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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

I-23261/83
21 December 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 02 2018

THROUGH: The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) *MB/for*
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Policy) *(RP)*

SUBJECT: START End-of-Round Report (Round Five) (U) - INFO MEMO

(S) Round five produced no discernible progress in narrowing differences between U.S. and Soviet START positions. The U.S. Delegation placed greatest emphasis on the build-down initiative, tabling new provisions that incorporated build-down into the U.S. draft treaty. The U.S. Delegation also proposed to trade areas of U.S. interests, such as heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles, for areas of Soviet interests, such as ballistic missiles and their throw-weight.

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(S) In contrast, the Soviet Delegation was highly negative and polemical, attacking both the build-down and the possibility of trade-offs. The Soviet START Delegation also referred to INF issues with increasing frequency. The Soviet Delegation proposed a number of times to ban ballistic missiles stationed in third countries from which they could reach U.S. or Soviet territory -- a proposal obviously intended to prevent the deployment of the Pershing II. Combined with the initial Soviet START proposal to ban long-range ground-launched cruise missiles, this new proposal would ban in START both U.S. systems which the Soviets tried unsuccessfully to block in INF.

(S) The only even faintly positive Soviet moves were agreement to establish a working group on confidence-building measures, and preliminary indication that Soviet ICBM throw-weight would decrease by approximately 20 percent under the Soviet proposal. At the same time, however, the Soviets continued to assert that their throw-weight advantage is irrelevant.

(S) Round five continued as usual to the agreed closing date, and it would be incorrect to say that the Soviets have "walked out" of START. Thus far, however, they have declined to set a resumption date for round six, on the ground that the beginning of U.S. missile deployment in Europe requires them to re-examine all issues under discussion at START. The Soviets probably seek by this tactic to create additional apprehension and tension among Western publics, particularly within NATO. The Soviets may hope thus to bring pressure on the United States for "new initiatives" to entice the Soviets back to separate INF and START negotiations or some form of merged negotiations.

(S)

(S) When the Soviets elect to return for round six (as I believe they will), it is unclear how they will have changed their START position to take U.S. INF deployments into account. Among

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Other approaches, the Soviets might: raise their proposed limit of 1800 SNDVs; insist on counting Pershing II and GLCM as U.S. "strategic" systems (because they can strike Soviet territory) while omitting SS-20s as "nonstrategic" (because they cannot strike U.S. territory); or combine the two negotiations, bringing in the SS-20s, British and French systems, and "FBS" aircraft.

~~(S)~~ The U.S. government should begin to consider how it would handle public and Allied relations in the face of the above or other possible Soviet moves. We would not want to be caught unprepared, for example, should the Soviets unilaterally inject their version of INF issues into START just as a major campaign arose in some NATO circles to merge START and INF. In such circumstances, the possibilities for Soviet divisive tactics and other mischief in Europe would be rife.

~~(S)~~ Until we have a clearer idea of the future Soviet approach, however, we should make no major changes to our START position. In the present context, we should not expect that any U.S. initiatives short of adopting the Soviet START framework would significantly speed the process. Indeed, if the Soviets do intend to roll INF into START in some fashion, major changes by us could complicate matters even further.

~~(S)~~ Two fundamental issues still separate the U.S. and Soviet positions: whether to limit all strategic delivery vehicles and their weapons under aggregate ceilings, and whether to make significant reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight. These two questions are at the heart of what are essentially incompatible U.S. and Soviet negotiating frameworks. Until these questions are resolved, a START agreement appears highly remote.

Michael H. Mobbs

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 02 2018

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 12 Apr 2018 Authority: EO 13526 + S USC 3552
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 18 -M-0695