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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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Date: SEP 06 2018

1 2 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Collateral Damage Restraint (U)

(U) I appreciate your informative memorandum * addressing my recent questions on nuclear planning, and look forward to receiving the follow-on material your staff is preparing.

(S) You asked for my interpretation of Presidential guidance on the issue of urban restraint -- whether this refers to Soviet fatalities or Soviet urban industrial damage.

(S) The general proscription against targeting civilian population per se, which results in guidance not to target deliberately residential areas, is intended primarily to cause our nuclear war-plans to conform with Western morality. While we may hope that the Soviets would also refrain from targeting civilians, we are not holding Russians at risk of later destruction to gain Soviet reciprocity. Avoidance of unnecessary civilian casualties, where appropriate, is thus a U.S. goal [redacted] Directly targeting civilians is correctly interpreted as a targeting prohibition [redacted]

(S) With regard to the purpose for exercising restraint in targeting otherwise permissible urban areas, this is clearly for escalation control: the desire to reduce the probability that the Soviets would perceive specific attack options as city attacks in the hope that mutual restraint could be exercised. NSDD 13 clearly expresses such a desire to provide "incentive to seek conflict termination short of an all-out attack on our cities and economic assets". The urban restraint criteria [redacted] must therefore leave Soviet urban assets at risk, both to generate reciprocity and to provide incentive for war termination short of urban attacks. [redacted]

b. (S) [redacted] to influence Soviet actions, the restraint must be recognizable by the Soviets. Otherwise, the U.S. would be preserving Soviet installations with no possible reciprocity. Unrecognizable restraint would neither

* Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, 21 October 1985, Subject: SIOP 6C Planning (U)

JS Appeal 3.3(b)(5)
OSD Appeal 3.3(b)(5)

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influence the Soviets to refrain from urban attacks nor terminate the war, and would represent only a unilateral degradation to the effectiveness of the U.S. attack. [redacted] studies have independently confirmed the concern that current U.S. urban restraint would be unrecognized. A new criterion is required for this reason alone.

(S) The criteria proposed in recent DNA studies -- which our staffs have been reviewing together -- center on [redacted]

[redacted] This approach appears to meet more satisfactorily the escalation control objective [redacted]

[redacted] Since the criterion currently being used is not recognizable as restraint, does not send any politically useful signal, increases the complexity of SIOP planning, and potentially degrades SIOP effectiveness with no compensatory benefit to the U.S., I strongly urge that it be replaced immediately.

James W. King

DIA Appeal Form 5 UK 9592(b)(3); 10 USC 442p
35 Appeal 2.3(b)(5)
OSD Appeal 2.3(b)(5)

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