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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

In reply refer to  
I-24495782  
18 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)  
The Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(International Security Policy) *R.P.*

AUG 20 1982

SUBJECT: START End-of-Round Report (Round One)

SECRET -- Entire Text

The opening round of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) ended in Geneva on August 12, 1982. Our primary objective during this round was to set forth the U.S. position as outlined by President Reagan on May 9 in Eureka. The Soviets also tabled a proposal which was essentially a reformulation of SALT II, with certain alterations and omissions unfavorable to the United States.

U.S. Position

The U.S. delegation explained the principal objectives of our position: stability, equality, substantial reductions and effective verification. We argued that the current instability results primarily from the Soviet deployment of numerous, highly accurate and powerful ICBMs capable of a disarming first strike against U.S. ICBMs. We made clear that we seek equality in the most significant measures of strategic capability (deployed ballistic missiles, their warheads, ballistic missile throw-weight) and not necessarily identical force structures. We rejected the Soviet concept of "equality and equal security" as a basis for agreement, because it is merely a formula to justify an alleged Soviet right to strategic capabilities greater than ours.

The U.S. delegation proposed a phased approach that would give first priority to the most destabilizing strategic systems, ballistic missiles. For the first phase we proposed to reduce each country's deployed ballistic missiles to 850 and each country's ballistic missile warheads to 5000, no more than half of which could be on ICBMs. We also proposed certain other constraints on ballistic missiles in order to assure a significant reduction of throw-weight in the first phase. In response to Soviet proposals to constrain heavy bombers, we stated that the United States would be prepared to accept equal levels of heavy bombers in the first phase,

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provided that the Backfire is included and that the Soviet Union accepts substantial reductions in ballistic missiles and their warheads during the first phase. For the second phase we proposed additional and direct reductions of ballistic missile throw-weight to equal levels below the current U.S. level. We also proposed to consider reductions and other constraints on slow-flying systems in the second phase.

Soviet Proposal

Early in the round the Soviets tabled a succession of proposals, the key features of which were:

-- a freeze on the numbers and modernization of strategic arms, which we rejected;

-- a phased reduction in the aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers to 1800 by the year 1990, conditioned on no increase in U.S. "forward based systems," including those in Europe;

-- a ban on all cruise missiles and air-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges over 600 km;

-- a reduction in the aggregate number of nuclear weapons (ballistic and cruise missile warheads and all weapons on heavy bombers) to a level which the Soviets refused to specify pending "resolution" of the cruise missile issue;

-- stringent restrictions on modernization, particularly of sea-based systems, which would permit most Soviet programs to proceed but would bar most of ours, including the MX and D-5 missiles, and sharply curtail others such as the Trident submarine (see Tab A);

-- a series of "confidence-building" measures, most of which seem primarily designed to restrict U.S. military operations (e.g., establishment of submarine sanctuaries, limitations on the operating areas of aircraft carriers and heavy bombers, advance notification of the "mass takeoff" of heavy bombers and "FBS" aircraft).

The Soviets argued that mobile ICBMs would enhance force survivability and thus promote stability.

The Soviets did not demand compensation for British and French forces in START. They did, however, suggest that they would seek compensation for Chinese nuclear forces in the event of "substantial development" of China's nuclear arms, "especially if this takes place when relations which could virtually

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Date: APR 20 2018

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3

be called those of allies are evolving between the U.S. and China." We replied that we would neither include nor compensate for third-country forces in START.

The table at Tab B compares the Soviet proposal with both the U.S. position and SALT II.

#### Soviet Attitude

The Soviet attitude in the first round was serious and frank. The Soviets came prepared to address substantive issues from the outset. The delegations turned to rather specific and detailed discussions somewhat earlier than might have been expected. The Soviet delegation generally did not engage in polemics and, on the whole, the round was marked by a sense of intensity.

On the other hand, the Soviets unquestionably need to appear serious in this negotiation for reasons of political expediency apart from whatever intentions they may have to work seriously toward an agreement. This need has informed the manner in which they are approaching the negotiation. By advancing concrete and far from frivolous proposals early in the talks, the Soviets may be attempting to put themselves in a strong position for the propaganda war that will erupt when and if the Soviets go public with their proposals.

While entertaining serious discussion in general, the Soviet delegation notably failed to address several key elements of the U.S. position on their merits. For example, the Soviets declined any genuine discussion of the obvious differences between ballistic missiles and heavy bombers in terms of their implications for strategic stability. The Soviets repeatedly mischaracterized elements of the U.S. proposal, for instance by erroneously alleging that we exclude heavy bombers. They ignored our extensive rationale for giving higher priority to more destabilizing systems, particularly ICBMs, and asserted that all systems are equally destabilizing. The Soviets employed contrived assumptions (for example, that their present number of SLBM warheads will not increase) in order to assert that the U.S. proposal would put them at a permanent disadvantage. They made no serious attempt to explore potential areas of similarity between the respective proposals, despite some effort by our delegation to do so.

The Soviets seemed to betray an attitude that the U.S. proposal is not tenable and will soon be modified. While the Soviets stopped short of formally rejecting our proposal, they expressly stated in plenary that the U.S. position as now formulated "cannot serve as a basis for a mutually acceptable accord," a fact which they "want the U.S. side to

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4

understand ... most definitely." The Soviets showed no flexibility on the fundamental issues that divide us and conveyed no impression that the Soviet Union at present is prepared to reciprocate significant concessions by the United States.

Assessment

The Soviet proposal cannot serve as the basis for an acceptable agreement, and we have so informed the Soviet delegation. The differences between us are serious and fundamental. The Soviet proposal fails to recognize (1) the destabilizing nature of ICBMs, (2) the distinction between fast-flying and slow-flying systems, (3) the importance of ballistic missile throw-weight as a measure of strategic capability, and (4) the current imbalance in destructive capabilities. Although the Soviet delegation frequently referred to a Soviet willingness to accept "radical" reductions, the Soviet proposal calls for reductions of only 20 percent from the high aggregate level of SALT II (2250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles). By failing to use proper units of account, the Soviet reductions would not have a major impact on the destructive capabilities of strategic forces.

While there are indications of narrow common ground, they are tentative and few. The Soviets, as we, are prepared to accept equality in the units of account they have proposed. But their principal units of account (launchers and bombers) would merely perpetuate the purely arithmetic equality of the SALT II Treaty without correcting the inequalities in strategic capability which it permitted.

The Soviets, as we, have proposed to effect reductions in agreed stages. But the parties differ greatly on what is to be reduced. The Soviets wish to concentrate on missile launchers and heavy bombers within the SALT II framework. We propose to concentrate on deployed ballistic missiles, their warheads and ballistic missile throw-weight.

The Soviets have shown some willingness to consider an exchange of data on strategic forces in aid of verification, as we have proposed. Whether the Soviets have in mind the extensive and detailed exchange of data that we envision, or merely the limited data which the parties exchanged under SALT II, remains to be seen.

By proposing to reduce the aggregate number of nuclear weapons the Soviets have implicitly conceded that launcher limits alone are insufficient, as we have argued. The difficulty, of course, is that the Soviet weapon limit applies to much more than ballistic missile warheads. It also encompasses cruise missile warheads and all bomber weapons -- subjects which we have thus far insisted should be deferred until the second phase of START.

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5

The Soviets have expressly recognized that survivability of strategic systems can enhance stability, as we have argued, whereas in previous negotiations they insisted that the concept of survivability was inconsistent with the objective of limiting nuclear arms. Thus far, however, they have restricted their discussion to the point that mobility would enhance the survivability of land-based ballistic missiles. Given the uncertainty that the United States would deploy a mobile ICBM system and evidence that the Soviets have begun to develop such a system, it is too early to judge whether this "advance" in Soviet strategic thinking is positive or negative from our viewpoint.

A likely reason for the Soviet willingness to discuss survivability, as well as their injection of mobility into the discussion, is their concern over U.S. strategic modernization programs. This concern was clearly evident during the first round. The Soviets are fully aware that if our cruise missile, MX and D-5 programs proceed unimpeded, Soviet land-based forces will eventually be in a position of vulnerability analogous to that in which the Soviet Union has already placed U.S. ICBMs. Our modernization programs thus provide some of our strongest negotiating leverage.

The Soviets vigorously attacked one of the weaker elements of our position, i.e., phasing. They accused us of seeking to discuss only the arms of greater concern to the United States (Soviet ballistic missiles, particularly ICBMs) while attempting to defer until the indefinite future any serious discussion of those arms allegedly of greater concern to the Soviet Union (heavy bombers and cruise missiles). The Soviets posed a number of questions in an effort to determine precisely what we mean by phasing: What is the relationship between the two phases? Do we mean two phases of reductions or two phases of a single negotiation? Do we mean two separate negotiations? How long will each phase last? What will delineate the end of one phase and the beginning of another? Do we foresee a separate agreement for each phase? Must the first phase of reductions (or negotiations) be completed before the second phase begins?

Our current instructions on these questions are sparse because the concept of phasing in our present position is indeed ill defined. The concept does not reflect a well considered negotiating strategy but is rather the outgrowth of a State Department attempt to avoid early negotiation of the throw-weight issue. There is some sentiment, particularly within the U.S. delegation, that the concept of phasing should be reexamined and more clearly defined, if retained at all.

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TAB A

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START Round One - Effect of Soviet Proposals

U.S. Systems Blocked

1. Dense Pack basing for MX
2. Aircraft basing for MX
3. Ohio-class SSBN (above four to six units)
4. New SLBMs for Ohio-class including D-5
5. All ALCMs
6. SLCM carriers in naval sanctuaries

Soviet Systems Allowed

1. New models of all existing ICBMs including heavy ala SALT II
2. One new type ICBM ala SALT II
3. Mobile ICBM basing
4. Continued deployment of D-III class SSBN
5. New heavy bomber

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START Round One -- Summary of Positions

18 Aug 82

Position	US	USSR	SALT II
ASBMs (over 600 km) Banned	No	Yes	No
Backfire Counted	Yes	No	No
Ballistic Missile Limit	Yes	No	No
Confidence Building Measures	?	Yes	Some
Cruise Missiles (over 600 km) Banned	No	Yes	No
Data Exchange	Yes	Some	Some
Encryption of Any Flight Test Data Banned	Yes	No	No
"FBS" Increase Banned	No	Yes	No
Fixed ICBM Launchers, Increase or Relocation Banned	No	Yes	Yes
Fractionation Limits	Yes	Yes	Yes
Heavy Bomber Limit	Yes	OnlyWith- in SNDV Aggregate	OnlyWith- in SNDV Aggregate
Heavy Bomber Weapons Limit	Not in 1stPhase	Yes	ALCM Only
Heavy Missile Sublimit (1st Phase)	Yes	No	No
Heavy Missiles (All) Banned (2d Phase)	Yes	No	No
Heavy Missiles (New Types) Banned (1st Phase)	Yes	?	Yes
MARVs Banned	No	Yes	No
Medium Missile Sublimit	Yes	No	No
Mobile ICBMs Permitted	?	Yes	Yes
New Type ICBM Limited to One	No	Yes	Yes
Nuclear "Charges" Aggregate (Ballistic Missile Warheads, Cruise Missile Warheads, Bomber Weapons)	No	Yes	No
Nuclear Freeze	No	Yes	No
Ohio/Typhoon, Ban New Missile Types On	No	Yes	No
Ohio/Typhoon, Limit to 16 Tubes	No	Yes	No
Ohio/Typhoon SSBNs, Limit at 4-6	No	Yes	No
Silo Volume (ICBM), Increase Limited	No	Yes	Yes
SNDV Aggregate Limit (ICBM and SLBM Launchers, Heavy Bombers)	No	Yes	Yes
Throw-Weight Aggregate Limit	Yes	No	No
200 kg RV Wt. Limit on New Missile Types	Yes	No	No
Undersea "Creepy Crawlers" and Earth Orbiting Weapons Banned	?	Yes	Yes
Warhead Aggregate Limit (Ballistic Missiles)	Yes	No	No
Weapons Aggregate Limit (Ballistic and Cruise Missile Warheads, Bomber	No	Yes	No

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