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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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9 December 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *FI* 15 DEC 1982
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY *RP* 15 DEC 1982

SUBJECT: START End-of-Round Report (Round Two) (U)

1. (U) Recently we concluded the second round of the START negotiations. Following is a summary of the key points that emerged during this round.

- (S) The U.S. objectives were:
 - (S) To elaborate and promote U.S. positions and rationale for the U.S. approach to START;
 - (S) To seek further details and clarification of the Soviet proposal.
- (S) We emphasized stability through substantial reductions of ballistic missiles and warheads and continued to press for significant reductions of ballistic missile throw-weight in the first phase.
- (S) We tabled confidence building measures initiated by the President.
- (S) The Soviets did not provide any significant new details or make any changes to their position.
- (S) The Soviets continued to condition their proposed reduction to 1800 ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers on no increase in U.S. "forward based systems," thereby attempting in START to block our planned INF deployments.
- (S) The Soviets refused to accept our position that ICBMs are more destabilizing than other strategic systems, contending that all strategic systems are equal in their effect on the strategic relationship.

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- (S) The Soviets continued to urge a ban on all long-range cruise missiles, although informal conversations suggested potential Soviet willingness to permit ALCMs.
- (S) The Soviets did not reject throw-weight as a unit of account and informally revealed some willingness to address U.S. concerns on throw-weight, if heavy bomber "throw-weight" is taken into account.
- (S) The Soviets contended that the SALT II constraints on rapid reload imposed sufficient limitations on ICBM force reconstitution.
- (S) The Soviets argued not only that "effective" verification can be accomplished by national technical means (NTM), but also that any agreement should deliberately be crafted so as to be verifiable by NTM alone.
- (S) The Soviets alleged that deployment of the M-X in CSB would violate SALT prohibitions against additional "silos."
- (S) In preparation for round three, the U.S. delegation proposed to Washington that all U.S. objectives of the first and second phases of START be discussed in the next round, including direct limits on throw-weight as quids for constraints on slow-flying systems.

2. (U) Attached is my End-of-Round Report which discusses the above points in greater detail.



Michael H. Mobbs
Representative of the
Secretary of Defense to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Attachment
a/s

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
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Secretary of Defense Representative to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
End-of-Round Report (Round Two)
6 October - 2 December 1982

(S) The second round of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) ended in Geneva on December 2, 1982. Our primary objectives during this round were to lay out additional elements of the U.S. position, to elaborate further the rationale for our approach to START, and to seek clarification of the Soviet position. The Soviet delegation, in contrast, did very little beyond repeating the Soviet position from round one and severely criticising the U.S. position. The third round of START is scheduled to begin on February 2, 1983.

U.S. Position

(S) The U.S. delegation continued to emphasize that a central objective of our proposal is to enhance stability, particularly in times of crisis, and thereby lessen the risk of nuclear war. We articulated in detail why ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs, are more destabilizing than other strategic systems. We also demonstrated that the massive Soviet buildup in the size and destructive capability of its strategic forces during the past decade invalidates any assertion that either a stable strategic balance or strategic parity now exists. We challenged the Soviets to exchange data on current strategic systems in order to establish an objective and factual basis for discussion of the current strategic relationship.

(S) The U.S. delegation continued to insist that reductions in ballistic missiles, particularly ICBMs, and their warheads must have the highest priority in order to correct the current imbalance and to promote strategic stability. We likewise continued to press for significant reductions of ballistic missile throw-weight in the first phase of START, followed in the second phase by direct and equal limits on throw-weight at a level below the current U.S. level. We also advanced additional elements of the U.S. position, including in particular definitions and counting rules, constraints on ICBM force reconstitution, and an illustrative schedule for achieving the substantial reductions we have proposed.

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(S) In addition, the U.S. delegation proposed a series of confidence building measures (CBMs) based on the President's public initiatives. Specifically, we proposed advance notification of all ballistic missile test launches, for both ICBMs and SLBMs; advance notification of major military exercises; and an expanded exchange of data on strategic forces. We proposed to seek a prompt, separate bilateral agreement on the notification of ballistic missile launches and major military exercises.

(S) In order to facilitate progress on CBMs and in the START negotiation generally, we proposed to establish working groups in round three on CBMs, definitions, and the exchange of data on strategic forces.

Soviet Position

(S) The Soviet delegation did not formally present any significant new elements or make any changes to their position from round one. Instead, they repackaged their first-round proposals in the form of a "Document on Basic Principles" which they proposed should be adopted as a framework for the negotiation. The only new point introduced by the Soviets was their view that an agreement should have a duration of ten years.

A. Soviet Reductions and INF Linkage

(S) The Soviets continued to refuse to specify the number of nuclear weapons that would be permitted on the 1800 ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers (SNDVs) contemplated under their proposal. As in round one they continued to condition their proposed reduction to 1800 SNDVs on no increase in so-called U.S. "forward based systems." In other words, the Soviets would not reduce even to the modest level of 1800 SNDVs if the United States deployed the Pershing II and GLCM in Europe. Thus the Soviets continued to demand U.S. capitulation in INF as the price for progress in START.

B. Destabilizing Systems

(S) The Soviet delegation claimed that our emphasis on reductions in ICBMs is a guise for seeking military superiority over the Soviet Union. They rejected our position that ballistic missiles, and ICBMs in particular, are more destabilizing than other strategic systems and argued that all strategic systems are equally destabilizing. As a corollary to this rather tenuous argument, the Soviets contended that all strategic arms are equal in their effect on the strategic relationship -- a notion which is contradicted even by Soviet positions in previous negotiations. As "proof" of these arguments, the Soviets continued to assert that all U.S. weapon systems are being given a so-called "first strike, counter-force" capability, including in particular cruise missiles.

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C. Cruise Missiles

(S) The Soviet delegation argued that the U.S. START proposal, rather than leading to real reductions, would in fact allow a substantial increase in the number of nuclear weapons by leaving cruise missiles totally unconstrained. Formally, the Soviets continued to urge a ban on long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes as the "best solution." Informally, some members of the Soviet delegation conveyed greater flexibility on cruise missiles (especially ALCMS) by observing that the issue was "of such importance" that the Soviet Union would be prepared to consider any U.S. proposal on cruise missiles, so long as they were not permitted "to run free" (see START I-M-055).

D. Throw-weight

(S) The Soviet delegation continued to assert that the introduction of ballistic missile throw-weight as a unit of account would serve no useful purpose whatsoever. They did not, however, formally reject throw-weight as a unit of account. Informally, several Soviet delegates displayed a tentative willingness to address U.S. concerns on ballistic missile throw-weight, provided that heavy bomber "throw-weight" was somehow taken into account and that the United States desisted from its alleged effort to "break the backbone" of Soviet strategic forces (i.e., to eliminate heavy ICBMs). For example, some Soviets stated that the Soviet proposal contemplates reductions in heavy ballistic missiles and that some treatment of throw-weight per se "is not excluded," although throw-weight should be treated "within the framework of SALT II" (see START II-M-068, II-M-71). Other Soviets referred to possibilities of sublimits on land-based ballistic missiles, priority reductions of specific Soviet missiles, and a compromise whereby the Soviets might relax their demand to ban long-range ALCMs in exchange for some relaxation of our throw-weight demands (see START II-M-089.)

E. Force Reconstitution

(S) The Soviet delegation claimed that the U.S. proposals to constrain non-deployed missiles available for force reconstitution were not needed and would pose difficult verification problems. The Soviets agreed with us that one aspect of force reconstitution, i.e., "rapid reload" of ICBM launchers, should be banned. They proposed, however, merely to carry forward certain vague and largely ineffectual SALT II constraints on rapid reload. In addition, the Soviets narrowly construed the term "rapid" to mean a couple of hours or so after a preceding salvo rather than a period of up to twenty-four hours, which is the U.S. understanding of the term "rapid."

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F. Data Exchange

(S) The Soviet delegation rejected our proposal to exchange data on current strategic forces, saying that such an exchange would be premature so long as there was disagreement on the parameters to be limited by a new agreement.

G. Verification

(S) The Soviets paid lip service to the need for effective verification, as we have emphasized. They made clear, however, that in their view "effective" verification may be accomplished by national technical means (NTM) alone, possibly with some exchange of information to enhance the effectiveness of NTM. Indeed, the Soviets seemed to harden their position somewhat by arguing in this round that the terms of an agreement should deliberately be crafted so as to be verifiable by NTM. They also continued to argue that a ban on encryption of flight test data was unnecessary. On its face, therefore, the Soviet approach would exclude a priori any consideration of constraints that may require verification measures beyond NTM, and would then severely restrict the effectiveness of NTM itself.

H. Confidence Building Measures

(S) The Soviets reiterated the "CBMs" which they proposed during round one, i.e., advance notification of certain ICBM (but not SLBM) launches, establishment of submarine sanctuaries, limitations on the operating areas of aircraft carriers and heavy bombers, and advance notification of the "mass takeoff" of heavy bombers and "FBS" aircraft. We urged the Soviets instead to accept our proposal for advance notice of all ballistic missile test launches, whether ICBM or SLBM and whether within or beyond national boundaries. We informed the Soviets that their remaining "CBM" proposals were unacceptable.

I. M-X and U.S. Strategic Modernization

(S) Misquoting SALT I and II, the Soviet delegation alleged that deployment of the M-X in closely spaced basing would violate the SALT prohibition against additional ICBM "silos." We refuted this allegation, pointing out that the relevant SALT provision would have barred the construction of additional "fixed ICBM launchers," not "silos," and that the M-X launcher will not be "fixed."*

*When members of our delegation briefed the North Atlantic Council in Brussels at the end of round two, we encountered skepticism over our distinction between "launchers" and "silos," as well as concern that Allied publics may perceive the M-X basing decision as inconsistent with SALT II. Allied representatives professed fear that adverse public reaction to M-X would have negative implications for NATO objectives (i.e., INF deployments).

(S) A number of Soviet questions identified several aspects of our own START proposal that could prove disadvantageous as applied to the M-X system. For example, since the M-X canister is the missile launcher, under certain counting rules we previously tabled in Geneva any M-X missiles in canisters generally would count as deployed missiles, even if the canisters were in reserve or in storage. Conversely, even an empty canister generally would be assumed to contain a deployed M-X under our proposed counting rules.* Potential issues such as these emphasize the importance of assuring that our START positions fully conform to our M-X requirements.


Preparation for Round Three

(S) The U.S. delegation has proposed to Washington that the United States be in a position by round three to discuss all our objectives of the first and second phases of START comprehensively, including direct limits on ballistic missile throw-weight and further constraints on slow-flying systems. Such an approach would be conditioned on Soviet willingness to address all second phase issues (including direct limits on throw-weight) and not merely those of special interest to them (such as cruise missiles). The delegation transmitted to Washington a draft "Basic Elements of a START Agreement" (START II-031) that could be tabled in round three if appropriate.

(S) The delegation has recommended that under this approach direct limits on throw-weight and a ban on heavy missiles, as we have proposed, would be guides for any constraints on cruise missiles to which the United States might agree. By thus capitalizing on the intense Soviet interest in constraining cruise missiles, we could increase our negotiating leverage on throw-weight.

(S) Finally, we must keep our strategic modernization programs intact. The Soviets will closely monitor the current Congressional debate on the M-X for any developments that would undercut our negotiating position or suggest a lack of U.S. resolve. By keeping the M-X and other programs on track we will provide the Soviets a strong incentive to accept substantial reductions of strategic forces to equal levels as we have proposed in START.

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*Test and training launchers would not be assumed to contain deployed missiles.