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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

October 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The President's National Security Adviser

FROM: *Sub* The Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: INF Policy

The President has decided not to accept the package discussed by Ambassadors Nitze and Kvitsinskiy in July because it is not consistent with the principle of equal rights and limits. The President wishes to keep the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy channel open, however, and has asked the NSC principals to consider possible alternative INF positions that might serve United States interests.

Attached for your review is a revised package designed to meet the President's criteria. It would provide for strict equality in the limits on US and Soviet INF forces. In particular, the sides would have equal rights to intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and we should have full freedom of choice to deploy GLCMs and Pershing IIs, or indeed other weapons of that class in the future.

An outcome along the lines of the attached package would:

- establish equal INF missile quotas at levels substantially below those of the present Soviet arsenal;
- focus on the most destabilizing systems in the first instance, and recognize the military dis-

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inctions among ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft;

- establish the principle of asymmetric Soviet reductions to equal levels as a precedent for the START talks; and
- reduce Soviet INF missiles in the Far East, and confirm the right of the United States to offset them.

The first question to ask about this package is its effect on United States security. Since long-range weapons can reach London as well as New York from the Soviet Union, there is no substance in the notion of an INF balance as such. The primary immediate military consequence of an INF package is its impact on the present Soviet advantage in ground-based intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles. From this point of view, the package described here would reduce the present Soviet superiority in INF missiles (324 to zero) to 150 on each side; measured in warheads, the change would be from 1200 to zero to about 500 on each side.

The second security issue to be considered is the effect of such a change on escalation. The zero-zero solution would mean that any conflict in Europe, Japan, or certain other areas would escalate nearly at once to the intercontinental level. Indeed, the main purpose of Helmut Schmidt and other European leaders in raising the issue of INF missiles five years ago was to overcome growing doubts about the credibility of the American strategic nuclear umbrella, and thus strengthen deterrence and assure firm "coupling" between Europe and America. The other side of that coin, of course, is the fear that the presence of Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Europe may make it possible for us to fight a limited nuclear war -- a nightmare with considerable emotional and political impact.

Some, indeed, do contend that with a zero-zero solution we might be able to handle the defense of Europe by conventional means. A few people of this persuasion

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accept the Soviet argument for a no-first use pledge. But even Bob McNamara argues that such a policy would require huge increases in Western conventional forces. Moreover, as McNamara admits, we could never assume that the Soviet Union would forego the early use of battle-field or theatre nuclear weapons, whatever they now say. Therefore a zero-zero solution would not change the requirements of nuclear deterrence, although it would profoundly alter the essence of deterrence -- the uncertainty in Soviet minds about an American response to a Soviet attack.

Insofar as INF could serve as a fire break between the stages of escalation -- which is doubtful -- the package outlined here should be somewhat more stable than the zero-zero solution, which would necessarily engage our strategic weapons almost from the beginning.

Under this package the Soviets would be able to cover all military targets in NATO Europe. However, even under a zero-zero outcome NATO Europe would be equally vulnerable to attack by shorter-range systems, intercontinental systems, nuclear-capable aircraft, sea-based systems, etc. An agreement along these lines would remove the current and projected asymmetries in INF forces through substantial Soviet reductions, and put the US in a strong position to go forward with our own INF deployments up to the agreed limits.

Politically, the enclosed package would offer the United States certain clear cut and important advantages. The political appeal of the zero-zero solution is fading. Both European and American opinion clearly expects a normal pattern of give and take in the negotiation and the charge of "rigidity" could be extremely damaging to us. It is preferable for us to anticipate that change in opinion, and guide it, rather than yield to it grudgingly after it takes place.

We should therefore be alert in INF and START to every possible opportunity for alternative outcomes which strengthen our security and reduce the chance of war. We should adopt this posture for obvious reasons of principle as well as strong and valid political reasons. We are widely suspected of not being "sincere"

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in arms control, and Soviet propoganda pounds at that theme. The freeze movement and other anti-nuclear movements at home make the problem worse, as our recent experience with the freeze Resolution in the House demonstrates. The problem is also acute in Europe and other countries. Unless we are perceived throughout the West as flexible and sensitive to any reasonable chance for progress in this area, it is an open question whether we shall be able to go forward with our deployment plans next year. An INF agreement based on the enclosed package would dramatically shift the terms of the arms control debate both in Europe and at home; help overcome European opposition to US INF deployments; and strengthen our hand in Congress and the country. Furthermore, if the Soviet Union should in the end reject such an approach, we should be in a strong position to proceed with the deployments originally planned, because we should then have demonstrated that we have exhausted every reasonable possibility for a mutually satisfactory agreement.

We should of course combine flexibility as to means with great firmness as to ends. So long as we convince our own people and our allies that we are willing to listen to reason, we shall be able to resist the growing pressure to agree for the sake of having agreements, and to insist on agreements which fully and genuinely satisfy the criteria which have been spelled out in the President's speeches and other statements of Administration policy.

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Enclosure:

Revised Package

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Revised Package

- o Each side agrees to reduce its "medium-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe" in approximately equal increments to no more than 225 such systems by December 31, 1987.
- o Each side agrees to limit its "medium-range nuclear missile delivery systems in Europe" to a subceiling of no more than 75 on each side by the same date.
- o The Soviet side agrees not to deploy "medium range nuclear missile systems" east of the Urals and west of 80 degrees east, not to deploy more than 75 such systems east of 80 degrees east, and not to deploy those 75 within range of targets in NATO Europe.
- o The U.S. side agrees not to deploy more than 75 "medium-range nuclear missile systems" outside Europe, and not to deploy those 75 within range of targets in Warsaw Pact Europe.
- o "Europe" includes Spain and the land, islands and inland waters eastward thereof to the Urals, etc., being the geographical border of Europe.
- o "Delivery systems" are, with respect to missiles, transporter erector launchers and their associated missiles and base facilities; with respect to airplane delivery systems, the airplanes and their immediately associated equipment.
- o "Medium-range nuclear missile delivery systems" include all missile systems with a range greater than 1000 kilometers and less than 5500 kilometers. "Medium-range airplanes" on the Soviet side presently include Backfire, Badger and Blinder (not Fencer); "medium-range airplanes" on the U.S. side include FB-111 and F-111 (not F-4 or F-16).
- o The inclusion of Backfire and FB-111 in this agreement is without prejudice to their possible treatment in a global context in a SALT/START agreement.

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- o New types of airplanes with a combat radius in excess of 1000 kilometers and less than intercontinental will be included as "medium-range delivery systems" subject to agreement between the sides on each such type.
- o The number of warheads on new types of "medium-range nuclear missiles" will not exceed 3 for ballistic missile systems and 4 for cruise missile systems.
- o The number of "medium-range" nuclear missiles in storage, etc., will not be in excess of normal maintenance and training requirements.
- o All medium-range nuclear delivery systems that become excess to the relevant limit or sublimit shall be destroyed pursuant to procedures to be agreed prior to entry into force of the agreement.
- o There will be no increase in the aggregate number of missile systems with a range greater than 500 kms. and up to and including that of the SS-12/22. This provision will cover, on the U.S. side, the Pershing missile (whether U.S. or German).
- o Verification procedures will include:
 - A data base MOU should identify the locations where systems covered by this agreement are assembled, deployed, tested, overhauled and repaired, and stored, and should specify the number of each type at each location.
 - Each side should have access to the locations specified in the MOU to verify the numbers of systems covered by the agreement at each location.
 - The transmission of telemetric information during flight tests of systems covered by this agreement shall not be encrypted and otherwise impeded, except for telemetric information concerning the operation of missile guidance and homing systems.

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- o The sides agree to resume negotiations for further reductions after conclusion of a SALT/START treaty.
- o After signature by both sides of this "Statement of Intent," and pending a definitive agreement, a three-month moratorium will go into effect on construction activities related to the deployment of medium-range nuclear ballistic missile delivery systems, and a definitive agreement will be concluded within that period.

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