



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 07 SEP 2018 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. § 552

Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____ Refer to: 1-1566/73

Declassify in Part: _____

Reason: _____

MDR: 18-M-1995

9 FEB 1973

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 07 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (U)

(U) You expressed an interest in the issue of Confidence Building Measures in CSCE. This memorandum highlights the current status of this issue, its relationship to other issues, and our conclusions.

a. Current Status

(U) Italy has tabled an agreed NATO proposal at the Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) in Helsinki outlining certain military measures, aimed at strengthening confidence and stability in Europe, such as:

- prior notification of military movements and exercises
- exchange of observers at maneuvers.

(U) On their part, the Soviets have informally indicated support for the two CBMs suggested by the allies; although the security mandate they tabled did not include specific proposal for CBMs. The German Democratic Republic has tabled a proposal essentially the same as that by NATO.

(U) The two CBMs we propose might provide some warning were the Soviets to apply the "Brezhnev Doctrine" militarily along the lines they pursued in Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, their deterrent value should not be exaggerated when fundamental Soviet interests are at stake.

(U) The US has maintained the firm position that any discussion of military security items beyond these generalized CBMs could prejudice Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) initiatives. France has supported the US view, but most of the other allies and all of the neutrals (except Finland) have come out for some form of MBFR-CSCE linkage.

(U) This linkage could take the form of declarations concerning disarmament, force reductions, or force levels. Adoption of such declarations would have very limited value in deterring the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

Dir, EurReg, OASD/ISA

18-M-1995

9 FEB 1973

20 FEB 1973

SEC DEF CONTR No. 2-0404

02/574

Like the CBMs, they could be counter productive by suggesting a false sense of security. More than that, if a declaration gave CSCE a mandate in the security field, or prejudiced the MBFR negotiations, it could be highly damaging to our interests.

(U) The Soviets have made clear their strong opposition to treating MBFR issues at CSCE, but might yield to pressure for a vague declaration on forces; particularly if they thought their opposition would unduly delay MPT or CSCE progress.

(U) On the other hand, considering the limited participation we seek in the MBFR talks, an innocuous and carefully worded declaration on force levels or reductions might meet the needs and interests of most CSCE participants in this subject area. This approach has been suggested by our negotiating team in Helsinki as a means to (a) prevent the US from becoming isolated on this matter if the Soviets change their position in favor of a declaration; and (b) prevent the US from siding with Soviets against the majority of conferees in the event the USSR continues to oppose a declaration.

b. Relationship to other issues

(U) We are trying to develop other elements of a possible CSCE agenda to refute the doctrine of "limited sovereignty". Specifically we hope that the following agenda proposals will have some effect on the implementation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine":

- Principles governing relations between states
- Economic Cooperation, and
- "Freer Movement."

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:

SEP 07 2018

(U) The allies and Soviets can agree on wording for political security principles such as "refraining from the threat of force, the inviolability of frontiers (paramount in Soviet view), nonintervention in internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, independence and equality." The allies view these phrases as making the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" more difficult to apply. The Soviets, on the other hand, find these same principles in support of their own interests. The Soviets have not yet endorsed other principles suggested by the allies of "sovereign equality of states, respect for territorial integrity, fundamental freedoms, equal rights, and self determination of peoples." The US position is to continue to press for a straightforward non-treaty type statement of principles challenging the Brezhnev Doctrine.

(U) The Soviet interest in maintaining clear limits and careful controls on contacts between citizens of Eastern European governments and those of the West is challenged by other CSCE agenda proposals on which there is general agreement. The Economic Cooperation and Freer Movement topics might contribute to a general loosening of Soviet control, but they would not in themselves directly deter implementation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

(u) The Soviets themselves are proposing a "consultative committee" or pan-European body to follow CSCE. This might serve the West as a hedge against application of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," but the general fear is that Moscow could use this as an institutional means to influence West European affairs and reduce US influence in European security. Thus, the US has opposed "permanent machinery."

c. Conclusions

(u) In light of MBFR negotiations, we do not believe it appropriate to pursue CBMs beyond the two we have already tabled. These, however, can be developed to maximize their utility in deterring the use of military force against "socialist states" under the "Brezhnev Doctrine" or against the West.

(u) Although there are no clear security gains for the US or any of the European states, and any statement may have implications for MBFR negotiations, we will probably be required to accept a declaration on force levels or reductions, in the interests of harmony and cooperation at the CSCE. ISA is now working on contingency wording that is as bland and innocuous as possible.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 07 2018

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
Acting Assistant Secretary

Mr. Secretary — The real forum for moving to limit, in meaningful ways, the Brezhnev Doctrine is probably MBFR. If we can get Soviet acceptance of "collateral constraints" (read confidence building measures) that apply to an area broader than the area of reductions we will have made at least some progress toward helping countries such as Romania. Even if the constraints are limited to the reduction area we will have achieved a substantial ~~absence~~ absence.