence, the US security problem will continue to have three basic dimensions. First is the need

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to correct the unfavorable military balance with the Soviet Union and the resultant surge of Soviet power in areas vital to Western interests. This surge of power, combined with other proliferating instabilities, has produced the second dimension: the erosion of Western power and position in areas where strategic resources are located. These two dimensions reflect the maturation of the Soviet Union's continental posture. The salient features of this challenge are represented by the geostrategic position of the Soviet Union in Europe, the Far East, and Southwest Asia. Soviet military power remains predominantly poised on the Eurasian land mass with upwards of 102 standing divisions against Western Europe, 42 divisions against the PRC, and more than 20 divisions capable of pushing forward into SWA. This power is supplemented by a mobilization potential which further threatens the stability of the Eurasian land mass. The Soviet threat to vital Western interests in the Arabian Gulf is supplemented with a growing alliance structure (e.g., India, Syria, Ethiopia, Vietnam) which supports and furthers the capability to deny Western access to critical resources and markets. The third and most fundamental dimension of the US security problem is the necessity to maintain a credible deterrence to Soviet nuclear attack or coercion. A key aspect of nuclear deterrence is the Ballistic Missile Defense Program, which is not an independent option, but an important factor in the strategic equation. Recent advances in BMD technology can enhance a credible nuclear deterrence.

(48) These strategic imperatives mandate a land combat force that will be able, in conjunction with air and naval forces, to establish and maintain the following conditions:

- o Deter the USSR from launching an attack on NATO or the Persian Gulf and, if deterrence fails, defeat the attack.
- o Preserve a balance of power and potential threat to the Soviet flank in Asia and the Pacific.
- o Maintain access to critical strategic materials.
- o Neutralize hostile military forces in the Western Hemisphere.

(49) The breadth and certainty of these requirements demand a modern, ready Army with staying power and extraordinary flexibility to meet the most likely and demanding challenges. This Army must be:

- o Able to meet armored threats in Europe yet rapidly deployable to other parts of the world.
- o Able to operate in a variety of environments across the full spectrum of conflict from terrorism and insurgency through high intensity conventional to nuclear war.
- o Able to terminate crises or conflicts on terms favorable to the United States.

(5) The Army's current 24-division force is not capable of fully accomplishing these objectives. To meet these challenges, the Army must have a more robust force

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structure that is adequately manned and equipped and takes full advantage of the complementary qualities afforded by our Active and Reserve Components. Only then will the National Command Authority possess the flexibility and freedom of action to guarantee national security. If we are to deter conflict, it must be clearly evident that the Army is ready for any contingency. The FY 83-87 program builds toward that objective.

4. (U) FORCE REQUIREMENTS.

(A) Analysis of the challenges likely to face the US in the decade ahead reveals multiple threats to our national interests and the requirement to meet those threats in conjunction with the other Services and our allies. The Army force level necessary to execute the national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success is 33 fully structured and supported divisions and 7 Theater Defense Brigades which must be in existence prior to commencement of hostilities. This force level reflects the minimum Army requirement to cope with a global war and takes into account the land force contributions of the U.S. Marine Corps. It is based on the necessity to protect the Western Hemisphere while securing our two principal security anchors abroad - Europe, our major theater, and Northeast Asia, an economy-of-force theater. At the same time, we must be capable of deploying a force to Southwest Asia or elsewhere to protect Western access to vital resources.

(B) The Army force requirement for NATO -- 24 fully structured and supported divisions -- represents the force required to stop a Warsaw Pact attack at the Esch-Rhine in NATO's Central Region in conjunction with our allies. This force requirement, which includes an 11-division D-day force, must be supported by forward deployments, an established theater support structure and substantial reinforcement by Active and Reserve Components. It does not provide forces for the defense of NATO's flanks nor contain the force level necessary to restore boundaries. Rapid total mobilization will be required to achieve those objectives.

(C) Northeast Asia and the Pacific constitute an economy-of-force theater. Our force requirement in that region of two fully structured and supported divisions relies heavily upon supporting allies to provide the bulk of required forces. With in-place sustainability to assure effectiveness during the initial stages of a worldwide war, this force provides reasonable assurance of retaining control over some portion of the Korean Peninsula.


(D) A non-theater specific force of 6 fully supported and structured Army divisions initially oriented on Southwest Asia, but capable of responding to other contingencies, is required to conduct operations in varied areas of the world where access to critical resources or other vital Western interests are threatened. This force requirement, sized upon defense of Arabian Gulf oil resources, must be capable of rapidly deploying to threatened regions and conducting sustained land combat without an established theater infrastructure.

(E) Finally, one fully structured and supported division is needed as a strategic reserve in CONUS to respond to threats within the Western Hemisphere or to any additional overseas requirement.

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5. (U) THE PROGRAM FORCE

↳ Although resource constraints preclude meeting full planning requirements, the Army is programing significant force structure improvements as indicated -

HIGH-LIGHTS OF THE FY83-87 FORCE	
<p><u>ACTIVE COMPONENT</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● TWO ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS● FIVE RDF DIVISIONS AT ALO 1● INCREASED CSS STRUCTURE FOR RDF● LIGHTER... MORE LETHAL... FLEXIBLE AND MOBILE (HI-TECH) DIVISIONS WITH... INCREASED RC INTEGRATION (ROUNDOUT BRIGADES)	<p><u>RESERVE COMPONENTS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● FOUR MORE ROUNDOUT BRIGADES● MORE DIVISIONS... +2 BY FY 87 THRU SEPARATE BRIGADE CONSOLIDATIONS● MANNED AT WARTIME LEVELS● POTENTIAL EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS... THRU AC HEAVY TO HI-TECH CONVERSIONS● NEW ORGANIZATIONS/INITIATIVES

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SECTION I. (U) SUMMARY

B. (U) PROGRAM CHANGES

1. (U) STRUCTURE.

6) The Army's FY 83-87 program force has been developed in full consideration of global requirements and the forces needed to execute those requirements. Special Forces, Mobile Training Teams, and Ranger Battalions are included to operate at the lower end of the conflict spectrum; an enhanced Rapid Deployment Force is designed to meet requirements of low and mid-intensity conflicts of a regional nature; and a phased build-up of the total force is designed to improve our deterrence posture, and should deterrence fail, to enable us to respond effectively at any level of conflict. Force structure initiatives for the mid-range period in both the Active and Reserve Components are outlined below.

6) In FY83 the Active force will remain at 16 divisions, four of which have two Active brigades and one RC roundout brigade. In FY85 and 86, the Army will begin to add two new divisions to the Active structure, one an air assault division, the other a light infantry division. By FY87 the air assault division will be structured with two Active and one RC roundout brigade. The infantry division will have one Active and one RC roundout brigade with a second Active brigade planned for FY88. In FY85 the 6th CBAC will deploy to USAREUR to replace a forward deployed brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division. The subsequent inactivation of this latter brigade and one CONUS based brigade in FY86 will provide structure spaces to support other initiatives and free heavy unit equipment for transfer to high priority Reserve Component organizations. The Active/RC roundout program will be expanded by adding roundout brigades to two divisions that are now three brigade divisions. The major AC combat structure will be -

<u>ACTIVE FORCE FY87</u>			
<u>ARMY CAV REGTS</u>	<u>SEPARATE BRGS</u>	<u>LIGHT DIVISIONS</u>	<u>HEAVY DIVISIONS</u>
2d Armd Cav Reg	6th Cbt Bde Air Cav	2d Inf Div	1st Armd Div
3d Armd Cav Reg	Berlin Bde 4/	7th Inf Div 2/2/	1st Cav Div 2/
11th Armd Cav Reg	172d Inf Bde (Alaska) 4/	9th Inf Div 3/	1st Mech Div
	193d Inf Bde (Panama) 4/	25th Inf Div 2/3/	2d Armd Div
	194th Armd Bde	82d Airborne Div	3rd Armd Div
	197th Inf Bde	101st Air Aslt Div	3rd Mech Div
		6th Inf Div 1/2/	4th Mech Div 1/2/
		11th Air Aslt Div 1/2/	5th Mech Div 2/3/
			8th Mech Div
			24th Mech Div 3/

1/ New divisions added in FY 85 and FY 86.
2/ Division's third brigade is an RC roundout organization - 4th Mech for programming only.
2/ Candidate divisions for hi-tech conversion during POM period...
Revision that all light divisions convert to hi-tech configuration during E.P.A. period.
4/ Theater Defense Brigades

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45) The Army has been aggressively pursuing high technology improvements to make the light division significantly more lethal and survivable while preserving its rapid deployability characteristics. The 9th Infantry Division is the test bed for high technology initiatives, and by FY85 is expected to be deployable in its hi-tech configuration. The Army envisions that two active divisions will also be converted to hi-tech by FY87. As these conversions occur, equipment no longer required by the new organizations will be transferred to RC combat units.

46) The FY83-87 program reflects the increasing need for stronger Reserve Component forces. Both of the new Active divisions will include an RC roundout brigade, and the 1st Cavalry and 4th Mechanized Divisions will receive roundout brigades as inactivations occur within those divisions. In all, there will be eight RC roundout brigades with Active divisions by FY87. Additionally, two new Reserve Component divisions will be added to the force structure (through consolidation of separate brigades) in FY86 and FY87, raising total RC divisions to 10. The Reserve Component force composition at end FY87 will contain heavy and 6 light divisions. The combat potential associated with these divisions will contribute to deterrence as well as additional warfighting potential for the total force. Organizing lighter forces in the Active component will free modern equipment for high priority Reserve Component armored and mechanized organizations. The major RC combat/training unit structure by FY87 will be -

<u>RC COMBAT FORCE STRUCTURE FY 87</u> (PROGRAM)			
<u>DIVISIONS</u> (ARRC)	<u>THE DIVISIONS</u> (USAR)	<u>SEPARATE BDES</u>	<u>ARMORED CAV REGIMENTS</u> (ARRC)
26th Infantry	70th Div (Tug)	(ARRC)	107th ACR
28th Infantry	76th Div (Tug)	32d Infantry (Mech)	116th ACR
30th Infantry ^{1/}	78th Div (Tug)	33d Infantry	163d ACR
31st Armored ^{2/}	80th Div (Tug)	53d Infantry	278th ACR
38th Infantry	84th Div (Tug)	38th Infantry	
40th Infantry (Mech)	85th Div (Tug)	73d Infantry	
42d Infantry	91st Div (Tug)	81st Infantry (Mech)	<u>ROUND OUT BDES (ARRC)</u>
47th Infantry	93th Div (Tug)	92d Infantry	29th Infantry (25 ID)
49th Armored	98th Div (Tug)	149th Armored	39th Infantry (11 AA)
50th Armored	108th Div (Tug)	(USAR)	41st Infantry (7 ID)
	104th Div (Tug)	157th Infantry (Mech)	45th Infantry (6 ID)
	108th Div (Tug)	187th Infantry	48th Infantry (Mech) (24 ID(N))
		205th Infantry	67th Infantry (6 ID(N)) ^{2/}
			69th Infantry (1 CAV)
			256th Infantry (Mech) (5 ID(N))

^{1/} New Division thru Consolidation of 30th Inf Bde, 116th Inf Bde, 218th Infantry Bde

^{2/} New Division thru Consolidation of 30th Armored Bde, 31st Armored Bde, 155th Armored Bde

^{3/} R/O of 4th Mech Div notional for programming purposes. Final decision has not been made of the eighth a.s. division to have roundout bde

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(S) Additionally, the Army is assessing the potential of providing selected items of modern equipment for certain specialized organizations within the RC. Alternatives include -

- o Equipping light, easily deployed anti-tank and air defense units with modern systems including TOW II and STINGER.
- o Equipping divisional air defense organizations with ROLAND and/or DIVAD.

(S) The Army's goal is to optimize the warfighting capability of the total force with resources that are either available or will be available in the program period. Reliance on RC divisions for early reinforcement in NATO will increase as Active divisions are added to the RDF. This requires the Army to manage resources in a manner that ensures Reserve Component units are brought to and maintained at a level of readiness enabling them to perform their missions.

(S) The program reflects significant increases in Army forces for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). During the POM years, five (5) Army divisions are included in the RDF package: 82d Abn, 101st Air Aslt, 9th Inf, 24th Mech(-), and 5th Mech(-) Divs. Sufficient structure spaces have been programed to raise the authorized level of organization of all Army RDF units to ALO 1. Ten thousand spaces have been applied for activation of approximately 80 Active CSS units to deploy with the RDF fighting forces. These additional units (ammunition, POL, water, medical, transportation, maintenance, and engineers) coupled with already existing units enable the Army to provide approximately 65 percent of the support needed for the 5-division RDF with Active Army CSS units by FY87. The remaining 35 percent of needed support will be provided by the Reserve Components. Many of the Active units programed to support the RDF are also marked for early deployment to Europe in the event of a NATO war, and a high percentage of these units have equipment in POMCUS in Europe. The Army is identifying RC support units to be mobilized immediately upon deployment of the RDF to meet requirements that cannot be provided by Active CSS units, and to replace Active support units that would be needed in the early days of a NATO war. During the EPA period, the Army intends to add an additional 72K Active support structure to reduce the risks associated with early reliance on mobilization of RC support.

(S) Despite the increase of 80 AC CSS units during the program years, CSS force structure deficiencies continue to represent a serious risk to near term readiness and long term sustainability. To make up some of the shortfall in CSS, the Army is accepting the risk of host nation support which is in the process of negotiation but not yet assured.

(S) A major thrust of this program is to improve the readiness of Army National Guard and Reserve units. The manning levels of both Reserve Components are to be significantly improved. The paid strength of the USAR increases 55,000 over the program years, reaching the wartime required level of 303,000 in FY87. The paid strength of the ARNG increases 32,000 over the program years but remains 12,000 below the wartime requirement. Recruiting programs in both components have been marginally increased toward meeting this goal.


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(U) One of the most important readiness initiatives in recent years has been the increase in full-time manning in selected units. Although still well below full-time manning levels in other Services, the current program increases full-time support levels to 6% of total wartime manning by FY86. This will improve training by placing full-time training NCOs in all company size units. Other full-time personnel will significantly reduce the administrative burden on supervisory personnel, freeing unit leaders for a more active training role. Further training and readiness initiatives include extension of annual training to three weeks for selected units, expanded cold weather and desert training programs and the acquisition of simulators and training aids to maximize the effectiveness of training currently constrained by limited training time. Equipment levels in Reserve Component units are a continuing problem. The program makes significant improvements in chemical defensive equipment and in organizational clothing and equipment. This provides soldiers in early deploying units of the Army National Guard and the Reserve the same equipment as in the Active Component.

(S) The shortage of CS/CSS force structure places additional heavy reliance upon Host Nation Support. HNS requirements to complement rapid reinforcement of NATO have been presented to certain NATO countries for discussion and negotiation. The HNS concept is also under consideration in Southwest Asia and Korea. HNS should be viewed as an offset for support force shortfalls rather than a force structure replacement. The POM provides funds to begin planning for implementation of a German program to organize reserve HNS units. A total requirement to fund over \$750 million remains unprogramed.



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2. (U) MANNING.

(S) An Active Army end strength of 870,000 by FY87 is required to man the force structure associated with the two new divisions and the RDP-A expansion. This end strength is dependent on extraordinary manpower policies and will require substantial additional resources. These policies and resources should also assist in achieving the manpower increase needed to bring the Reserve Components to the 744,000 level reflected in this program.

(U) The Army National Guard and Reserve are on a ramp to attain their wartime strength requirements of 453,000 and 303,000, respectively. The USAR achieves that level in FY87, the ARNG in the EPA years. Both the Guard and Reserve forces achieve Full Time Unit Support levels of six percent of the wartime structure by FY86. The pretrained manpower shortfall continues throughout the program years and no easy solution exists in this area.

	POM			EPA	
	83	85	87	88	87
AC (END STR)	700K	800K	870K	840K	1200K
RC (PTU & FULL TIME STR)	657K	700K	740K	740K	800K
CIV STR	200K	400K	410K	447K	620K
MIL PAY (MFA, RPA, NCPA)	\$ 150	\$ 160	\$ 170	\$ 180	\$ 220
CIV PAY	\$ 95	\$ 95	\$ 105	\$ 115	\$ 165

CONSIDERATIONS.....

- INCREASED AC STRUCTURE WILL BE MANNED AT ALO 2 BY FY 87..... ALL AC RDP AT ALO 1 BY FY 87
- ABILITY TO ACHIEVE AC/RC STRENGTH REQ'D TO MAN INCREASED FORCE LEVELS DEPENDENT ON EXTRAORDINARY MANPOWER POLICIES
- USAR REACHES WARTIME STRENGTH IN 1987..... ARNG IN EPA
- CIV MANPOWER PROG AND FUNDS DO NOT FULLY SUPPORT AC STRENGTH

(U) The recruiting objectives in the first two years of the program are attainable provided an adequate educational incentive package is available. The education package is needed in an all volunteer environment to sustain the high school diploma graduate male requirement in a declining manpower pool and to meet anticipated Congressional constraints.


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(U) The Army's program increases its civilian workforce to about 413,000 end strength by FY 1987. This level is required for force modernization, equipment repositioning, military construction, military substitution, depot maintenance and medical support initiatives. Not addressed are the civilian strength requirements associated with the force structure and military end strength increases beginning in FY85.

(U) The FY83-87 POM contains a programmatic estimate that 4,400 civilians and over 1,500 military spaces will be saved beginning in FY83 through contracting out. These manpower savings offset new program initiatives that include substitution of civilians for military positions as a way of reducing the Army's operating strength deviation to management levels.



FY83-87 POM MANNING	
<u>DOES</u>	<u>DOES NOT</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• CONTINUE ACTIVE ARMY MILITARY END STRENGTH (796,300) IN FY 82 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET - RAMP TO 796,000 IN FY 83, 800K IN FY 85 AND 870K IN FY 87• INCREASE USAR STRENGTH TO 100% OF WARTIME MANNING BY FY 87 -- ARMY GUARD TO 100% OF WARTIME IN EPA• RAMP CIVILIAN END STRENGTH FROM 306K IN FY 83 TO 413K IN FY 87	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• CONTAIN NEW EDUCATIONAL INCENTIVES FOR RESERVE AND MILITARY POLICIES• MAN THE ACTIVE ARMY AT WARTIME REQUIRED LEVELS -- ONLY THE INF AT ALO 1• PROVIDE NECESSARY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STRENGTH TO SUPPORT FULLY THE PROFESSIONAL TRAINING AND BASELINE SUPPORT OF ADDITIONAL TRAINEES/STRUCTURE

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3. (U) EQUIPPING

(U) The FY83-87 program capitalizes on the growth in funding permitted by the FY81 Supplemental and FY82 Amendment. Increased efficiency with production and development, leading to earlier fielding of critical equipment, is the primary result of the increased funding. The RDTE account has grown by 26% over the FY83 projection of the January FYDP and the procurement account has increased by 80%. The increases permit a faster modernization pace while also filling badly needed equipment shortages. However, equipment shortfalls will still exist in the Active and Reserve Components in FY87. It is essential that the level of funding initiated by supplemental and amendment budget actions be preserved through this POM period. A lesser funding alternative would require a return to a less efficient program, with failure to fill existing equipment shortages and field critical modernized equipment.

(U) The RDTE Appropriation generally continues the initiatives started in the FY81 Supplemental and FY82 Amendment.

(U) The Army allocated an additional \$175M in FY83 above the January FYDP level to the BMD Load Program. The USAF has informed the Army that the MX program has been held at the January FYDP funding level pending the findings of the Townes Committee. Feedback from Congress, the Townes Committee and OSD has indicated broad support for increasing the Army's strategic defensive capability. Load was fully funded to support MX in a variety of basing modes and with technology that can contribute to the underlay portion of a layered defense. The Army Corps of Engineers has also been allocated up to 3,000 spaces for MX construction since MX IOC cannot be met without early commitment of resources. In the event OSD desires to either reduce strategic defense or reduce construction requirements these resources should be returned to the Army for other critical programs.

(U) Many of our General Purpose Forces new initiatives are Advance Development (6.3A) demonstration programs designed to capitalize on advances resulting from the increased funding in the technology base over the past few years. Examples include a lightweight air defense weapon, standoff jammer suppression program, mobile protected gun, close combat laser assault weapon and a forward area laser weapon. The Chemical Warfare/NBC Defense programs received large increases in RDTE funding. Other major changes include increased funding allocated to several key development programs. These include the Advanced Rocket Control System, All Source Analysis System, Remotely Piloted Vehicle, ROLAND, PATRIOT, Fighting Vehicle System and M1 Tank Improvement Program. These improvements have allowed the RDTE appropriation for the first time in several years to present a balanced program which fully funds development efforts, continues technology base improvement, and most importantly, funds initiatives which demonstrate technology and will lead to future development for the Army of the 90's.

(U) The Procurement appropriation contains major funding increases in all functional areas. Program changes include accelerating the deployment of selected modern air defense, ground and aircraft combat systems to meet an increasingly superior threat and improved nuclear and chemical material; equipping the forces committed to the RDJTF to better respond to potential global

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requirements; rebuilding our badly deteriorated vehicle fleet to adequately support the combat forces; improving the overall fill of badly needed other support equipment such as generators, materials handling equipment, and chemical defensive equipment, and; increasing funding for the modern ammunition stockpile and for ammunition associated with newly introduced and accelerated weapon system programs.

(S) Procurement highlights include: reestablishing a 90 vehicle per month production rate for the M1 Tank and Fighting Vehicle System; achieving more economical production rates for the DIVAD GUN and the PATRIOT Air Defense Missile System; reestablishing the four battalion ROLAND Air Defense Program; ramping the production rates for the Attack Helicopter (AAH) and the BLACKHAWK helicopter to 96 aircraft per year; achieving economical production rates for the CH-47D modernization and COPPERHEAD programs; accelerating the procurement of 5T and 10T trucks, HMMWV, and commercial vehicles; accelerating the procurement and increasing the total buy of rockets for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) to adequately sustain fielded launchers with rockets, and; initiating procurement of major new systems such as the Light Weight Air Defense System (LADS), the Mobile Protected Gun (MPG), the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP), the Corps Support Weapons System (CSWS), the Stand-off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS), QUICKFIX, and SINGGARS. The program does not provide for economic production rates for all systems, nor does it significantly improve the Reserve Component equipment posture or provide all Active and Reserve Component units with modernized equipment. In addition, it does not eliminate all overage tactical vehicles nor provide fill to Force Package II for all tactical vehicles.

(S) In the C³I area the FY83-87 program is consistent with approved plans and accelerates the improvement of tactical and strategic command, control and communications, especially in the areas of TRI-TAC for active forces, C³ for the Theater Nuclear Forces, C³ for the RDJTF, test measurement and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) for major weapons systems, improved communications for Korea, WWMCCS ADP and survivability, Defense Satellite Communications System (Ground Environment) and Tactical Satellite Communications (TACSATCOM) for forward deployed and early deploying forces. In addition, the Army will fully fund its interchange requirements and initial spares. Even so, it does not provide economic production rates for all major C³ systems, nor provide all Reserve Component units with improved division communications.

(S) The significant increase in the Chemical Warfare/NBC Program, including initial procurement of the 155mm binary chemical projectile, is intended to overcome the Army's critical shortcomings in this area. The amount of procurement funds that can be programed is currently constrained because of the long neglect of this area. An aggressive R&D program will permit additional procurement programing in the future as additional items are developed. Examples of the current increases over the past FYDP include M51 Shelter Systems from 200 (\$12M) to 1160 (\$73M) and M8 Chemical Alarms from 15,669 (\$64M) to 33,532 (\$139M).

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**FY83-87 POM
EQUIPPING**

DOES

- RAMP SOME SYSTEMS UP TO ECONOMIC RATES (PL, FVS, CR-47, DIVAD, VRC-12, AND SELECTED TACTICAL AND SUPPORT VEHICLES)
- IMPROVE TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PROFICIENT CRTI-TAC FOR ACTIVE FORCES, C³ FOR THE AND INJTF, TACSATCOM, THEF FOR MAJOR SYSTEMS)
- PROVIDE PRODUCTION STARTS (SOTAS, OBICRFX, MFG, ANIP, SINCARS, CSMS, LABS (MOMV))
- CONTINUE CONVERSION (MOMV) TO MFGAS
- REDUCE SHORTAGES/OVER-AGE/OVER MILEAGE PROGRAMS IN ARMY AND MGS
- IMPROVE CM/DC DEFENSE ROTE CAPABILITY AND PRODUCE MOST PRODUCIBLE EQUIPMENT
- BEGIN RDTF NEW STARTS OF G.3A DFFONSTRATION PROGRAMS
- FULLY FUND ALL MAJOR ARMY THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

DOES NOT

- PROVIDE ECONOMIC PRODUCTION RATES FOR ALL MAJOR SYSTEMS
- SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE RC EQUIPMENT POSTURE NOR PROVIDE ALL ACTIVE AND RC UNITS WITH MODERNIZED EQUIPMENT
- ELIMINATE ALL OVER-AGE TACTICAL VEHICLES NOR PROVIDE FILL TO PACKAGE II FOR ALL TACTICAL VEHICLE SYSTEMS
- MAINTAIN PRODUCTION BASE FOR ALL REED ITFYS
- PROVIDE THE ARMY WITH ALL REQUIRED MODERNIZATION ITEMS
- PROVIDE ADEQUATE NUCLEAR PROJECTILES FOR PROGRAMED FINCE UNLESS STOCKPILE OF EFFECTIVE IS INCREASED

4. (U) TRAINING

(U) The increased career content and accessions associated with Active and Reserve Component force structure expansion will impact directly on the individual training of enlisted personnel and their NCO and officer leaders on training done in units, and on training support.

(U) To implement an expanded individual training and skill development program, especially for CS/CSS personnel, manpower and dollar resources must be allocated to ensure that quarters, ranges, and other training facilities are upgraded or constructed; sufficient ammunition, equipment, training devices, aids and simulators are provided; and that the requisite number of qualified cadre and instructors and base operations support personnel are identified, trained and on-hand.


(U) Funding has been programed to support most one time and recurring training requirements associated with new unit activations (to include the expanded Active Component CSS force structure to support the RDF) and to provide the increased number of RDF combat units with the necessary environmental and deployment training for potential global missions.

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(U) In conjunction with the activation and stationing of new units, improvements in training facilities and ranges are required. The increased tempo of training required to support a global strategy creates a new demand for additional training ammunition. This requirement coupled with escalating costs necessitates additional emphasis on training devices and simulators that can partially offset the higher cost of training.



FY83-87 POM TRAINING

<u>DOES</u>	<u>DOES NOT</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• CONTINUE AMENDED FY 82-86 TRAINING PROGRAMS• PROVIDE 60-85% OF AIR ROMI FOR TNG APPD• ACCOMMODATE:<ul style="list-style-type: none">- CARSON LAND DEVELOPMENT- ITC OPS GROUP- REVISION OF AVN MAINTENANCE TNG (OPF 67)- ROTC RAMP AND SCHOLARSHIPS- INCREASED AC/DC AVIATOR TNG RATES- INCREASED RC READINESS TNG- FULL-TIME TNG RCs (2+60 UNITS)- CONTINUED STOCKPILING FOR MOB TNG BASE- 3 WKS OF ANNUAL TRAINING FOR SELECTED RC UNITS- EXPANDED RC DESERT/COLD WEATHER TNG	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• PROVIDE REQUIRED RESOURCES TO TNG BASE FOR:<ul style="list-style-type: none">- INCREASED SPEC SKILL TNG LOADS AND BT/OSBT ACCESSIONS- RESTRUCTURING AIT FOR SELECTED CFFs- CONTRACTING OF 16 TECH SKILLS DURING SURGE TNG PERIOD- DEFENSE INFO SCHOOL NEW MISSIONS- BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS• BUY ALL REQUIRED TNG APPD

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
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5. (U) SUSTAINING

(C) The Army's new force structure initiatives must be matched with complementing sustainability initiatives to ensure staying power and flexibility. The Army cannot afford to place undue focus on modernization and combat force structure improvement without adequate attention to supporting requirements. Support must now be tailored to match both combat structure and equipment changes. In the early years, the main focus of equipping the force remains modernization--procuring items which inherently have heavy support requirements. For example, the Abrams Tank, while designed to simplify the tasks of the operator and the organizational levels of maintenance, adds complexity for succeeding levels of maintenance. It also adds to support requirements for POL and Ammo handling not only within the division but also in the non-divisional slice. The same can be said for many of the other new systems. The current CSS shortfall grows with fielding of the new, more support requirement intensive systems and is further compounded as additional combat forces are added.

(U) The Depot Maintenance Program is divided into two aspects, Depot Level Materiel Maintenance and Materiel Maintenance Support Activities. The more visible component of depot maintenance is the materiel maintenance element which overhauls, repairs, and applies product improvements to Army materiel. The funding of the hardware program is sufficient to accomplish the majority of the depot maintenance level requirements; however, because of higher priority claimants, it does not maintain 8 commodity areas at zero backlog. Included within these commodity areas which are not maintained at zero are combat vehicles, which the Congress in the FY81 appropriation legislation directed be kept at zero, and aircraft, which OSD directed be held at the maintenance management level. Also, the program does not provide additional end strength to fully accommodate reimbursable workload increases. Zero hardware backlog is achieved in FY82 and is reattained in FY86. The support activities component of depot maintenance is the management





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and engineering backbones of the Army maintenance system. A continuing backlog exists in this element and it continues throughout the FY83-87 POM period at approximately \$265 million. This backlog has a long term adverse effect on readiness because it translates into longer lead time in the development of product improvement packages, late delivery of technical publications and skill performance aid packages to the field, and less than desirable levels of training.

(6) The FY83-87 POM provides for a significantly increased war reserve stockpile for ammunition and secondary items. There is no change to the major item war reserve stockpile over the January 81 FYDP. For ammunition, the increase is 30 days for Korea (to 60 days), 15 days of modern munitions for NATO (to 60 days), and 60 days for the RDF (to 120 days). The secondary item stockpile increases by 30 days for both Korea (to 60 days) and the RDF (to 90 days). In FY87, the program begins to ramp to support an increase in the RDF from 3 divisions to 5 divisions. Even though the FY83-87 POM provides an increased stockpile of ammunition and secondary items, there remain serious shortages in war reserves because the programed stockpile (approximately 60 days) is less than the stockpile objective (180 days). Stocks of ammunition could be exhausted in 40 days of intense combat, while equipment and repair parts would be depleted much earlier. Critical shortages of support equipment will continue to exist beyond FY87. Resource limitations continue to preclude procurement of the full objective.

 **FY83-87 POM** 
SUSTAINING

<u>DOES</u>	<u>DOES NOT</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• IMPROVE PMS POSTURE -- E.G., ADDITIONAL 60 DAYS OF AWD FOR RDF• ACCOMPLISH MAJORITY OF DEPOT MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS• IMPROVE RDF SUPPORT CAPABILITY:<ul style="list-style-type: none">- BUILDS POL PIPELINE IN FY 84- STARTS BUY OF MATFCRAFT IN FY 85	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• MAKE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT UNTIL OUYEARS• FUND THE WR STOCKPILE TO MEET THE D TO P REQUIREMENT• KEEP DEPOT MAINTENANCE BACKLOG AT ZERO

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6. (U) MOBILIZATION

(U) For POM 83-87, mobilization has been restrictively defined as pre-M day procedures required to permit rapid force expansion upon mobilization. Initiatives that will significantly improve the Army capabilities after mobilization have been addressed elsewhere. Examples include manning Reserve Component units at wartime required levels and war reserve levels that improve sustainability. Within the restrictive definition of mobilization, other initiatives have made marginal improvements to the mobilization process itself. Included are mobilization training base requirements, purchase and storage of non-perishable medical stocks and enhancement of pretrained manpower management processes.

(U) Resources for the Army's Industrial Preparedness Program have been increased from FY82 to 83. These resources will stabilize the condition of the reserve industrial base by continuing the operation and maintenance of approximately 325 laid-away production lines and will provide adequate facilities for peacetime production as well as limited modernization and productivity improvement measures. Improved planning with industry for emergency production is expected as a result of increased contract and voluntary planning efforts. However, little capability is provided for emergency surge of production of new hardware items.

(S) Although the POM provides approximately 60 days of sustainability, a stockpile of that size is not sufficient to sustain the force from D-Day until such time as an expanded production base could provide adequate resupply (P Day). The lead time for the production base to reach the P rate is a function of the peacetime funding allocated for facilitization and the level of operation of the production base on D-Day. POM 83-87 does not provide adequate facilitization so that the production base can accelerate to meet the P rate as rapidly as desired.

 FY83-87 POM MOBILIZATION	
<u>DOES</u>	<u>DOES NOT</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• BUY BY FY 87:<ul style="list-style-type: none">- INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT FOR 200,500 OF 334,000 TRAINEES EXPECTED THRU D + 90- PLANS FOR FACILITIES THRU M + 300 DAYS- NON-PERISHABLE HOSPITAL EQUIPMENT THRU M + 30- ADEQUATE TIE DOWN EMBSP FOR AC & HC THRU M + 30- INCREASED CAPABILITY TO MANAGE IIR THRU M + 90- TRAINING EQUIP (LESS TRACKED VEHICLES) THRU M + 30• UPGRADE RAIL LOADING SITES THRU M + 30• PROVIDE PRODUCTION BASE FACILITIES TO SUPPORT HARDWARE PROCURED	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• PROVIDE BY FY 87:<ul style="list-style-type: none">- ALL TRAINING BASE REQUIREMENTS THRU M + 90 -- SHORTAGES OF: M-16 RIFLES; TRACK VEHICLES; 254 TRAINING COMPANIES; 22K TRAINERS- ADDITIONAL 34,500 SETS OF INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED THRU D + 90- CONSTRUCTION OF REQUIRED MOBILIZATION FACILITIES• FUND THE PRODUCTION BASE FOR REASONABLE P-DAY• BUY BY FY 87 CLASS VI(1) ITEMS REQUIRED BY THE TRAINING BASE FROM M + 30 TO M + 90• PROVIDE SUFFICIENT HC PERSONNEL MANAGERS REQUIRED TO INSURE READINESS OF PERSONNEL MOBILIZED THROUGH M + 90

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7. (U) DEPLOYMENT

(U) The capability to project power rapidly is key to achievement of US strategic objectives. This capability not only provides deterrence but, if deterrence fails, is essential to the successful conduct of military operations. Although strategic lift enhancement programs have been underway for several years, current and programed strategic mobility forces are inadequate to execute US strategy. Future mobility forces must possess the capability and flexibility to permit a proper force mix for global deployments with less reliance on additional prepositioning.

1990 DIRECTION.....DEPLOYMENT

- SIX DIVISIONS WITH ESSENTIAL SUPPORT POMCUS'D IN NATO
- INCREASED AIRLIFT AND FAST SEALIFT FOR THE RDF AND NATO
- IMPROVED ALLIANCES.....BASING AND OVERFLIGHT AGREEMENTS.....FORWARD STOCKAGE OF CONSUMABLES
- LIGHTER, HI-TECH FORCES

(S) In the near term the accelerated acquisition and conversion of the SL-7s to full Roll-On Roll-Off configuration is the most important and achievable mobility enhancement. Simply stated, the achievement of our NATO D-Day goal and other deployment requirements is dependent on the availability of fast sealift for the simultaneous lift of a 2 division corps. Our appraisal of mobility requirements indicate that additional airlift, eight fully converted SL-7s, and approximately 24 Maine Class or faster Roll-On Roll-Off ships are needed to meet minimum deployment requirements over the next several years.

(S) Immediate emphasis must be given to improving upon and exploiting technology to adapt it to our future mobility programs. Specifically, the Navy Surface Effect Ship (SES) program needs revitalization. The potential of SES to enhance power projection may be achievable in the early 1990s if a deliberate RDTB effort is aggressively pursued.


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(U) Force structure changes, particularly the conversion of major units to hi-tech, have implications for the present POMCUS program. In order to maintain a viable reinforcement capability, we are reviewing the impact of these force structure changes and alternatives to the mid- and long-term execution of the POMCUS program.

 FY83-87 POM DEPLOYING	
<u>DOES</u>	<u>DOES NOT</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• ACHIEVE FY 87 POMCUS FILL: BS 1-4: FROM 87% TO 98% BS 5 & 6: 88%• IN OTHER SERVICE LIFT: - ATTAIN SOME C-141/CS UTILIZATION RATE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• TOTALLY FILL BS 5 & 6• IN OTHER SERVICE LIFT: - CLOSIF REQUIRED FORCE ON TIME - RESTORE CONGRESSIONAL CUTS OR SI-7 TO INSURE FULL CONVERSION - PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DEDICATED SFALIFT BEYOND FY 82 AMENDMENT - PROVIDE O&S FOR HTPS, FUNDED IN FY 87 AMENDMENT FOR AF/ARMY APPROPRIATION (OSD INITIATIVE)

8. (U) FACILITIES


(U) The FY83-87 POM reflects substantial program growth over the Jan 81 FYDP. Major reasons for this growth include correction of prior year underfunding, force modernization and support for new Army initiatives. Major thrusts of the FY 83-87 POM MCA programs are support for forward deployed forces, improvement in the soldier's quality of life and reduction of the \$16.3 billion (FY82 constant dollars) MCA program backlog. The FY 83-87 European MCA program reflects a substantial program growth over the January 1981 FYDP. The NATO Infrastructure Program, although reduced from previous levels, provides essential facilities for PATRIOT, POMCUS and Theater Reserve Storage.

(U) RPMA program increases will fully fund annual recurring maintenance requirements (ARR) and allow for EMAR reduction starting in FY84, resulting in reductions of EMAR to the operational level in FY87. Real program growth of 30% exists for the level of maintenance effort between FY82 and FY87. This revitalized facility support will contribute significantly to force readiness through improved morale and retention of military members due to better working and living conditions.

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(U) Family Housing resources in the January 81 FYDP presented the Army with a sizeable deficit over the program years in the cost of ownership — the annual recurring cost of operating and maintaining the family housing inventory. Verbal guidance which updates the Jan 81 FYDP raises the funding level to cover the cost of ownership and a minimum of new initiatives. This funding level, however, is far short of meeting Army requirements. To accomplish much needed construction and leasing at locations with severe housing deficits, to make a meaningful reduction in deferred maintenance, to reduce the improvement backlog and to upgrade substandard housing, the Army requires an additional \$430 million in FY83 and \$1928 million in the FY84-87 period. OSD FHMA programing procedures should be revised to allow Service input of requirements before allocations are made. The Army supports returning properly funded FHMA to individual Service accounts.


46) The addition of one brigade and one division base in FY86, and two brigades and another division base in FY87 will require substantial MCA and FHMA funding. The POM accommodates some of the required MCA but none of the FHMA. No specific sites have been chosen. Selection criteria include post training capability, impact on existing Army stationing, impact on local communities, impact on mobilization deployment, and cost. Resources for planning and initial MCA construction have been programed. Programed are training, logistical, operational, and personnel support facilities and unaccompanied personnel housing.

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The total cost for facilities required for the major elements, the training base, and the support force to implement fully this initiative could be as much as an additional \$2 billion.



FY83-87 POM FACILITIES

<u>DOES</u>	<u>DOES NOT</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• MEET NPMA ANNUAL REPAIRING NEEDS IN FY 83• HOLD DPAR TO NO GROWTH IN FY 85 AND REDUCE IT TO OPERATIONAL LEVEL OVER FY 84-87• CONTAIN NEG DPAR• PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT BACKLOG REDUCTION IN MCA, MCR, AND MCRMS• PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET FIPA COSTS OF OWNERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• REDUCE DPAR IN FY 83• PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FIPA FUNDING TO BRING FIPA DEFERRED MAINTENANCE TO AN OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN THE POM YEARS• PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FIPA FUNDING TO LEASE OR CONSTRUCT REQUIRED NURSING UNITS• PROVIDE SUFFICIENT NEAR TERM FUNDING TO REDUCE CONSTRUCTION BACKLOG ON DESIRED GLIDE PATH• FULLY FUND MCA AND FAMILY HOUSING FOR NEW UNIT ACTIVATIONS

9. (U) EFFICIENCIES, ECONOMIES, AND MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

(U) The Army fully recognizes and supports the commitment this Administration has made in the area of efficiencies, economies, and management improvements. Continuing the momentum initiated by the Secretary of Defense requiring each military department to identify potential reductions of \$10 billion over FY 1983-87, numerous proposals have been examined, adopted, and are reflected in this POM submission. Others require legislative adjustment before they can be implemented. The proposals which have been programed include an estimated savings of \$1 billion, 4,400 civilians and 1500 military spaces. In addition, the Army has identified savings of approximately \$5 billion, 4,600 civilians and 1,700 military spaces that are achievable if certain existing statutes and policies are changed. These are noted in the POM as programable with assumptions, and have therefore not been programed. The Army is prepared to identify how it will reprogram the \$5 billion if the assumptions become fact. Attempts have been made

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to eliminate marginal and inefficient programs and fund those initiatives that show a potential for saving the Army greater resources than the required investment.

(U) This POM submission reflects ramp up of certain systems (e.g., M1, FVS, CH-47 and VRC-12) to economic rates, with significant savings to be realized in terms of cost avoidance in the years beyond the POM period. Another initiative, RESHAPE (Resource Self-Help/Affordability Planning Effort), is a DARCOM pilot program which is designed to alleviate severe logistics-related manpower shortfalls within existing end strength authorization by using cost-effective overhire, overtime, organizational streamlining, capital investment, and incentives.

(U) While the Army has identified a possible savings of more than \$3 billion through multi-year contracting, the exact nature of legislative changes currently being considered under H.R. 745 is not certain. Therefore, the details of the procurement efficiencies are not displayed in the POM. The Army is prepared, however, to develop an amended POM procurement program once legislation on multi-year contracting is passed.

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SECTION I. (U) SUMMARY

C. (U) RISK ASSESSMENT

1. ~~(S)~~ GENERAL. While setting the course for future improvement, the programed force still does not provide reasonable assurance of successfully executing the national military strategy. Although the Army goal of attaining a fully structured, supported, equipped, and manned force is feasible in the long term, significant shortfalls will continue to exist during the program years. The result is considerable risk to the program force ability to defend successfully in NATO and Southwest Asia. Further, the quality of this force is not sufficient to counter the trend toward qualitative and quantitative superiority by the Soviet/WP. This section highlights the impact of resource limitations on achieving necessary force improvements in the program period and provides an assessment of the risks associated with the program.

2. (U) FORCE STRUCTURE.

~~(S)~~ The size of the total force remains about 25 percent below that required to provide reasonable assurance of accomplishing the national military strategy. This shortfall lowers the nuclear threshold in NATO by increasing the likelihood of execution of the nuclear option to compensate for insufficient conventional defensive capability. Inadequate AC support structure results in heavy reliance on the RC for NATO early deploying forces. This limits the availability of AC CSS units to that which can support an RDP force of 3 1/3 divisions. The programed force is incapable of simultaneously prosecuting a non-NATO contingency and a war in Europe against the USSR. Force structure deficiencies create a serious risk to readiness, battlefield endurance, and flexibility.

~~(S)~~ The Army structure must be designed to generate maximum early combat power with necessary support units to sustain the force. Neither objective is completely accomplished in the program. The flexibility of this force is reduced by the unbalanced AC/RC contribution to the force increments and the imbalance between divisional increments, nondivisional combat increments (NDCI), and tactical support increments (TSI).

~~(S)~~ Approximately 7 percent of the NATO D+30 combat force is RC. The seven ARNG divisions scheduled for later deployment to NATO are not brought to the required state of readiness to meet deployment times primarily due to insufficient equipment. Of the total NDCI structure, approximately 68 percent is in the RC. This will require early deployment of RC combat forces to NATO.

~~(S)~~ The programed AC force possesses the capability to provide 3 TSIs to NATO, 3 1/3 to a Southwest Asia contingency, and 1/3 to Korea. The programed force is structured with approximately 66 percent of the TSIs in the RC. This imbalance in force composition necessitates early deployment to NATO of RC TSI units, resulting in over 80 percent of the NATO early deploying M to M+10 TSI units being in the RC. The risk associated with this force structure imbalance is further compounded in that approximately 50 percent of the RC TSI units at D+30 are Type "B" organizations which require indigenous population or Type "C" which require US

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national fillers, respectively, to flesh-out their TOEs before they can be considered operational. For some critical logistics functions such as petroleum, maintenance, supply, and transportation, the D+30 active unit mix is less than 20 percent. Support of the RDF requires deployment of AC NATO identified units which must be rapidly replaced by mobilization of RC units. This further exacerbates the already critically deficient support structure for NATO and increases requirements for RC support units and additional untested Host Nation Support.

(S) Early execution of the Presidential 100K callup authority is required for commitment of the RDF. This provides limited Selected Reserve units to deploy with the RDF (until sufficient AC CS/CSS units are activated to support the RDF entirely with AC units--about FY86), to replace POMCUS AC units deploying with the RDF, and to provide initial CONUS base augmentation. The 100K callup should be accompanied by termination of civilian end strength limitations. Additionally, partial mobilization is required in order to provide sufficient pretrained individuals (IRR) to fill units, provide casualty replacements, and mobilize additional RC units. Full mobilization should be considered for its deterrent effect and to preclude unacceptable degradation of the NATO force.

(S) There are shortfalls in NBC force structure at Corps and Echelons Above Corps. Further, the projected NBC defense force is comprised of a high percentage of RC units which are not available during the critical early days of the conflict. The force lacks NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke generator units necessary to support a defense in NATO under chemical warfare conditions, although current HNS negotiations may substantially reduce the shortfall in decontamination units.

3. (U) MANNING

(S) The AC is increased in force size, but the manning of that force is subject to the success of extraordinary manpower policies. If the force is to be manned, the Army requires substantial augmentation to the Volunteer Concept. While the majority of the AC will be at ALO-2, the program adds enough AC spaces to bring the RDF combat units to ALO-1. The USAR total paid strength is programed to achieve wartime requirements (the ARNG in the EPA years). Although there is improvement, the force continues to have insufficient combat service support spaces to support the increased manning levels of forward deployed and early deploying combat forces to be implemented in the program period. This increases the risk that the force will not be able to accomplish the military strategy and reduces force credibility. Civilian manpower programed is inadequate to support either the AC or RC. The programed civilian workforce will only relieve some of the Army's current mission shortfalls and will impair the Army's ability to support mobilization. A major concern is the size of the IRR. Currently filled at the 200K level it is critically short of the numbers and MOSs needed to guarantee both the fill of forces in combat and the integrity of later deploying units before the training base begins to output wartime levels of trained manpower.

4. (U) EQUIPPING

(S) The programed Army equipment inventory is not adequate to fully equip all Army units, POMCUS sets and war reserve stocks. Although some improvement, both in

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modernization of the inventory and in the equipment on hand will be effected by this program, equipment shortages will continue to be a major deficiency.

(S) Programed modernization efforts improve the capability of the force. This improvement is characterized by greater efficiency in development and production and earlier fielding of selected equipment. Army efforts to gain qualitative equivalence with Soviet forces significantly improve in this program. The Soviets will retain a qualitative advantage in most ground systems through the program period as well as a significant quantitative advantage. Investment in the modernization of Army equipment must be balanced with investment for sufficient quantities of existing equipment to ensure the readiness and sustainability of the force. It is vital that the recent growth in investment to continue critical development and acquisition efforts be maintained. Continued growth will begin to reverse the trend of the past several years which has seen an aggressive Soviet program to field systems of higher quality than those possessed by the US. Acceleration of the growth rate will close this gap even more quickly.

(S) The currently approved stockpile objective for artillery fired atomic projectiles must be increased to meet programed force requirements. The modernized 8-inch and LANCE warheads must be deployed with an ER capability. The Department of Energy's capability to produce special nuclear materials and fabricate weapons must be enhanced, so that balanced modernization of both strategic and theater nuclear systems can be accomplished without adverse impact on either category.

(S) The offensive CW capability remains seriously deficient and will likely continue to be degraded throughout the program period due to deterioration of the stockpile and obsolescence of the weapon systems for which it was designed. The absence of a credible CW capability increases the probability of a chemical war and serves to amplify the urgency of the improvements required in our defensive capability. If the required policy decisions are made, the production of 155mm binary munitions programed for FY 83-87 would provide the first step in modernizing the CW stockpile. The currently programed effort must be expanded to other weapon systems to include air-delivered and surface-to-surface rocket capabilities if an effective multi-range deterrent capability is to be achieved. Under the most optimistic program, the CW stockpile is likely to remain deficient until the early 1990s. US forces will have the necessary equipment to withstand an initial chemical attack, but shortages of war reserves of both unit and individual equipment will persist through the end of the program period. The limitations of current NBC defensive equipment seriously degrade force operability and will not allow sustained operations in an NBC environment. Technological breakthroughs are needed to produce an effective chemical agent antidote, more efficient decontamination procedures and equipment, protective clothing compatible with the combat soldier's needs, and more effective detection and warning equipment to include an all clear capability.

(S) The EW capability is significantly less than required to offset the Soviet advantage. The capability to electronically home-on and destroy Soviet/WP ground and air electronic jammers is required to enable tactical commanders to effectively command and control their forces. An ability to attack (lethal and nonlethal)


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Soviet/WP multichannel communications and other critical C³ nodes is required if the force is to successfully perform its mission against numerically superior forces.



(S) The US strategic posture reflects an inherent risk since it places total reliance on the triad of offensive systems with Ballistic Missile Defense relegated to a technology advancement role. The technology is available to reduce our strategic defensive risk by providing an improved tactical warning and attack assessment capability or by accelerating the overlay portion of a layered BMD system. The defensive portion of our strategic posture has been neglected since the signing of the ABM treaty. Technological advancements in the interim provide opportunities for new initiatives in this area. BMD should not be considered as a separate option but must be evaluated within the overall strategic equation.

5. (U) SUSTAINING

(S) The Army lacks staying power for NATO, Korea, and SWA (and other non-NATO contingencies) throughout the program period. Planning objectives for these three force requirements include substantially higher levels of war reserves to ensure force viability until the CONUS production base can provide the quantities necessary to meet expected consumption. Risk results from inadequate readiness of the production base (120-180 days from D-Day to production sufficiency for many items) and a low number of days of supply (e.g., 1/3 of planning objective - NATO). Improving the responsiveness of the production base while increasing the number of days of supply for NATO and non-NATO conflict are necessary actions appropriate to minimizing the risk in the sustainability area.

(S) A second but related risk deals with the fact that the improvement in limited number of days of supply is achieved primarily in the out-years. Improvement from the current on-hand sustainability posture is minimal until late in the program period and, because of the delay between procurement and distribution, the program objective level is actually not achieved with delivered assets until 1989.

(U) Equipment availability for fielded units is reduced in the near years of the program due to insufficient funding for depot maintenance. Equipment backlog as a result of a requirement for modification/maintenance is above the management level (zero) from FY83-85. Those items of equipment awaiting maintenance are therefore not available to the deployed forces and their percentage of fill is

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degraded. The result is a less ready and less capable force.

6. (U) DEPLOYING

(S) If the full SL-7 RO/RO conversion program is completed and a minimum of 2 CX squadrons added, programed mobility forces will be marginally adequate to deploy either the required air and land forces to SWA or to meet the NATO reinforcement objectives. In FY 87, NATO requires 7 reinforcing divisions by M+10; the projected capability is one division with some support by sea and 5 POMCUS divisions by air, prior to the outbreak of hostilities (10/15 day warning scenario). For SWA, requirements are 2 divisions by C+15 and a total of 5 divisions by C+35. The projected capability is 2 divisions (-) by sea and 2 divisions by air. The forces required for a SWA contingency necessitate activation of CRAF Stage III airlift. The shortage of timely strategic mobility assets places both NATO and SWA at risk.

(S) Prior fiscal constraints precluded significant improvements in RC training, equipment modernization, and mobilization support initiatives necessary to achieve objectives for early deploying (D+30) NATO forces. An increase in priority of resources alone will not allow all RC units to achieve their full combat potential nor ensure they will be capable of meeting deployment schedules by FY 87. Many late-deploying units, including seven ARNG divisions, will not benefit from these initiatives, and require significant additional material resources to insure the ability to meet their deployment schedules.

7. (U) FACILITIES

(S) The facilities program is improved compared to recent years but nonetheless does not provide the proper number of adequate facilities soon enough to meet Army requirements. The construction program is heavily weighted toward the later program years (FY 86-87) and reduction of the construction backlog (currently over \$16 billion) is delayed with resultant reduced force readiness. Maintenance and repair of real property is also weighted toward the late program years degrading mission readiness and soldier morale and retention. Further, the condition of Army facilities, especially overseas, sends the wrong signal to our allies and our potential adversaries as to our commitment to a first class defense establishment. The current Family Housing program does not adequately fund Army requirements. Given current funding limitations the Army cannot properly house its married soldiers and their families. This shortfall, too, has its negative effects on morale, retention and readiness. Lastly, facilities are needed to transition to mobilization rapidly. Although the program provides resources for planning there is no money for construction. Consequently, the Army risks an unacceptable delay in mobilizing, training and deploying forces for a national emergency.

8. (U) RISK REDUCTION

(U) Program and resource requirements designed to address and reduce the risks described in this section are discussed in detail in Annex A, Risk Reduction Measures.

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SECTION I. (U) SUMMARY

D. (U) THE EXTENDED PLANNING ANNEX (EPA)

6) The EPA covers the period from fiscal years 1988 through 1997. The summary table below compares the Army posture by functional category programed by the end of the POM period with the improvements forecast by the end of the EPA period. EPA real dollar growth assumptions are: FY 88-89 - 5%; FY 90-91 - 4%, and; FY 92-97 - 3%.

FUNCTIONAL AREA	FY 87 (POM)				FY 97 (EPA)			
	AC	RC	COMPO 4	% SPTD	AC	RC	COMPO 4	% SPTD
<u>Structure</u> Divisions	18	10			20	11		
NDCI	6 1/3	15	6 2/3	76.2	12 1/2	18 1/2	0	100
TSI	6 1/3	14	7 2/3	76.6	15	16	0	100
<u>Manning</u> Active ES			870K				1,200K	
NG			441K				540K	
USAR			303K				360K	
CIV			413K				624K	
<u>Equipping</u> % Modernized			37% (28 Div)				35% (31 Div)	
<u>Training</u>	Begins to support training requirements associated with: - new unit activations - expansion of training base - mobilization training base Adequately supports RDF-A combat units/provides necessary environmental and deployment training. Begins to support unit training for expanded RDF-A AC CSS.				Gradually improves training resources in areas of: - special skill training - lengthened IET (2 weeks) - force modernization - mobilization training base Continues unit training for global strategy Emphasizes increased use of simulation, devices and facilities to: - improve efficiency - enhance readiness - reduce ammunition consumption			
<u>Sustaining</u> War Reserve Stocks Ammo prod. response by M+180	60 days (overall average) 23% line items				180 days 90% line items			

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FUNCTIONAL AREA	FY 87 (POM)	FY 97 (EPA)
<u>Mobilizing</u> Industrial base response by M+180	25% line items	80% line items
<u>Deploying</u>	Anticipates fast sealift for 2 Divisions Capable of reinforcing NATO by 6 Divisions by M+10 with full SL-7 conversion and 2 CX Squadrons	Anticipates fast sealift for 4 Divisions Anticipates the JSPD lift req of 13 Divisions will be met Adds prepositioned stock in Persian Gulf
<u>Facilities</u> Mil Construction Backlog Backlog of Maint & Repair Family Housing	Meets 75% of annual investment objective At an operational level Meets new annual requirement but does not reduce backlog	Backlog eliminated by 1992 Supports incr Force Structure Continues at operational level Still requires significant improvements

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