

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

#17



DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 20 2018

November 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As I said I would do when we talked tonight, I am summarizing here the reasons why I feel so strongly that we should not make another move on the INF negotiations before November 15, or other date, under some vague threat that the Soviets may walk out of the talks:

(1) We have moved several times from the zero option, each time presumably somewhat closer to what the Soviets want, and their only response has been to insist on maintaining their monopoly, to insist on counting French and British systems, and to continue to treat SS-20s deployed east of the Urals as being totally separate from the European negotiations, a position not only highly damaging and threatening to China, Japan and Korea, but also equally dangerous to Europe because the mobility of the SS-20s permits them to be moved back and forth. It is that mobility, as you have repeatedly said, that requires that any agreement must cover all SS-20s, no matter where they are temporarily located.

Nato 4/9/61

(2) We are in a strong position now, here and in Europe, and if the Soviets choose to walk out on the basis of the latest Andropov proposal (which is nothing more or less than a repeat of their previous refusals to consider anything less than maintenance of their monopoly, and insistence on counting French and British systems), that will not weaken us in the so-called public opinion battle. Deployment, except for warheads, is now underway with regular shipments going to England, Germany and Italy, and while there are debates still scheduled in Germany and possibly Italy, we are assured by the governments of both countries that deployment will proceed.

(3) Indeed, the only thing that could block deployment would be a new proposal from us which would be seized upon as an excuse for delaying deployment while any new offer from us was considered.

(4) The NATO Defense Ministers with whom I met in Ottawa last week found nothing new in the Andropov proposal, and reiterated their commitment to deployment.

(5) The continued suggestion that we either consider putting on the table another offer, or make more moves toward the Soviet position to secure "agreement" at any price, simply keeps alive in the minds of the Soviets and our Allies the possibility that deployment can be blocked without an agreement of the kind you have always quite properly insisted upon.

7 Nov 83

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

18-M-0677

X27926

See Def Cent No.

330-85-0023, 1x 20, ↑ (Nov-Dec)

(6) If the Soviets should walk out, it would hurt only them. We have been more than forthcoming. //

I am taking this unusual step of writing separately to you in advance of seeing the actual paper because you will be beginning your trip tomorrow, and I think it is extremely important that we not make another offer or move in these negotiations simply because some fear the Soviets might walk out and that their walk-out may hurt us. I have also talked with Jack Vessey a short time ago, and my understanding is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully agree with this position.

Sign

cc: Bud MacFarlane

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 20 2018

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 20 APR 2018 Authority: EO 13526 + SUSC 2552
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 18 -M- 0011