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OFFICE OF
THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

September 2, 1981

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Frank,

Attached is the memo to the President that was agreed upon at this morning's Haig/Weinberger breakfast. Our thinking now is that Jim Buckley would carry the President's letter to Zia immediately, probably leaving this Friday.

Accordingly, I would appreciate your cooperation in getting Cap's sign-off so that we can go to the President with it and get a response that meets the Friday night deadline.

Thanks,

Attachment:

As stated.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 22 AUG 2018 Authority: EO 13526+5042

Declassify: X Deny in Full: §552

Declassify in Part: _____

Reason: _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Date: AUG 22 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Casper W. Weinberger

Subject: Accelerated Delivery of F-16s for Pakistan

Pakistan is a critical strategic asset near the Persian Gulf. Its location, close relations with China and Saudi Arabia, and staunch opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are key elements of our Southwest Asian security strategy. Iran's continuing deterioration only increases Pakistan's importance. While the Pakistanis do not want attention drawn to this subject, they also play a crucial role in facilitating support for the Afghan freedom fighters. Moreover, our security relationship with Pakistan dates back to President Eisenhower's 1959 Agreement to consult immediately in the event of direct or indirect Soviet aggression.

You decided in March to strengthen our relationship both to demonstrate our commitment to Pakistan's security and to deter new Soviet adventurism in Southwest Asia. We offered to provide \$3 billion in assistance over five years and to sell equipment in the near-term before US credits become available. We also offered F-16 aircraft with initial delivery starting in 1984.

Although the Pakistanis have favorably received our overall offer, they have hesitated to conclude a final agreement on a new security relationship because we have been unwilling to offer F-16 deliveries earlier than January 1984. President Zia views early F-16s as essential to deter Soviet pressure to cease opposition to the occupation of Afghanistan and to ensure domestic political support for a new US relationship. He is also sensitive to what he views as the inconstancy of earlier US foreign policy commitments.

On August 21 Foreign Minister Agha Shahi personally delivered a letter from President Zia to you (at Tab 1). In it, Zia expresses "acute embarrassment" at being without a near-

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Date: AUG 22 2010

- 2 -

term sign of significant US support, i.e., early F-16 deliveries. He strongly urges your personal intervention to provide "as many aircraft as possible" before October 1982.

As we are already providing US-produced F-16s to Israel and Egypt and because the USAF has a critical need for our remaining F-16 production, we were reluctant to put forward US aircraft to improve our earlier offer. As a result of Zia's letter, we have asked our European F-16 partners for assistance, and they have agreed to divert six of their F-16 production to Pakistan.

In responding to Zia's request, we suggest offering Pakistan the six European F-16s by October 1982 and then assuming the previously proposed delivery schedule. As spares are short in the USAF and because we are uncertain as yet whether the Europeans will be able to assist in this regard, we would offer only limited spares with the first six aircraft. Admittedly, this would not provide much initial military capability, but it is our considered judgment that this gesture has a good chance of satisfying Zia's political problem and allowing us to proceed with the planned, significant military sales and assistance program.

In conjunction with our early F-16s offer, we would note to Zia that our entire relationship is at a critical stage. The provision of security and economic assistance and F-16 aircraft hinge upon Congressional action. Pakistan's nuclear program and, in particular, indications to the IAEA of irregularities which may have permitted the diversion of nuclear materials are of serious concern and threaten our efforts to build a Congressional and national consensus. Specifically, we wish to tell Zia that his government's cooperation with the IAEA is essential to dispel doubts regarding Pakistan's nuclear intentions. By providing an enhanced F-16 offer at the same time we seek his cooperation on nuclear safeguards, we should strengthen the appeal of our request.

In addition, to engage Zia directly on both the F-16 and the nuclear issues, we propose that Under Secretary of State James Buckley personally deliver your letter. As he has previously established a personal rapport with Zia, we believe that employing him as your personal emissary to discuss further the issues contained in the letter will lend special importance to its impact.

Given the instability in Southwest Asia, a goal the USSR is actively promoting, we need a solid relationship with Pakistan. Egypt, China, and Saudi Arabia have told us how important they

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- 3 -

think our aid to Pakistan is. The renewed relationship with Pakistan is a major foreign policy initiative of your Administration. We must not allow it to fail.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Zia (at Tab 2) indicating our offer of six F-16s by October 1982 and reminding him that cooperation on nuclear matters is critical to our security relationship.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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Draft Reagan-Zia Letter

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Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciate your bringing directly to my attention your concerns about the political implications of the delivery schedule of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. Jeane Kirkpatrick has also reported to me on her full discussion of this matter with you in Islamabad. I have asked Under Secretary Buckley to serve as my special emissary to continue the discussion with you.

I entirely share your satisfaction with our agreement to embark on a new relationship and with the effective dialogue we have conducted during the past seven months toward that end. We have already come very far in fashioning a relationship which substantially enhances the security interests of both our peoples. We must not now falter, but rather should forge ahead in order to consolidate this new beginning. This requires a sympathetic understanding on both our parts of the need to assure solid domestic political support in Pakistan and the United States for the close partnership we seek.

I am very pleased to inform you that we can satisfy your request for deliveries of F-16 aircraft to begin before October 1982. We will be able to provide six aircraft before that date accompanied by an austere package of spare parts and ground support equipment. Delivery of the remaining aircraft will be

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Date: AUG 22 2018

- 2 -

according to the schedule earlier offered to your military team.

I am sure you can appreciate the political and logistical difficulties which this decision has entailed, but I believe we have worked out an arrangement which will meet your basic requirements and ours.

I would hope that our new F-16 offer will provide a capstone to our new relationship and that we can quickly agree on the military equipment items you wish to purchase. If we are to deter any new Soviet adventurism directed at Pakistan, you will need our equipment and the demonstrated security relationship which it carries. I am convinced that our growing partnership can promote a sense of calm and stability in the region in the face of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and chaos in Iran.

I want also to take this opportunity to call to your attention a matter which could completely undo this arrangement and undermine all our efforts to strengthen Pakistan's security. I am referring to the difficulties encountered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in applying what they consider to be adequate safeguards on your nuclear facilities.

My Administration has approached the ^{global} nuclear proliferation problem from the premise that effective security arrangements offer an incentive to non-nuclear weapons states to avoid nuclear explosives programs. This premise will be an

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 22 2018

- 3 -

important element in the justification for the Pakistan assistance program before the Congress. It is clear that this justification will be undermined if the questions raised by the IAEA regarding your nuclear program are not resolved.

As you are aware, this issue may arise at meetings in Vienna this month. We are also concerned by the ability of those unsympathetic to closer US-Pakistani ties to use this issue for their own purposes. However strong you may believe your legal position may be within the IAEA, a less than cooperative stance with the Agency will not meet the urgent need of our two governments to assure that this issue does not disrupt our new bilateral relationship. In my judgment, the security assistance program in the Congress risks failure unless the safeguards issue is amicably resolved between the IAEA and Pakistan.

I want you to understand fully the serious implications which I believe your government's response to the IAEA will have. Jim Buckley's presence in Islamabad will provide an opportunity for a frank dialogue with you and your experts on how this problem might be effectively resolved in a manner which meets both our vital needs.

Let me close by saying that I view our new relationship as the key element in deterring Soviet aggression against Pakistan and maintaining security in Southwest Asia and globally. It is thus essential that we both ensure that we move quickly

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- 4 -

to complete this phase of our evolving relationship and push on with your military modernization program. In this way, we can demonstrate to friend and potential foe alike the vitality of our new relationship.

Finally, Mr. President, I want you to know that cementing the best possible relationship between our two countries is one of the highest priorities of my Administration.

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